In times of economic or political turmoil, the doctrine of frustration of purpose usually gets a workout. A series of recent Commercial Division decisions have signaled that this doctrine is alive and well in New York. First, this article examines the history of the frustration of purpose doctrine. Next, we review recent decisions out of the Commercial Division that apply this doctrine to a variety of fact settings.
History of the Doctrine
The frustration of purpose doctrine traces its ancestry back to the courts of England in the line of so-called coronation cases.1 In Krell v. Henry, a decision familiar to any first-year law student, the English Court of Appeals excused the defendant from his obligation to rent the plaintiff’s apartment on coronation day in 1902 because the coronation procession of King Edward VII was cancelled when the king became sick.2 The court reasoned that the occurrence of the coronation procession was the basis of the contract, the cancellation of which was not contemplated by either party at the time they made the contract.3 Based on the extrinsic evidence presented, the court determined that both parties had knowledge that the defendant decided to rent the rooms because of the coronation, even though the contract itself was silent on the purpose of the renting.
This content has been archived. It is available through our partners, LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law.
To view this content, please continue to their sites.
Not a Lexis Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
Not a Bloomberg Law Subscriber?
Subscribe Now
LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law are third party online distributors of the broad collection of current and archived versions of ALM's legal news publications. LexisNexis® and Bloomberg Law customers are able to access and use ALM's content, including content from the National Law Journal, The American Lawyer, Legaltech News, The New York Law Journal, and Corporate Counsel, as well as other sources of legal information.
For questions call 1-877-256-2472 or contact us at [email protected]
