Interrogation-RoomRule 603 (Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is unambiguous: "Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness's conscience." The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that similar language does not apply to police officers when they are interrogating a suspect. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Nonetheless, a small number of states have banned police from lying or being deceptive when interrogating minors. New York should follow suit.

The Guide to New York Evidence Article 6: Witnesses & Impeachment, in Subdivision (1), explains: "This rule is derived from Court of Appeals precedent that holds that requiring a witness to take an oath or make an affirmation is a 'traditional safeguard[ ] to truthfulness' (Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 NY 461, 474 [1954]). The requirement of an oath or affirmation, the Court has observed, serves two functions: '(1) to awaken the witness to his moral duty to tell the truth, and (2) to deter false testimony by providing a legal ground for perjury prosecutions' (see Matter of Brown v. Ristich, 36 NY2d 183,189 [1975])." That same logic should apply during a criminal interrogation of a juvenile.

Law enforcement officials commonly use deceptive tactics during interrogations in order to acquire a confession of guilt, or a partial confession of guilt, with the goal that a prosecutor may subsequently use such incriminating statements in a criminal hearing or trial. While judges already have discretion to throw out statements that are elicited by use of coercion or force, a discretionary call by a judge does not always guarantee similar outcomes. Moreover, lying or using intentionally deceptive tactics while interrogating an adult should be considered wholly separate from the application of those deceptive tactics on a child or minor.