SINNREICH WASSERMAN GRUBIN, LLP. v. ROMEO

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Supreme Court

Suffolk County

Justice Doyle

SINNREICH WASSERMAN & GRUBIN, LLP. v. ROMEO ” ORDERED that this motion by defendant Louis T. Romeo for an order changing the venue of the trial in this action from Suffolk County to Queens County is granted.

Plaintiff, Sinnreich, Wasserman & Grubin, as successor-in -interest to Sinnreich Wasserman, Grubin and & Cahill, LLP, commenced this action in April, 2000 to recover payment in excess of $345,000 for legal fees alleged to be owed plaintiff by defendant.

Defendant seeks an order changing the venue of the trial in this matter, arguing that there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in Suffolk County. Defendant argues that Jonathan Sinnreich, a partner in the plaintiff law firm and the person who filed the initial complaint, is married to the Hon. Emily Pines, who was elected a justice of the Supreme Court of Suffolk County in November, 2001. This uncontroverted fact, defendant argues, necessitates that the case be transferred out of Suffolk County to ensure that the interests and the appearance of justice are best served. Furthermore, defendant argues, that because her husband’s law firm seeks to recover several hundred thousand dollars from defendant, Justice Pines would have an interest in the outcome of the case. Finally, defendant points to the fact that he was represented in 1992 through 1995 by a law firm in which Justice Pines was a partner until 1993 and which retained Jonathan Sinnreich as trial counsel to represent the defendant.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that to transfer this case to another jurisdiction would be tantamount to precluding all relatives of members of the judiciary from practicing law in the county in which their relatives preside. Plaintiff argues that Jonathan Sinnreich is not the actual plaintiff in this case, rather it is the law firm in which he is a partner that is the plaintiff and he is therefore merely a witness to be called at trial. Moreover, plaintiff argues, Justice Pines was a District Court Judge at the time this action was commenced, a fact of which defendant was aware. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s motion, made approximately 19 months after the complaint was filed and two months before a trial was scheduled to begin, was not made within a reasonable time after the commencement of the action.

CPLR 510 allows the court, upon motion from either party, to change the place of trial when there is “reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be held in the proper county” (CPLR 510). Although such a motion should be made within a “reasonable time after the commencement of the action,” it can be made at any time before trial and is subject to the court’s discretion (CPLR 511[a]; Korman v. City of New York, 89 AD2d 888, 453 NYS2d 452 [2d Dept 1982]). Movant is required to make a factual showing demonstrating a strong possibility that an impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county (Jablonski v. Trost, et al., 245 AD2d 338, 665 NYS2d 438 [2d Dept 1997]). In deciding such a motion, it is critical that “the reputation of the courts for strict impartiality in the administration of justice” be maintained (Arkwright v. Steinbugler, 283 AD2d 397, 128 NYS2d 823 [2d Dept 1954]; Amann v. Caccese, 223 AD2d 663, 637 NYS2d 217 [2d Dept 1996]; Milazzo et al. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 106 AD2d 495, 483 NYS2d 33 [2d Dept 1984]; Burstein v. Greene, 61 AD2d 827; 402 NYS2d 227 [2d Dept 1978]).

Although defendant in the case at bar waited almost 19 months after the commencement of this action to interpose this motion, such a delay was reasonable in view of the fact that Justice Pines, while a District Court judge since January 1, 1999, was elected to the Supreme Court in November of 2001. Defendant filed this motion at the end of November, 2001. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that this delay was unreasonable, the court must still determine whether Mr. Sinnreich’s relationship with Justice Pines disqualifies the entire court (Milazzo v. Long Island Lighting Co., supra).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, plaintiff Sinnreich is not merely a potential witness in this trial nor is his law firm merely counsel for the plaintiff. Mr. Sinnreich is a partner in the plaintiff law firm. He is also the attorney who allegedly performed the services for which payment is sought and the pro se plaintiff who swore out the initial complaint against the defendant. It is Mr. Sinnreich’s role as plaintiff in this case, not as attorney for plaintiff, and his relationship to Justice Pines that causes this court to determine this issue in favor of defendant (Amann v. Caccese, supra; Burstein v. Greene, supra).

Therefore, to avoid the appearance of impropriety and to maintain the court’s reputation for impartiality, this action is transferred to Queens County. The movant is directed to serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the Calendar Clerk of this Court and upon the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Queens County within 20 days of the date of this order. Upon such service, the Clerk of this Court shall deliver to the Clerk of Supreme Court, Queens County, all papers and records filed in this action.