Decided and Entered: November 9, 2006 500531 ________________________________ MARY SHARPE, Appellant, v FRANK MANN, Doing Business as ALTA REALTY, et al., Respondents. ________________________________ Calendar Date: September 7, 2006 Before: Crew III, J.P., Carpinello, Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ. __________ Levene, Gouldin & Thompson, L.L.P., Binghamton (Michael R. Wright of counsel), for appellant. Whiteman, Osterman & Hanna, Albany (William S. Nolan of counsel), for respondents. __________ Carpinello, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.), entered January 23, 2006 in Delaware County, which, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff commenced this action asserting mostly fraud and breach of contract claims against defendants in connection with a contract to construct a log cabin on her Delaware County property. She also asserted one claim alleging defendants’ breach of General Business Law ??? 777-a (the housing merchant implied warranty), which had been expressly incorporated in their contract.1 At issue is an order of Supreme Court dismissing this action and referring the matter to binding arbitration. We agree with Supreme Court’s finding that the claims raised by plaintiff are subject to arbitration. The parties’ contract contained a broad arbitration clause which required all disputes arising thereunder to be settled by arbitration (see e.g. Matter of Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 37 NY2d 91, 95-96 [1975]; Matter of City of Ithaca [Ithaca Paid Fire Fighters Assn., IAFF, Local 737], 29 AD3d 1129, 1131-1132 [2006]; NAMS Intl. v Spectra.Net Communications, 255 AD2d 758, 759-760 [1998]; Matter of International Fid. Ins. Co. [Saratoga Springs Pub. Lib.], 236 AD2d 719, 719-720 [1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 817 [1997]). Moreover, as the contract pertained to the building of a custom home (see n 1, supra), it was governed by General Business Law article 36-A, which itself has no restrictions on arbitration. Plaintiff seeks to avoid application of the broad arbitration clause in the parties’ agreement by arguing that there is a statutory prohibition against arbitration, namely, General Business Law ??? 777-b (4) (h).2 Although General Business Law ??? 777-a was expressly incorporated into the parties’ contract, even though it was otherwise inapplicable (see n 1, supra), there is no corresponding reference to General Business Law ??? 777-b. This being the case, we are unpersuaded that this latter statutory provision trumps the otherwise broad arbitration clause in the contract and permits plaintiff to avoid arbitration. In other words, we are unpersuaded by plaintiff’s contention that the specific reference to General Business Law ??? 777-a in the contract brings into play all of the other provisions of General Business Law article 36-B, including General Business Law ??? 777-b (4) (h). Plaintiff’s remaining contentions, to the extent properly before us, have been considered and rejected. Crew III, J.P., Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
