In this “back to school” period, we reflect on one of the most important lessons any student of the law can learn: the same terms or phrases may be interpreted differently depending on the specific context in which they are found. As stated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Sentry Ins. Co. v. Amsel, 36 NY2d 291, 294-95 (1975), “The Legislature of course, frequently employs the same words in different statutes with different meaning and effect.” Examples of this proposition abound in several areas of the law.
For example, in Colon v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 48 NY2d 570 (1980), the Court of Appeals held that the word “occupant” should be interpreted differently under the no-fault statute than under the Uninsured Motorist statute in order to conform with the stated purpose of each law. In a case involving a person who had exited his disabled vehicle and was standing on the highway directing oncoming traffic, the Court held that he was not an “occupant” of his own car and, therefore, not excluded from no-fault insurance benefits under the policy of the driver of the vehicle that struck him as “an occupant of another motor vehicle” within the meaning of the no-fault statute.
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