The rule that a party opposing summary judgment has no burden of proof until the movant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to such relief is deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence. There has never been any question that it applies to medical malpractice cases. Indeed, the Court of Appeals decision most widely cited for that proposition—Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986)—was a malpractice action.
Somewhere along the way, however, confusion developed regarding the shifting of the burden to plaintiffs on the issue of proximate causation when opposing summary judgment motions by defendants in malpractice actions. The problem developed, seemingly inadvertently, over time. It appears to have derived from the recitation, in various appellate decisions addressing summary judgment motions, of a plaintiff’s burden in proving a cause of action for medical malpractice, i.e., a departure from proper practice and causation.
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