DISSENTING OPINION
This appeal requires us to decide whether an offense was committed within the arresting officer’s presence or view, as required by Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.03(g)(2), when the police officer conducting the warrantless arrest did not personally observe the traffic violation, but was instead informed about it by another officer.*fn1 This exception to the warrant requirement–that the offense be committed in the officer’s presence or within the officer’s view–has been the law in Texas since the original 1856 Code of Criminal Procedure.*fn2 Because the plain meaning of the statute does not allow such a warrantless arrest and the Court ignores the plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Boykin v. State, I respectfully dissent.*fn3
This Court in Gonzales v. State misinterpreted the plain meaning of Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.01 to allow a peace officer who did not see the offense to arrest the offender without a warrant: “Even though Officer Guerra was the only officer to have seen the commission of the offense, it is sufficient that he saw the offense and communicated his knowledge to other officers, giving them authority to act on the information and to effect an arrest.” Gonzales, 638 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d). This opinion was cited in an unpublished opinion by this Court and subsequently criticized by three judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals. McGowan v. State, No. 01-83-00190-CR (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 16, 1983) (not designated for publication), pet. ref’d, 689 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Clinton, J., dissenting, joined by Teague and Miller, JJ.).
