12522. RALPH COLE HARDWARE, ETC., PLAINTIFF, v. ARDOWORK CORPORATION def — ARDOWORK CORPORATION Third-Party plf-res, v. LLOYD HARDWARE, Third-Party def-ap — Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney, Ltd, New York (David S. Kostus of counsel), for ap — Havkins Rosenfeld Ritzert & Varriale, LLP, White Plains (Carmen A. Nicolaou of counsel), for res — Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered March 28, 2013, which denied third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and granted defendants/ third-party plaintiffs’ cross motion to deem personal service sufficient and proper, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Third-party plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that third-party defendant, the father of the infant plaintiff, was “doing business” in New York, through a voluntary, continuous and self-benefitting course of conduct, sufficient to render him subject to the general jurisdiction of this State’s courts (CPLR 301; see e.g. ABKCO Indus. v. Lennon, 52 AD2d 435, 440 [1st Dept 1976]; see also Bryant v. Finnish Natl. Airline, 15 NY2d 426, 428 [1965]; Lancaster v. Colonial Motor Frgt. Line, 177 AD2d 152, 156 [1st Dept 1992]). The evidence included, among other things, Mr. Hardware’s testimony concerning his long-term employment as a scientist at an “undisclosed location” in New York, and documentary evidence presented by third-party plaintiffs showing that he also had a long-term business relationship with a New York company, for which he acted as designated agent, but which he failed to disclose. Under the circumstances of this case, the court properly discredited Mr. Hardware’s self-serving affidavit, submitted in opposition to third-party plaintiffs’ cross motion, which was tailored to avoid the consequences of his earlier, inconsistent deposition testimony and representations concerning his continued employment in New York (see Phillips v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp., 268 AD2d 318, 320 [1st Dept 2000]).