Surrogate Edward McCarty III
In a case of first impression, the court noted no New York court had decided if a person who pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in a criminal proceeding was disqualified from sharing in proceeds of a wrongful death compromise arising from the killing of her own two children. Petitioner father and the guardian ad litem relied on the doctrine articulated in Riggs v. Palmer in which the court held a grandson could not inherit from his grandfather where he murdered the grandfather in order to inherit from him. The court held the common-law doctrine articulated in Riggs was relevant to the question of whether mother’s plea prevented her disqualification as a distributee for purposes of the allocation of the wrongful death proceeds. It stated to ignore mother’s own admissions regarding her children’s deaths by permitting her to share in a fund which would not have existed but for her conduct, “disturbs the conscience of the court.” Thus, while mother was excused from criminal punishment for her crime, principles of morality and equity dictated that the murderer was still morally responsible for her crime. Hence, the court ruled equity must intervene to combat the unjust enrichment that would inure to mother in the absence of a finding of disqualification.
