*1 APPEAL by the defendant, in an action for divorce and ancillary relief, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court (Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.), dated November 18, 2016, and entered in Richmond County, as, after a hearing, granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to hold him in civil contempt for his violation of certain orders that had been issued during the pendency of the action and directed his incarceration unless he paid a purge amount of $150,000 by December 16, 2016. By decision and order on motion dated February 2, 2017, this Court stayed enforcement of so much of the order as directed the defendant’s incarceration unless he paid the purge amount by December 16, 2016, pending hearing and determination of the appeal.*2
OPINION & ORDERThis case presents two issues of first impression in the area of matrimonial law not previously addressed by an appellate court in New York. The first issue is whether the provisions of Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b) and Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) §202.16-a, in tandem (hereinafter together the automatic orders), constitute unequivocal mandates of the court for the purposes of holding a party in civil contempt pursuant to Judiciary Law §753. If so, then the next issue is whether such civil contempt is an available remedy for a violation of the automatic orders when that civil contempt is sought after entry of a judgment of divorce. For the reasons set forth below, we answer the first issue in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Specifically, we find that the automatic orders constitute unequivocal mandates of the court, but civil contempt is not an available remedy for violation of the automatic orders when civil contempt is sought after entry of a judgment of divorce.Sharon Marie Spencer (hereinafter the plaintiff) commenced this matrimonial action in the Supreme Court, Richmond County, against her husband, Dwayne Spencer (hereinafter the defendant), on July 18, 2012. An 18-day trial was held, and thereafter, on November 30, 2015, a judgment of divorce was entered.After the judgment of divorce had been entered, the plaintiff learned that, while the trial was pending, unbeknownst to her, the defendant sold a warehouse in Brooklyn, which was a marital asset (hereinafter the Property), without her consent and without the consent of the Supreme Court during the pendency of the action.At the time the defendant sold the Property, both Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b) and 22 NYCRR 202.16-a were in full force and effect. As is relevant to this appeal, each provision, with language that virtually mirrors the other, precludes either of the parties in a matrimonial action from transferring or in any way disposing of marital assets such as the Property without the written
