8626. MARIA GONZALES, ET AL. pet-res, v. IHAY ZINNER res, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, res-res, ESQUIRE GROUP ESTATES, LLC, Respondent-Intervenor-ap — ELISA VAZQUEZ pet, v. IHAY ZINNER RESPNDENTS, VINTAGE VENTURES, LLC, Respondent-Intervenor-ap — The Berkman Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn (Robert J. Tolchin of counsel), for ap — Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Susan Paulson of counsel), for Department of Housing Preservation and Development, res — Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered on or about December 1, 2010, which affirmed an order of the Civil Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered on or about September 30, 2009, granting respondent Department of Housing Preservation and Development’s (HPD) motion to clarify a provision of an order and judgment (one paper), same court (Pam B. Jackman Brown, J.), entered on or about December 21, 2007, that HPD had the authority to issue loans to the Article 7A Administrator for repair of the subject buildings and to place liens against these properties in connection with the loans without prior court approval, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Intervenors’ interpretation of the court’s appointment order, made pursuant to RPAPL 778(1), does not comport with our reading of the order. “[T]he starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof” (Majewski v. Broadalbin—Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). Here, the plain language of the court’s order expressly empowers and authorizes the 7A Administrator to, among other things, obtain loans from HPD, and permits HPD to place liens on the subject buildings in connection with those loans, without prior court approval. By contrast, the order requires the 7A Administrator to obtain court approval prior to obtaining loans from any bank, lending institution or grant which would result in a lien on the premises.
