Dyer v. Cotton

In this trespass-to-try-title suit, Eddie Dyer contends that no legally or factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Dyer had failed to acquire title to the farmland by adverse possession. He further contends that the trial court erred by 1. including a jury instruction requiring Dyer to establish ouster of his other co-tenants to prove adverse possession; 2. allowing evidence of other adverse possession and property dispute suits in which Dyer was involved; and 3.allowing the testimony of a witness whom defendant did not properly disclose during discovery and whose testimony violated the parol evidence rule. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or evidentiary rulings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Houston's 1st Court of Appeals, No. 01-09-00228-CV, 11-18-2010

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OPINION

In this trespass to try title suit, Eddie Dyer sued Ronald Cotton, claiming that, in addition to procuring an undivided 1/7th interest to farmland in Grimes County by conveyance, he also had acquired title to the remaining 6/7th interest by adverse possession. A jury disagreed, finding that Dyer had not adversely possessed the property, and the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment against Dyer. On appeal, Dyer contends that no legally or factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Dyer had failed to acquire title to the farmland by adverse possession. He further contends that the trial court erred by (1) including a jury instruction requiring Dyer to establish ouster of his other co-tenants to prove adverse possession; (2) allowing evidence of other adverse possession and property dispute lawsuits in which Dyer was involved; and (3) allowing the testimony of a witness whom Cotton did not properly disclose during discovery and whose testimony violated the parol evidence rule. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or evidentiary rulings. We therefore affirm.

Dyer v. Cotton

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