Brown v. Brown

Brown v. Brown - In the first cause of action asserted in the complaint, plaintiff seeks to set aside a prenuptial agreement entered into between her and decedent, Sherman L. Brown, Sr., prior to their marriage on March 9, 1997. The second cause of action is to set aside a deed, dated Augus.....

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Brown v. Brown – In the first cause of action asserted in the complaint, plaintiff seeks to set aside a prenuptial agreement entered into between her and decedent, Sherman L. Brown, Sr., prior to their marriage on March 9, 1997. The second cause of action is to set aside a deed, dated August 10, 1998, by which decedent transferred certain real property he owned to himself and his three sons, the individual defendants herein, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. By a last will and testament executed on March 1, 1995, decedent had bequeathed his entire estate equally to his three sons. The prenuptial agreement included a provision waiving and releasing plaintiff’s right of election against the will.

Plaintiff’s contention that the prenuptial agreement is not effective because it was not acknowledged in the manner required for the recording of a conveyance of real property (Domestic Relations Law ?§235[B][3]; EPTL 5-1.1-A) is without merit. The certificate of acknowledgment indorsed upon the agreement demonstrates compliance with the requirements of Real Property Law ?§?§292, 298, 303 and 306 for the acknowledgment of a conveyance of real property. Although the subject certificate of acknowledgment is not in the same form as the uniform form of a certificate of acknowledgment set forth in Real Property Law ?§309- a, section 309-a was not enacted until July 8, 1997. (L 1997, ch 179, ?§2.) Moreover, effective until September 1, 1999, use of the uniform form was not mandatory and a subdivision of the statutory provision (Real Property Law ?§309-a[5]) specifically allowed for the use of any other form which met the requirements of the other sections of article 9 of the Real Property Law pertaining to recording instruments affecting real property. (L 1997, ch 179, ?§?§3, 4, 5.)

Brown v. Brown

Brown v. Brown - In the first cause of action asserted in the complaint, plaintiff seeks to set aside a prenuptial agreement entered into between her and decedent, Sherman L. Brown, Sr., prior to their marriage on March 9, 1997. The second cause of action is to set aside a deed, dated Augus.....

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