The distinction between summary judgment and partial summary judgment is well-known in New York practice. CPLR 3212(b) provides for summary judgment in toto if, "upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party." CPLR 3212(e) provides for partial summary judgment, or "summary judgment…as to one or more causes of action, or part thereof, in favor of any one or more parties, to the extent warranted, on such terms as may be just."

Yet little is known of CPLR 3212(g), "a seldom used procedural device contained within CPLR 3212 that serves alongside its more frequently used legal cousins—the motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment." Launt v. Lopasic, 189 A.D.3d 1740, 1744 (3d Dept. 2020). Professors Siegel and Connors lament, "This is unfortunate because [CPLR 3212(g)] can be versatile." David D. Siegel and Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice, §286, p. 542 (6th ed., Practitioner Treatise Series, 2018).

This is especially true in defending personal-injury actions, where CPLR 3212(g), properly invoked, should permit the court to deem a plaintiff's comparative fault or negligence established at time of trial. Cf. Leathers v. Approved Oil Co. of Brooklyn, 2023 NY Slip Op 00180 (1st Dept. 2023) (awarding defendant "summary judgment on the issue of decedent's negligence" pursuant to CPLR 3212(e)); and Nicholas Hurzeler and James Strauss, Equalize NY Summary Judgment Standards in Tort Cases, Law360.com, April 14, 2022 (arguing for "partial summary judgment on comparative fault" as implication of Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312 (2018) [holding plaintiff need not demonstrate freedom from comparative fault to be awarded partial summary judgment on issue of defendant's liability]).