IN RE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH L. DE SANCHEZ, DECEASED, PEDRO R. ARELLANO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PERSONAL RESPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH LAURENT DE SANCHEZ, pet-res, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ETC., res-res

10267. IN RE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH L. DE SANCHEZ, DECEASED, PEDRO R. ARELLANO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PERSONAL RESPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH LAURENT DE SANCHEZ, pet-res, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ETC., res-res — Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York (Robert E. Crotty of counsel), for ap — Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York (Mark S. Sullivan of counsel), for res — Order, Surrogate’s Court, New York County (Nora Anderson, S.), entered on or about October 19, 2012, which denied JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s motion to (1) vacate its default at the January 27, 2012 call of the calendar on the petition for a compulsory accounting, (2) vacate the order (same court and Surrogate), entered on or about February 15, 2012, which directed it to file an account within 45 days, (3) permit it to oppose the petition nunc pro tunc, and (4) dismiss the petition, unanimously modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, to grant branches 1-3 of the motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Contrary to the Surrogate, we find that JPMorgan has shown both a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the underlying petition. Law office failure is the reasonable excuse (see e.g. Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 75 NY2d 1, 12 [1989]; Cruz v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 73 AD3d 597 [1st Dept 2010]). As to its defense, JPMorgan made a prima facie showing that the settlor of the trust at issue revoked it before she died (see Bergen v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 162 AD2d 330 [1st Dept 1990]).