2017-65 K C. HARVEY v. PROTO PROP. SERVS. — Motion by appellant on an appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, entered November 17, 2016, to continue a stay granted by decision and order on motion of this court dated March 13, 2017, and extended by decisions and orders on motion of this court dated July 26, 2017 and November 17, 2017, respectively.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted on condition that appellant perfect the appeal by April 6, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the above condition is not met, the court, on its own motion, may vacate the stay, without further notice, or respondent may move to vacate the stay, on three days’ notice.February 15, 2018By: Pesce, P.J., Aliotta, Siegal, JJ.2017-935 K C. SUPER ACUPUNCTURE AND HERBOLOGY, P.C. v. ALLSTATE INS. CO. — Motion by respondent to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, entered September 19, 2016, or, in the alternative, for an enlargement of time to serve and file a respondent’s brief.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking to dismiss the appeal is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking an enlargement of time to file a respondent’s brief is granted and the respondent’s brief shall be served and filed within 21 days from the date of this decision and order on motion; and it is further,ORDERED that appellant, if so advised, may serve and file a reply brief within 14 days from the service of the respondent’s brief.February 15, 20182017-1271 K C. GAMMA REALTY, LLC v. PLOTITS — Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, entered March 28, 2017.On the court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as by accepting the benefit of the order, appellant waived its right to appeal therefrom (see Burkwit v. Olson, 98 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2012]; HPS Holdings Co., LLC v. AL & Assoc., LLC, 10 Misc 3d 135[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52103[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Crystal Ridge Assoc. v. Pascal, 2003 NY Slip Op 50669[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]).February 15, 2018By: Pesce, P.J., Aliotta, Elliot, JJ.2018-74 K C. PAZ RENTAL, LLC v. PANACK — Motion by David R. Brody, Esq., for leave to withdraw as counsel for appellant on an appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, entered May 12, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted, and on or before March 2, 2018, David R. Brody, Esq., shall serve his client, by one of the methods specified in CPLR 2103 (c), with a copy of this decision and order on motion and shall file proof of such service with the clerk of this court; and it is further,ORDERED that no further proceedings shall be taken against appellant, without leave of this court, until the expiration of 30 days after the service upon them of a copy of this decision and order on motion.February 15, 2018Ninth and TenthJudical DisTRICTSBy: Garguilo, J.P., Tolbert, Ruderman, JJ.Edward T. McCormack, for appellant.Dutchess County District Attorney (Kirsten A. Rappleyea), for respondent.2015-1930 D CR. THE PEOPLE v. KRASNIQI, BURIM — Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of East Fishkill, Dutchess County (Irene McAliney, J.), rendered May 19, 2015. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of speeding, making an unsafe lane change, failing to signal, and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic, respectively.ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of speeding and failing to signal are affirmed; and it is further,ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of making an unsafe lane change and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic are reversed, on the law, the accusatory instruments charging defendant with those offenses are dismissed, and the fines and surcharges, if paid, are remitted.On October 12, 2014, defendant was charged in four simplified traffic informations with speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1180 [d]), making an unsafe lane change (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1128 [a]), failing to signal (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1163 [a]), and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1102), respectively.At a nonjury trial held in the Justice Court of the Town of East Fishkill, a New York State trooper testified that he had been trained to estimate the speed of a moving vehicle to within five miles per hour of its actual speed. Between milepost marker 57.8 and Exit 17 on Route 84, in the Town of East Fishkill, Dutchess County, he had observed a vehicle, which he later learned was being driven by defendant, and visually estimated its speed to be 85 miles per hour. The maximum speed limit in that area is 65 miles per hour, and his radar device indicated that the vehicle’s speed was 84 miles per hour. All of these events occurred in the Town of East Fishkill, which ended at the entrance of Exit 17, where a Putnam County sign is located. The trooper then turned on the emergency lights of his patrol car, followed behind defendant’s vehicle, and continuously activated his patrol car’s siren, but the vehicle did not pull over and stop. Next, the trooper observed defendant’s vehicle move, without signaling, from the left lane on Route 84 over the safety zone and onto the Exit 17 exit ramp, where the vehicle exited the highway. The trooper followed the vehicle off Route 84 and into a gas station in the Town of Kent, Putnam County. At the gas station, the trooper issued defendant tickets for speeding, making an unsafe lane change, failing to signal, and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic. Following the trial, the Justice Court convicted defendant of all four charges.On appeal, defendant contends that the Justice Court of the Town of East Fishkill did not have geographic jurisdiction to preside over the failing to signal, making an unsafe lane change, and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic charges, as these alleged violations took place in the Town of Kent in Putnam County, New York. Defendant further contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt of all of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.Contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial evidence established that all of the traffic infractions took place in the Town of East Fishkill in Dutchess County, New York. We note that an “offense committed within five hundred yards of the boundary of a particular county, and in an adjoining county of this state, may be prosecuted in either such county” (CPL 20.40 [4] [c]). Moreover, it is of no import that the trooper issued the tickets to defendant in the Town of Kent, Putnam County, New York, which county adjoins Dutchess County (see CPL 140.10 [2] [b]; 1.20 [39]). Consequently, the Justice Court of the Town of East Fishkill had the geographic jurisdiction to entertain the prosecutions of all of the traffic infractions.