Two months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases representing a significant shift in the court’s regulation of the criminal justice system. In Missouri v. Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper,2 the court turned its attention to discrete areas of the plea bargaining process. In Martinez v. Ryan,3 the court addressed the constitutional right to counsel in state collateral proceedings attacking the validity of a conviction. This column will discuss these decisions and their possible impact on New York criminal procedure.
In the past, the court has devoted less attention to the plea bargaining process than the trial itself when defining the role of counsel, even though the court had noted on occasion the significance of the plea bargaining process as a component of the criminal justice system.4 Two years ago, however, the court held that a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. In Padilla v. Kentucky,5 the court held that counsel has an obligation, under the Sixth Amendment, to give accurate advice about the immigration consequences of a proposed guilty plea.
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