By: Gonzalez, J.P., Cooper, Edmead, JJ.18-035. ALEXANDRE BORISOVSKI, plf-res, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND OTIS NOBOA, def-app — Order (Anthony Cannataro, J.), entered July 6, 2017, reversed, without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), plaintiff failed to state a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC §1983, arising from an MTA police officer’s order directing him to leave a certain Staten Island train station. Plaintiff failed to make sufficiently specific allegations of fact indicating that he was deprived of his constitutional rights (see Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F2d 883, 887 [2nd Cir 1987]), and failed to adequately allege that the act that allegedly deprived him of his rights was the result of an official municipal policy or custom (see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 690-691 [1978]; Thompson v. City of New York, __ AD3d __, 2018 NY Slip Op 02267 [1st Dept 2018]). Plaintiff’s broad and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim (see Pang Hung Leung v. City of New York, 216 AD2d 10, 11 [1995]). Similarly, plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful training and hiring are conclusory (see Thomas v. City of New York, 154 AD3d 417, 418 [2017]).Plaintiff’s State common-law claims for wrongful ejection and arbitrary refusal to carry him as a passenger should also have been dismissed. No allegations are made that plaintiff was prevented from boarding any train (see Barney v. Oyster Bay & Huntington Steamboat Co., 67 NY 301, 302 [1876]; compare Borisovski v. City of New York, 41 Misc 3d 126[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51649[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2013] [arbitrary refusal to carry plaintiff as a passenger on its ferry]) or that he was wrongfully ejected from a train (see Gillespie v. Brooklyn Hgts. R.R. Co., 178 NY 347 [1904]; Hamilton v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 53 NY 25 [1873]). Indeed, plaintiff conceded at his General Municipal Law §50-h hearing that he “didn’t intend to use the train.”THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 23, 2018
17-191. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. EDWARD DAZA, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Ann E. Scherzer, J.), rendered June 15, 2016, affirmed.The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. It charged all the elements of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §511[1][a]), the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty. Allegations that “the key was in the ignition, the engine was running and defendant was behind the wheel” satisfied the operation element of the offense (see People v. Alamo, 34 NY2d 453, 458-459 [1974]; People v. Almanzar, 113 AD3d 527 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1059 [2014]).We perceive no basis for reducing the fine. Defendant received the precise sentence for which he had bargained, which was within the permissible statutory range (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §511[1][b]). Although the defendant now claims that he is indigent, he never sought relief from the fine by way of a CPL §420.10(5) motion for resentencing (see People v. Toledo, 101 AD3d 571 [2012]), lv denied 21 NY3d 947 [2013]), and indeed, has paid the fine.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 23, 2018