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt of speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1180 [d]), beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the trooper’s testimony was insufficient to show the reliability of the radar device, the reading of an untested radar device, when taken in conjunction with a qualified officer’s visual estimate, is legally sufficient to establish the speed of a moving vehicle (see People v. Dusing, 5 NY2d 126, 128 [1959]). Moreover, the testimony by a trooper qualified to visually estimate the speed of moving vehicles is, standing alone, sufficient to support a speeding conviction where, as here, the variance between the officer’s visual observation of the speed of the defendant’s vehicle and the posted speed limit was 20 miles per hour, which variance is “sufficiently wide, so that [the factfinder] may be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exceeded the permissible limit” (People v. Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]; see People v. DiBello, 46 Misc 3d 143[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50192[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]; People v. Raghubir, 39 Misc 3d 138[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52476[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d at 621), was also legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of failing to signal (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1163 [a]), since the trooper testified that he had observed defendant’s vehicle move from the left lane on Route 84 into the safety zone without signaling.However, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d at 621), was legally insufficient to establish defendant’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of making an unsafe lane change (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1128 [a]), since the trooper’s testimony did not indicate how the change of lane was unsafe. “[A]bsent any testimony regarding the circumstances and nature of the lane change[] at issue, it cannot be said that merely changing lanes, as alleged in this matter, is a violation of the statute” (People v. Krantz, 6 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50058[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]).Likewise, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d at 621), was legally insufficient to establish defendant’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1102). Although the trooper testified that defendant had failed to pull over and stop his vehicle after the officer had activated the lights and siren of his patrol car, the trooper otherwise provided no testimony regarding any order or direction he had given to defendant. We note, however, that, based on defendant’s act of failing to pull over and stop his vehicle, he could have been charged with failing to yield the right of way (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1144 [a]) and, if defendant had been traveling at, or in excess of, 25 miles per hour above the speed limit, with unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law §270.25).Accordingly, the judgments convicting defendant of speeding and failing to signal are affirmed, and the judgments convicting defendant of making an unsafe lane change and failing to comply with the lawful order or direction of a police officer regulating traffic are reversed and the accusatory instruments charging defendant with those two offenses are dismissed.GARGUILO, J.P., and RUDERMAN, J., concur.TOLBERT, J., taking no part.February 15, 2018Scott M. Bishop, for appellant.Westchester County District Attorney, for respondent (no brief filed).2016-177 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. WIGGINS, ANTHONY C. — Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of White Plains, Westchester County (Barbara A. Leak, J.), rendered December 21, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of petit larceny. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738 [1967]), seeking leave to withdraw as counsel.ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738 [1967]), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252 [2011]; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631 [1976]; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606 [1979]).GARGUILO, J.P., and RUDERMAN, J., concur.TOLBERT, J., taking no part.February 15, 2018Belinda Primus, appellant pro se.Hasana Carlos, respondent pro se.2016-197 W C. CARLOS v. PRIMUS — Appeal from a final judgment of the City Court of Peekskill, Westchester County (Reginald J. Johnson, J.), entered January 6, 2016. The final judgment, entered upon tenant’s failure to make a court-ordered deposit of rent, awarded landlord possession and the sum of $20,350 in a nonpayment summary proceeding.ORDERED that the final judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the City Court for all further proceedings.In this nonpayment proceeding, the City Court, without holding a trial, entered a final judgment awarding landlord possession and the sum of $20,350 after tenant stated that she would be unable to make a court-ordered deposit of half of the alleged arrears. Since, outside the City of New York, there is no authority for the court, in an RPAPL article 7 summary proceeding in which triable issues of fact have been raised, to enter a final judgment in favor of a landlord based on a tenant’s failure to make a court-ordered deposit of rent (see Merenda v. Fried, 42 Misc 3d 136[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50117[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]; Rizzuto v. Novack, 2002 NY Slip Op 50701[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002]; Stepping Stones Assoc. v. Seymour, 184 Misc 2d 990 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2000]; cf. RPAPL 745 [2]), the final judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the City Court for all further proceedings.GARGUILO, J.P., and RUDERMAN, J., concur.TOLBERT, J., taking no part.February 15, 2018Herman Wagschal, appellant pro se.Monroe Village Prosecutor, (Robert M. Rametta), for respondent.2016-1099 OR CR. THE PEOPLE v. WAGSCHAL, HERMAN — Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Monroe, Orange County (Forrest Strauss, J.), rendered March 9, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of failing to stop at a stop sign. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review the denial, on March 9, 2016, of defendant’s motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information.ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information is vacated, defendant’s motion is granted, and the fine and surcharge, if paid, are remitted.Defendant was charged, in a simplified traffic information, with failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law §1172 [a]), on May 20, 2015 at 3:57 p.m., at the intersection of Franklin Avenue and Forest Avenue in the Village of Monroe, Orange County. Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant moved to dismiss the simplified traffic information based upon the complaining officer’s failure to provide a requested supporting deposition, contending that he had mailed to the court the traffic ticket which he had received from the officer whereon he indicated that a supporting deposition had not been provided to him when the ticket had been issued and that he was requesting a supporting deposition. After hearing testimony on the matter, the Justice Court denied the motion, finding that a supporting deposition had been served on defendant by the complaining officer contemporaneously with his issuance of the ticket to defendant. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of the charge.When a defendant is charged in a simplified traffic information with a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation and makes a timely request for a supporting deposition, he is entitled, as of right, to receive a “supporting deposition of the complainant police officer…containing allegations of fact, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged” (CPL 100.25 [2]; see also People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 116 [1978]) within 30 days of the court’s receipt of his request, or at least five days before trial (see CPL 100.25 [2]). Additionally, “[u]pon such a request, the court must order the complainant police officer…to file such supporting deposition with the court together with proof of service thereof” (CPL 100.25 [2]). The failure to timely serve and file a supporting deposition “renders the simplified [traffic] information insufficient on its face” (CPL 100.40 [2]; see People v. Ortreger, 56 Misc 3d 140[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51094[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]), subjecting it to dismissal upon motion (see CPL 170.30 [1] [a]; 170.35 [1]; People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 104 [1991]; People v. Concepcion, 55 Misc 3d 150[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50734[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]).While the record demonstrates that a supporting deposition had been filed with the court, it was not accompanied with any “proof of service thereof” (CPL 100.25 [2]). Consequently, under the particular circumstances of this case, the People failed to demonstrate their full compliance with CPL 100.25 (2).Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed, the order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the simplified traffic information is vacated, and defendant’s motion is granted.GARGUILO, J.P., and RUDERMAN, J., concur.TOLBERT, J., taking no part.February 15, 2018Michele A. Gramse, appellant pro se.Courtney Fernandez and C. David, Inc., respondents pro se (no brief filed).2016-2442 N C. GRAMSE v. FERNANDEZ — Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Fourth District (Darlene D. Harris, J.), entered February 26, 2016. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of only $1,453.79.ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is modified by increasing the award in favor of plaintiff to the principal sum of $5,000; as so modified, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $5,000, representing an overpayment she had allegedly made to defendants for home improvement work that had been performed pursuant to a written home improvement contract. Defendants interposed a counterclaim seeking to recover the principal sum of $3,591 for additional work that had been performed.At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that she had entered into a written home improvement contract with defendant C. David, Inc. to repair her home, which had been damaged during a hurricane, for the total contract price of $200,850, to be paid in three equal installment payments of $66,950. The evidence established that plaintiff had made all three installment payments, but the last payment, which had been made by means of a check drawn from an escrow disbursement account in the sum of $73,447.79, was $6,497.79 more than what had been due under the written agreement. Plaintiff conceded that there was an additional cost incurred, which had not been reflected in the written contract, in the sum of $1,400 for upgrading the bathroom and the hardwood flooring. Defendants’ witness testified that additional work in the sum of $10,088, as reflected in an unsigned memo, had been performed and not paid for, and, thus, plaintiff was not entitled to any refund. Following the trial, the District Court, without making any findings of fact, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,453.79 and dismissed defendants’ counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals, on the ground of inadequacy, from so much of the judgment as awarded her the principal sum of only $1,453.79.In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether “substantial justice has…been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v. Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v. Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).Upon a review of the record, we find that substantial justice (see UDCA 1807) requires that the award to plaintiff be increased to the principal sum of $5,000, the monetary jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Part of the District Court (see UDCA 1801). Except for the upgrades for the bathroom and hardwood flooring totaling $1,400, which plaintiff conceded had been performed, defendants cannot recover upon a cause of action alleging a breach of a home improvement contract, in the absence of an enforceable written agreement therefor (see General Business Law §771; Home Constr. Corp. v. Beaury, 149 AD3d 699 [2017]). The record is devoid of any evidence establishing that an agreement for the additional work, which defendants claimed had been performed and which was allegedly reflected in an unsigned memo, was ever reduced to a signed written contract. Moreover, defendants never established the reasonable value of these services and, thus, they have not established a right to an offset or a monetary award based upon a theory of quantum meruit (Home Constr. Corp. v. Beaury, 149 AD3d at 702), which would reduce plaintiff’s right to a refund.Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is modified by increasing the amount awarded to plaintiff to the principal sum of $5,000.GARGUILO, J.P., and RUDERMAN, J., concur.TOLBERT, J., taking no part.February 15, 2018By: Marano, P.J., Tolbert, Brands, JJ.2015-1652 S C. WEINTRAUB v. PETERVARY — Motion by respondent-appellant for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District, entered February 13, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated November 16, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from this court’s decision and order.