Judges Rivera, Fahey, Garcia, Peradotto and Mulvey concur.
*1PER CURIAM:The issue presented on this appeal is whether Civil Service Law §167 (8), as amended, authorizing a reduction of the State’s contribution to health insurance benefits for State employees, including members of the State judiciary, violates the Judicial Compensation Clause of the State Constitution (NY Const, *2art VI, §25 [a]). We conclude the State’s contribution is not judicial compensation protected from direct diminution by the Compensation Clause, and the reductions in contributions do not have the effect of singling out the judiciary for disadvantageous treatment. Therefore, plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge fails.I. Statutory and Regulatory BackgroundState employees, including members of the judiciary, are eligible to participate in health insurance plans that are paid, in part, by the State’s contributions towards insurance premiums (Civil Service Law §§161, 167; see Governor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1956, ch 461 at 3). Participation is optional and the choice of which insurance to purchase is within the sole discretion of employees.In 2011, facing a budget crisis, the Legislature negotiated with State-employee unions to avoid layoffs in exchange for a percentage reduction to the State’s premium contributions, as well as salary freezes and unpaid furloughs. Thereafter, the Legislature amended Civil Service Law §167 (8) to authorize the Civil Service Commission to make these reductions for nearly all State employees and retirees. These changes also applied to unrepresented State employees and retirees not involved in negotiations, including approximately *31,200 judges,1 and over 12,000 “managerial” or “confidential” employees. At the time, the changes did not apply to members of unions who had not agreed to modify their collective bargaining agreement, but those employees were subject to layoffs (4 NYCRR 73.12).2 The implementing regulations, effective October 1, 2011, provided for a two to six percentage point reduction in the State’s health care contributions, depending on the employee’s salary grade (4 NYCRR 73.3 [b]). Judges are not assigned salary grades, but all Supreme Court Justices receive a salary above “salary grade 10,” and therefore the State reduced its premium contribution from 90 percent to 84 percent for judges who elect to enroll in the State’s health insurance plan, and for judges who retired after January 1, 2012. The regulations also reduced the State’s contribution for employees who elected to participate in the State plan and retired between January 1, 1983 and January 1, 2012 from 90 to 88 percent of the cost of coverage (4 NYCRR 73.3 [b]).II. Plaintiffs’ ActionPlaintiffs are 13 named current and retired Justices of *4Supreme Court, the Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and the Supreme Court Justices Association of the City of New York. Plaintiffs filed suit against the State seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute that authorizes the reduction in contributions towards health insurance premiums, Civil Service Law §167 (8), violates the Compensation Clause of the New York State Constitution, and appropriate injunctive relief.Supreme Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). On the State’s appeal from this interlocutory order, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that compensation includes health insurance benefits, and that the decrease in the State’s contribution level discriminates against judges because, unlike public-sector unionized employees, judges cannot collectively bargain to obtain compensation for the reduction in the State’s contributions (Bransten v. State, 117 AD3d 455 [1st Dept 2014]).The parties subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court denied the State’s motion and granted the plaintiffs’ to the extent of declaring Civil Service Law §167 (8) and its implementing regulations unconstitutional as applied to members of the judiciary (Bransten v. State of New York, 2015 WL 1331265 [Sup Ct, New York County 2015]). The State appealed to this Court as of right directly from Supreme Court’s *5judgment pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (2).3III. Judicial Compensation Clause Salutary PurposeArticle VI, section 25 of the New York State Constitution provides that the compensation of State sitting and retired judges: “shall be established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which [a judge] was elected or appointed.” The term “compensation” is not defined in the Constitution, but its meaning is inextricably tied to the purpose of the Compensation Clause, which is “to promote judicial independence” and, relatedly, to “ensure that the pay of prospective judges, who choose to leave their practices or other legal positions for the bench will not diminish” (Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 NY3d 230, 250 [2010], citing United States v. Will, 449 US 200, 221 [1980]).Historically, the focus of the Compensation Clause has been to protect against the danger of external control over judicial pay as a means by which to exert influence over the judiciary. “[T]he Legislature was precluded from diminishing salaries in recognition of the risk that salary manipulation might be used as a tool to retaliate for unpopular judicial *6decisions” (Matter of Maron, 14 NY3d at 252). As with the similar prohibition contained in the federal Compensation Clause, the anti-diminution language was intended to protect judges from the corruptive force of financial uncertainty, in order to maintain an able and independent judiciary, free of coercion from the other branches (see US Const, art III, §1 [judges' compensation "shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office"]; Matter of Maron, 14 NY3d at 250 [purpose of State clause is same as federal clause: to promote judicial independence]; Will, 449 US at 218-220 [framers of federal constitution made certain the compensation of judges was protected from one of the evils that brought about the Revolution]; United States v. Hatter, 532 US 557, 568-569 [2001] [founders recognized importance of protecting judiciary from financial dependence on legislature]).To that end, and as this Court explained in Matter of Maron, the legislature may not enact laws that directly diminish judicial compensation or accomplish the same result by singling out judges for disadvantageous treatment that indirectly diminishes their pay (14 NY3d at 252-54; see also Hatter, 532 US at 571). Thus, plaintiffs may establish a Compensation Clause violation here by demonstrating that the State’s reduced contribution to their health insurance premiums: 1) is a direct diminishment of their compensation; or 2) is an indirect diminishment that targets judges for disadvantageous treatment.
