PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Houston P. B. (Anonymous), ap — (Ind. No. 12-00455)Appeal by the defendant from an amended judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Freehill, J.), rendered March 23, 2016, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that he violated a condition thereof, upon his admission, and imposing a term of imprisonment upon his previous adjudication as a youthful offender for assault in the second degree.ORDERED that the amended judgment is affirmed.The record of the plea proceeding is inadequate to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal and, thus, the purported waiver of his right to appeal is not enforceable (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264-265; People v. Brown, 122 AD3d 133).The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the County Court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate him in violation of probation due to a delay between a probation warrant and his appearance in court at the proceeding in which the court revoked the prior sentence of probation and imposed a period of incarceration (see People v. Douglas, 94 NY2d 807, 808; People v. Horvath, 37 AD3d 33, 36; People v. Williams, 19 AD3d 868, 869). In any event, this contention is without merit. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s failure to raise this argument before the County Court (see generally People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 146-147).The defendant also failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the County Court improperly sentenced him without obtaining an updated presentence report (see People v. Heine, 122 AD3d 644, 645; People v. McGinn, 96 AD3d 977; People v. Gledhill, 91 AD3d 886; People v. Ortega, 1 AD3d 533; cf. People v. Jackson, 106 AD2d 93, 98), and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, MILLER and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Priscilla Hall, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Connolly, JJ.MATTER of Sierra Club ap, v. Joseph Martens, Commissioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, et al., res — (Index No. 2949/14)APPEAL by the petitioners, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation dated November 15, 2013, as amended March 7, 2014, which granted the application of the respondent Trans Canada Ravenswood, LLC, for a water withdrawal permit pursuant to Environmental Conservation Law §15-1501(9), from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Robert J. McDonald, J.), entered December 10, 2014, in Queens County, which, upon decisions of the same court dated October 1, 2014, and October 2, 2014, respectively, denied the petition and dismissed the proceedingLippes & Lippes, Buffalo, NY (Richard J. Lippes of counsel), Rachel Treichler, Hammondsport, NY, Gary Abraham, Allegany, NY, and Jonathan L. Geballe, New York, NY, for appellants (one brief filed).Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Anisha S. Dasgupta and Bethany A. Davis Noll of counsel), for respondent Joseph Martens, Commissioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.Barclay Damon, LLP, Albany, NY (Yvonne E. Hennessey, Danielle E. Mettler-LaFeir, and Laura L. Mona of counsel), for respondent Trans Canada Ravenswood, LLC.CONNOLLY, J.We hold that the issuance of an “initial permit” for making water withdrawals pursuant to Environmental Conservation Law §15-1501(9) is not a ministerial act that is excluded from the definition of “action” under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter SEQRA; see ECL 8-0105[5][ii]).IThe respondent Trans Canada Ravenswood, LLC (hereinafter TC Ravenswood), operates the Ravenswood thermoelectric generating station (hereinafter Ravenswood Station or the station) in Long Island City, Queens, which produces energy for the City of New York. In connection with electrical generation by three of the station’s four steam generators, Ravenswood Station withdraws large amounts of water from the East River to cool the station’s boiler equipment, turbines, and auxiliary equipment. The water is used only once and then discharged back into the East River. This “once-through cooling” system is the original cooling system that has been used by Ravenswood Station since it began operating in 1963. The station’s fourth generator uses a multi-celled air-cooled condenser system that does not require the withdrawal of water from the river. When operating at full load, the station has a maximum withdrawal capacity of 1.5 billion gallons of water per day, although the actual amount of water used to operate the station is typically less, and varies depending upon the station’s operating needs. This sizable water withdrawal has environmental consequences, most notably to fish and other local aquatic life. When the cooling water is drawn in, larger fish are killed when they become “impinged” on the screens that cover the intake structures to prevent debris in the water from entering. Juvenile fish, larvae, and eggs that are small enough to pass through the intake screens are killed when they become “entrained” in the cooling system. Additionally, the discharge of heated water back into the East River also has an impact on the aquatic environment. In the early 1990s, studies by ConEdison, the station’s prior owner, demonstrated that, each year, approximately 83,000 fish became impinged and an average of 220 million eggs, larvae, and juvenile fish became entrained by the station’s cooling system. Technology installed at the station in 2005 reduced annual impingement to approximately 25,000 fish and entrainment to 150 million organisms and eggs. Additional measures implemented in 2012 resulted in further reductions in impingement and entrainment.IISince the 1970s, Ravenswood Station has been regulated by the Federal Clean Water Act (see 33 USC §1251 et seq.), and required to maintain a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter SPDES) discharge permit (see