Fragin v. Fragin,1 Bayen v. Bayen,2 and Denaro v. Denaro3 represent a troika of uber hyperbolic statutory construction as the epicenter of a solution in search of a problem where none existed before in the Land of Limitations: that the procedural device by which a party chooses to enforce an agreement governs the applicability of the statute of limitations. Otherwise stated, the quantum of substantive justice is procedure dependent. This is evident from Fragin’s inability (the first of the decisions) to cite the stare decisis on which it rested, which appellate courts do when referencing existing authority. Alluding to Article 2 in the CPLR and its failure to include “motions” but only “actions,” Fragin does not complete that thought, saying no more than “only actions are subject to a six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(2).”
While arising in a matrimonial context, the language of this triumvirate broadly claims all areas of practice: “motions to enforce the terms of a stipulation of settlement are not subject to statutes of limitations [see, Bayen, Denaro].” Diverse principles of law and legislative intent have always worked quietly and synergistically to obviate such a result. Hopefully, the judiciary will soon abandon these cases.
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