Twenty-six years ago, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme Court held that, where a police officer has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has been committed, the stop is lawful under the Fourth Amendment even though the underlying reason for a vehicular stop might have been to investigate some other matter, or even if it was predicated on racial profiling. The court rejected any effort to tie the legality of an officer’s conduct to his or her primary motivation or purpose in making the stop, deeming irrelevant whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop.

For the first time in New York, after Whren, an appellate court has held that the exclusionary rule can be applied to a racially motivated traffic stop even where a police officer has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction was committed. In People v. Jones, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op 05892 (3d Dept. 2022), the Appellate Division, Third Department has held that our state Constitution provides broader protection than the federal Constitution, with respect to pretextual traffic stops.

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