In this dispute between neighbors, we must decide whether the trial court’s judgment issued after a conventional trial on the merits was final for purposes of appeal. We conclude that it was. The Drennons’ grandchildren were joined as parties due to their shared interest in the subject property, but no claims against the grandchildren were addressed at trial nor were any jury questions submitted on the grandchildren. The grandchildren were not mentioned in the trial court’s judgment, and this raised finality concerns in the court of appeals. Under the Aldridge presumption, any judgment following a conventional trial on the merits creates a presumption that the judgment is final for purposes of appeal. See Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897–98 (Tex. 1966). A judgment following a conventional trial on the merits need not dispose of every party and claim for the Aldridge presumption of finality to apply. See id. at 895, 897–98. Accordingly, we conclude that the Aldridge presumption applied in this case, and it was error for the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Millard and Barbara Vaughn and Paul and Mary Drennon had repeated disputes about water drainage off the Vaughns’ property. The Vaughns sued the Drennons for blocking and diverting the natural flow of water off the Vaughn property with a concrete fence, also alleging trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Drennons filed a separate lawsuit against the Vaughns for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the trial court consolidated the two cases.