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is denied.February 15, 2018By: Garguilo, J.P., Tolbert, Ruderman, JJ.2015-2250 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.2015-2271 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.2015-2273 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.2015-2274 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.2015-2275 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.2015-2276 N C. THE PEOPLE v. CONFINO — Motion by respondent for leave to reargue an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, entered August 20, 2015, and an order of that court entered September 1, 2015, which was determined by decision and order of this court dated October 26, 2017, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division from the decision and order of this court.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to reargue is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking leave to appeal to the Appellate Division is granted.By: Marano, P.J., Tolbert, Garguilo, JJ.2017-1685 RO C. FREMONT v. NEMEROFF — Motion by appellant to stay enforcement of a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Clarkstown, Rockland County, entered May 2, 2017, as well as a certain income execution, pending the determination of an appeal from the judgment.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted, and enforcement of the judgment and the income execution dated August 25, 2017, directed to the New York City Department of Education, are stayed pending the determination of the appeal.February 15, 20182017-1887 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. TAYLOR, FUQUAN — Motion by appellant for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the Justice Court of the Village of Dobbs Ferry, Westchester County, rendered July 27, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted and Thomas Keating, Esq. is assigned pursuant to article18-B of the County Law; and it is further,ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that the appeal shall be perfected expeditiously; and it is further,ORDERED that the court stenographer, if any, shall promptly make, certify and file two typewritten transcripts of the minutes of all proceedings, if any, with the clerk of the trial court, who is directed to furnish without charge one copy to the attorney who is now assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal and to file the second copy of the transcript, if any, with the record, which shall then be filed with this court; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel shall serve a copy of the transcript, if any, upon the District Attorney, same to be returned upon argument or submission of the appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report, if any, prepared in connection with appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on appellant which are incorporated or referred to in the report.February 15, 20182017-2002 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. TAYLOR, FUQUAN — Motion by appellant for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the Justice Court of the Village of Dobbs Ferry, Westchester County, rendered July 27, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted and Thomas Keating, Esq. is assigned pursuant to article18-B of the County Law; and it is further,ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that the appeal shall be perfected expeditiously; and it is further,ORDERED that the court stenographer, if any, shall promptly make, certify and file two typewritten transcripts of the minutes of all proceedings, if any, with the clerk of the trial court, who is directed to furnish without charge one copy to the attorney who is now assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal and to file the second copy of the transcript, if any, with the record, which shall then be filed with this court; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel shall serve a copy of the transcript, if any, upon the District Attorney, same to be returned upon argument or submission of the appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report, if any, prepared in connection with appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on appellant which are incorporated or referred to in the report.February 15, 20182017-2326 W C. CPG PHASE III LTD. PARTNERSHIP (WARBURTON TOWNHOUSES) v. ANDREWS — Motion by appellant for a stay pending the determination of an appeal from an order of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County, entered October 27, 2017, and for leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is denied as moot, as the appeal has been withdrawn.February 15, 20182017-2427 S C. MARTINEZ v. KEENAN — Motion by appellant for a stay pending the determination of an appeal from an order of the County Court of Suffolk County, entered October 31, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted on condition that the appeal be perfected by May 4, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the above condition is not met, the court, on its own motion, may vacate the stay, without further notice, or respondent may move to vacate the stay, on three days’ notice.February 15, 20182018-145 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. DIXON, BARBARA — Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Ossining, Westchester County, entered October 16, 2017.On the court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order arising out of a criminal proceeding absent specific statutory authorization (see CPL 450.10; 450.15; People v. Santos, 64 NY2d 702, 704 [1984]; People v. Herrara, 171 AD2d 85, 87 [1991]).February 15, 20182018-146 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. DIXON, BARBARA — Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Ossining, Westchester County, entered November 28, 2017.On the court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order arising out of a criminal proceeding absent specific statutory authorization (see CPL 450.10; 450.15; People v. Santos, 64 NY2d 702, 704 [1984]; People v. Herrara, 171 AD2d 85, 87 [1991]).February 15, 20182018-147 W CR. THE PEOPLE v. DIXON, BARBARA — Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Ossining, Westchester County, entered November 28, 2017.On the court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order arising out of a criminal proceeding absent specific statutory authorization (see CPL 450.10; 450.15; People v. Santos, 64 NY2d 702, 704 [1984]; People v. Herrara, 171 AD2d 85, 87 [1991]).February 15, 2018
