Foreclosures—Voluntary Discontinuance of Action in 2011 Did Not "Reset The Statute of Limitations"—Loan Documents Did Not Vest Plaintiff With "Right to Unilateral De-Acceleration"—No Violation of the Contracts Clause Since No Contract Provision Was "Substantially Modified By Retroactive Application of FAPA"—No Common-Law Implied Right to Unilateral Revocation Existed Before 'Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel'—Prior to 'Engel,' Court of Appeals Never Addressed Whether Voluntary Discontinuance or Stipulation Which Did Not Discuss De-Acceleration or Readiness To Accept Installment Payments De-Accelerated Indebtedness—Engel Acknowledged Absent Precise Provision in Operative Documents, There Was "No Clear Rule" as to Whether Right Existed—Mortgage Industry "Has Been Subject to Regular and Robust Legislative Regulation" –Statute of Limitations Accrued in 2008 and More Than Six Years Transpired Before Subject Action Commenced –– Motion To Dismiss Granted

A plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage.  The mortgagor allegedly defaulted in paying the loan in December 2007.  A bank commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage on July 25, 2008.  In that action, the plaintiff asserted that it had "elected to declare the entire principal balance due and owing."

On May 4, 2011, the parties stipulated to discontinue the action pursuant to CPLR §3217.  The stipulation provided, inter alia, that the "statute of limitations (SOL) for any claims of plaintiff or defendant against the other is hereby tolled from July 22, 2008, the date of the summons hearing, until June 1, 2013, whether or not they have been previously pled."