10708-10709-10709A. KATAN GROUP, LLC, ETC., plf-ap, v. CPC RESOURCES, INC. def-res, JOHN DOES, ETC., def — KATAN GROUP, LLC, ETC., plf-ap, v. CPC RESOURCES, INC. def-res, DOMINO MEZZ HOLDINGS LLC def — Shapiro Tamir Law Group, PLLC, New York (Mitchell C. Shapiro of counsel), for ap — Katsky Korins LLP, New York (Adrienne B. Koch of counsel), for res — Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered June 28, 2012, which determined that plaintiff could not voluntarily discontinue its first action (index No. 650664-12), unanimously dismissed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered July 2, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from, determined that plaintiff could not voluntarily discontinue its second action (index No. 651450-12), and granted so much of defendants-respondents’ motion in the second action as sought dismissal of the second action, cancellation of the notice of pendency of that action, and an award of attorneys’ fees, and referred the matter of attorneys’ fees to a Special Referee for a hearing and determination of the amount of those fees, unanimously affirmed with respect to the granting of defendants’ motion, and the appeal therefrom otherwise dismissed, with costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered September 21, 2012, which, upon defendants-respondents’ motion in the first and second actions, consolidated the second action with an action commenced in Supreme Court, Kings County (Katan Group, LLC v. CPC Resources, Inc., et al., under index No. 13071-12), dismissed the complaint in the Kings County action, vacated the notice of pendency of the Kings County action, awarded defendants attorneys’ fees incurred in the defense of the Kings County action and costs incurred in the cancellation of the notice of pendency, and referred the matter of attorneys’ fees and costs to a Special Referee for a hearing and determination of the amount of those fees and costs, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The June 2012 order declining to permit plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the first action, and the portion of the July 2012 order declining to permit plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue the second action, did not resolve motions made on notice; therefore, no appeal lies therefrom as of right (CPLR 5701[a][2]; see Reyes v. Sequeira, 64 AD3d 500, 507 [1st Dept 2009]). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, we never granted its request for leave to appeal, and we decline to do so now.
