This article is in honor and in memory of Angela Susan Scheinberg, to whom I was married on 9/11. Angela was a paradigm of kindness, virtue and integrity. I also honor every American murdered that day.

CPLR 2221(e)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that a motion for leave to renew "shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination." Unlike CPLR 2221(d)(3), which imposes a 30-day time period for leave to reargue to be made before the expiration of the time in which to take an appeal, 2221(e)(2) imposes no time limit. Redeye v. Progressive Ins. Co., 158 A.D.3d 1208, 1209 (4th Dep't 2018).

"After entry of a final judgment, a motion for leave to renew pursuant to CPLR 2221(e)(2) based upon 'a change in the law that would change the prior determination' must be made, absent circumstances set forth in CPLR 5015 [newly discovered evidence, fraud, lack of jurisdiction, etc.], before the time to appeal the final judgment has expired" (Eagle Ins. Co. v. Persaud, 1 A.D.3d 356, 357, quoting CPLR 2221(e)(2); Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Itzkowitz, 47 A.D.3d 923, 923 (2d Dep't 2008)." ). Opalinski v. City of New York, 205 AD3d 917 (2d Dep't 2022); Nash v. Port Authority. of New York and New Jersey, 22 N.Y.3d 220, 224 [2013] ("[Plaintiff's] judgment had become final when the Port Authority failed to appeal within the requisite time period. But the discussion does not end there. Although a court determination from which an appeal has not been taken should 'remain inviolate,' that rule applies [a]bsent the sort of circumstances mentioned in CPLR 5015."); CPLR 5015 is the exclusive expedient.