By: Gonzalez, J.P., Cooper, Edmead, JJ.17-231. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. PAULINO CAMACHO, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Stephen Antignani, J.), rendered November 29, 2016, affirmed.By failing to object, by making generalized objections, or by failing to request further relief after the court took curative actions, defendant failed to preserve most of his challenges to the prosecutor’s summation, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. In any event, the challenged remarks, viewed in context with the statements made by defense counsel during summation, were fair comment on the evidence and did not misstate the applicable law (see People v. Garland, 155 AD3d 527, 529 [2017]; People v. Feola, 154 AD3d 638, 639 [2017]). Any isolated improprieties were not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial (see People v. D’Alessandro, 184 AD2d 114, 118-119 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 884 [1993]) and the court’s curative instructions were sufficient to prevent any prejudice (see People v. Overlee, 236 AD2d 133 [1997], appeal denied 91 NY2d 976 [1998]; see also People v. Brown, 90 AD3d 575, 576 [2011], aff’d 21 NY3d 739 [2013]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 25, 201817-226. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. JOSELITO COMPRES, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Thomas Carroll, J.H.O.), rendered December 21, 2016, affirmed.The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. It charged all the elements of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §511[1][a]), the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty. Contrary to defendant’s present contention, allegations that “the key was in the ignition, the engine was running and the defendant was behind the wheel” satisfied the operation element of the offense (see People v. Alamo, 34 NY2d 453, 458-459 [1974]; People v. Almanzar, 113 AD3d 527 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1059 [2014]). The factual allegations were also sufficient for pleading purposes to establish that defendant knew, or had reason to know, that his license was suspended. The instrument recited that a computer check run by the officer of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles showed that “defendant’s license was suspended three or more times on at least three separate dates for failure to answer a summons and failure to post bond and has not been reinstated,” and “all such summons have printed on them, ‘If you do not answer this ticket by mail within fifteen days, your license will be suspended’ [and that] the suspension occurs automatically (by computer) within four weeks of the defendant’s failure to answer” (see People v. Gerado, 55 Misc 3d 127[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50344[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1079 [2017]; People v. Maldonado, 42 Misc 3d 81 [2013]).The record fails to support the conclusion that defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, since the court, after defendant expressed confusion about the term “Boykin rights,” failed to address any of the constitutional rights defendant was waiving (see People v. Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375, 383-85 [2015]; People v. Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 365-366 [2013]). Nevertheless, the only relief defendant requests is dismissal of the information, and he expressly requests this Court to affirm his conviction if it does not grant a dismissal. Since it cannot be said that no penological purpose would be served by reinstating the third degree unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle charge (see People v. Murray, 46 Misc 3d 136[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51891[U][App Term 1st Dept 2014]; see also People v. Conceicao, 26 NY3d at 385 n 1; People v. Teron, 139 AD3d 450 [2016]), dismissal is not warranted and therefore we affirm.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 25, 201813-354. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, res, v. STEPHEN SKIPWITH, def-app — Judgment of conviction (Miriam R. Best, J.), rendered December 21, 2012, affirmed.Defendant’s present challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for two of the three counts of attempted endangering the welfare of a child (see Penal Law §§110/260.10[1]) is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Gray, 86 NY2d 10 [1995]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits. Defendant’s guilt was established by evidence that he engaged in acts of domestic violence in the presence of victim’s two younger children (see People v. Johnson, 95 NY2d 368, 371 [2000]; People v. Aikey, 153 AD3d 1603 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1058 [2017]). The credited evidence established that after the victim ordered defendant to leave her apartment, defendant yelled and screamed as he wedged his foot in the apartment door; kicked the door open with enough force that the victim was pushed into a wall; then chased the victim’s oldest child to prevent him from calling 911 and pushed him to the floor in front his younger brothers who were yelling and crying.The evidence is also legally sufficient to support the conviction of attempted second degree criminal trespass (see Penal Law §§110/140.15[1]). Defendant’s lack of license to enter the victim’s apartment and defendant’s knowledge that his entry was unlawful were established by both the victim’s testimony that defendant did not have permission to be in the apartment (see People v. Singer, 121 AD3d 455, 455-456 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1089 [2014]), as well as the totality of the circumstances (see People v. Jackson, 118 AD3d 635 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1044 [2014]), including that defendant paid no rent, his name was not on the lease, and he did not have a key (see People v. Dela Cruz, 162 AD2d 312, 313 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 892 [1990]).Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the verdict as to all charges was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, including its evaluation of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim (see People v. Sandoval, 137 AD3d 653, 654 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1138 [2016]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 25, 201817-374. WFCC REALTY CORP., pet-lan-res, v. MARY MA, res-ten-app — Order (Jack Stoller, J.), dated February 10, 2017, reversed, without costs, landlord’s motion for summary judgment of possession denied, and matter remanded to Civil Court for further proceedings. (See WFCC Realty Corp. v. Huang Hui Zhen, appeals numbered 17-378/380, decided herewith.)THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 25, 201817-378/380. WFCC REALTY CORP., pet-lan-res, v. HUANG HUI ZHEN & XIAO SAICHEN, REN KAI ZHENG & MEI RONG LIN, AND QIN GAO XUI YUN GUO & JIJIAN YANG, res-ten-app — Order (Jack Stoller, J.), dated December 28, 2016, insofar as appealed from, reversed, without costs, landlord’s cross motion denied, and matter remanded to Civil Court for further proceedings.These consolidated holdover proceedings, based upon allegations that the apartments are exempt from rent stabilization due to a substantial rehabilitation of the subject apartment building after January 1, 1974 (see Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] §2520.11), are not susceptible to summary disposition. Landlord failed to adduce evidence establishing, as a matter of law, that at least 75 percent of the building-wide and apartment systems had been totally replaced, in accordance with the substantial rehabilitation criteria of DHCR’s Operational Bulletin 95-2 (see Matter of Woodcrest Mgt. Corp. v. Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 2 AD3d 172 [2003]. Indeed, landlord, who owned the building in the mid-1980s when the work was allegedly performed, claimed to have retained no evidence of the rehabilitation, such as invoices, receipts or photographs, and relied upon documents in public files. Similarly, landlord’s contractor also professes to have no records or independent recollection of the work. In addition, the limited evidence submitted raises triable issues as to whether there was a total replacement of windows, doors, electrical wiring, gas supply and intercoms, among other building-wide and apartment systems.While Operational Bulletin 95-2 does provide for relaxation of documentation requirements in situations where, as here, the rehabilitation was performed prior to the implementation of the Operational Bulletin, the landlord is not relieved of the burden to establish, through adequate documentation, that substantial rehabilitation has taken place (see Matter of Pavia v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 22 AD3d 393 [2005]).In view of our determination, we reach no other issue.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.April 25, 2018