ECL 17-0801 et seq.; see also 33 USC §1342[b]). The SPDES permitting system, which the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC) administers at the state level, regulates the discharge of pollutants from point sources (see 33 USC §1311[a]). With respect to cooling water intake structures, the Clean Water Act provides that effluent standards for discharges “shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” (33 USC §1326[b] [emphasis added]). ”Best technology available,” or “BTA,” is a standard of performance established through detailed regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR 125.94[a]; see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 US 208). The Clean Water Act expressly provides that states may adopt and enforce more stringent effluent limitations or standards of performance than required by federal law (see 33 USC §1370; Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Connecticut Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 482 F3d 79, 90 n 9 [2d Cir]).While the SPDES permitting system generally authorized the DEC to regulate entities that discharge into water, under prior law (see former ECL 15-1501), the DEC also had separate authority to regulate withdrawals of water, i.e., the removal or taking of water from the waters of the state, but only with respect to withdrawals made by public water suppliers (see Assembly Sponsor’s Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2011, ch 401; see also ECL 15-1502[16]). However, the “consumptive uses of water for agricultural, commercial, and industrial purposes remain[ed] largely unregulated” (Assembly Sponsor’s Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2011, ch 401 [emphasis added]). Neighboring states, including “Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts all ha[d] programs that regulate[d] industrial, commercial and agricultural water withdrawals” (id.; see Conn Gen Stat §§22a-365 to 22a-379; NJ Stat §58:1A-1 et seq.; RI Gen Laws tit 46, ch 15.7; Mass Gen Laws ch 21G).Accordingly, in 2011, the State Legislature amended ECL article 15 by enacting the Water Resources Protection Act (see ECL 15-1501 et seq. [hereinafter the WRPA]), which directed the DEC to implement a water withdrawal permitting program to regulate the use of the state’s water resources. Pursuant to the WRPA, all commercial and industrial operators of water withdrawal systems with a capacity to withdraw more than 100,000 gallons per day are required to obtain a water withdrawal permit (see ECL 15-1501[1]; 15-1502[14]). Applicants for water withdrawal permits are required to submit a “proposed near term and long range water conservation program that incorporates environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures” (ECL 15-1503[1][f]). The DEC has the power to grant or deny a permit, or to grant a permit with conditions, and in doing so, must consider a number of statutory factors, including whether “the proposed water withdrawal will be implemented in a manner to ensure it will result in no significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts on the quantity or quality of the water source and water dependent natural resources,” and whether “the proposed water withdrawal will be implemented in a manner that incorporates environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures” (ECL 15-1503[2][f], [g]).As pertinent to this appeal, with respect to existing operators of water withdrawal systems, the WRPA provides for the issuance of an “initial permit” based upon an operator’s self-reported “maximum water withdrawal capacity” prior to the statute’s effective date (ECL 15-1501[9]). Specifically, the statute states: “[the DEC] shall issue an initial permit, subject to appropriate terms and conditions as required under this article, to any person not exempt from the permitting requirements of this section, for the maximum water withdrawal capacity reported to [the DEC]… on or before February [15, 2012]” (ECL 15-1501[9] [emphasis added]; see 6 NYCRR 601.7[d]). The DEC’s regulations implementing the WRPA state that an “initial permit… includes all terms and conditions of a water withdrawal permit, including environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures to promote the efficient use of supplies, and is subject to modification, suspension and revocation” (6 NYCRR 601.7[e]).IIIIn order to comply with the WRPA, in 2013, TC Ravenswood applied for an initial permit. The DEC determined that the permit application was not subject to SEQRA. In response to public comments that the application should be reclassified as a Type I action under SEQRA, the DEC asserted that the issuance of the permit was ministerial, because it “has no discretion but to issue ‘initial permits’ for the amount of the water withdrawals for users that were in operation and properly reported their withdrawals to [the DEC] as of February 15, 2012.” On November 15, 2013, the DEC issued TC Ravenswood an initial permit authorizing the withdrawal of 1.39 billion gallons of water per day. The initial permit incorporated monitoring requirements from TC Ravenswood’s SPDES permit, and imposed several additional conditions related to the installation of meters and the collection of data regarding water withdrawals. Subsequent to the issuance of the initial permit, the DEC amended the initial permit to authorize the withdrawal of just over 1.5 billion gallons of water per day.The petitioners, who are nonprofit organizations dedicated to the protection of the environment and conservation of water resources, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, arguing that the DEC erroneously classified the issuance of the permit as a ministerial action not subject to SEQRA. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, concluding that the WRPA and its implementing regulations did not leave the DEC with any discretion to deny TC Ravenswood an initial permit, and that it was thus required to issue the initial permit regardless of environmental concerns. The petitioners appeal, and we reverse.IV”In a CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a determination of an administrative agency, the standard of judicial review is whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (Matter of Wilson v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 145 AD3d 905, 907; see CPLR 7803[3]). For the reasons that follow, we find that the issuance of an initial permit pursuant to ECL 15-1501(9) is not a ministerial act and, therefore, the DEC’s determination was affected by an error of law (see CPLR 7803[3]; Matter of 149 Glen St. Corp. v. Jefferson, 140 AD3d 742, 743; cf. Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v. Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn., 138 AD3d 996, 998).“SEQRA’s fundamental policy is to inject environmental considerations directly into governmental decision making; thus the statute mandates that ‘[social], economic, and environmental factors shall be considered together in reaching decisions on proposed activities’” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate of City of N.Y., 72 NY2d 674, 679, quoting ECL 8-0103[7]). ”The procedures necessary to fulfill SEQRA review are carefully detailed in the statute and its implementing regulations, and [courts] have recognized the need for strict compliance with SEQRA requirements” (Matter of City Council of City of Watervliet v. Town Bd. of Town of Colonie, 3 NY3d 508, 515 [citations omitted]; see Matter of King v. Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 347).“To promote the Legislature’s goals, and to provide an informational tool to aid in the decision-making process, SEQRA requires agencies to prepare an [environmental impact statement] ‘on any action they propose or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment’” (Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach v. Gavalas, 81 NY2d 322, 325, quoting ECL 8-0109[2]). ”[SEQRA] broadly defines the term ‘action’ to include projects or activities that the agency either directly undertakes or funds, policy and procedure-making and the issuance of permits, licenses or leases” (Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach v. Gavalas, 81 NY2d at 325 [emphasis added]; see ECL 8-0105[4]). When undertaking an action, a governmental agency (or designated “lead agency” where more than one agency is involved in the decision-making process) must initially determine whether a proposed action “may have a significant effect on the environment” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate of City of N.Y., 72 NY2d at 680; see ECL 8-0109[2]; see also ECL 8-0111[6]). ”If no significant effect is found, the lead agency may issue a ‘negative declaration,’ identifying areas of environmental concern, and providing a reasoned elaboration explaining why the proposed action will not significantly affect the environment” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate of City of N.Y., 72 NY2d at 680; see 6 NYCRR former 617.6[g]). However, “[i]f the lead agency determines that there may be significant environmental impact, it must see to it that an environmental impact statement [hereinafter EIS] is prepared, which fully evaluates the potential environmental effects, assesses mitigation measures, and considers alternatives to the proposed action” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Board of Estimate of City of N.Y., 72 NY2d at 680; see ECL 8-0109[2], [4]).To assist agencies in determining whether a proposed action may have a significant effect on the environment, SEQRA directs the DEC to promulgate regulations identifying, inter alia, “[a]ctions or classes of actions that are likely to require preparation of environmental impact statements,” and “[a]ctions or classes of actions which have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and which do not require environmental impact statements” (ECL 8-0113[2][c]). In furtherance of this mandate, the DEC classifies actions as Type I, Type II, or Unlisted (see Matter of South Bronx Unite! v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 115 AD3d 607, 609 n 4). ”[A] Type I action carries with it the presumption that it is likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and may require an EIS” (6 NYCRR 617.4[a][1]). Type II “actions have been determined not to have a significant impact on the environment or are otherwise precluded from environmental review under [SEQRA]” (6 NYCRR 617.5[a]). ”[A]ll remaining actions are classified as ‘unlisted’ actions” (Matter of City Council of City of Watervliet v. Town Bd. of Town of Colonie, 3 NY3d at 518 n 8). ”Type I and unlisted actions are subject to SEQRA review, and Type I actions ‘are more likely to require the preparation of an EIS than Unlisted actions’” (id., quoting 6 NYCRR 617.4[a]).As relevant to the case at bar, the DEC classifies “a project or action that would use ground or surface water in excess of 2,000,000 gallons per day” as a Type I action (6 NYCRR 617.4[b][6][ii]). Ravenswood Station has the capacity to withdraw over 1.5 billion gallons of water per day, an amount approximately 750 times greater than the DEC’s Type I threshold.However, SEQRA also expressly excludes from the definition of “action,” ”official acts of a ministerial nature, involving no exercise of discretion” (ECL 8-0105[5][ii]). The DEC construes the words “shall issue” in ECL 15-1501(9) to mean that the issuance of an initial permit to an existing operator is mandatory and involves no agency discretion, and is, therefore, a ministerial act. The petitioners argue that the words “subject to appropriate terms and conditions as required under this article” in ECL 15-1501(9) give the DEC the discretion to impose conditions on the initial permit and, therefore, the issuance of an initial permit is not excluded from the definition of “action” under SEQRA. We agree with the petitioners’ interpretation of the statute.Whether a particular action is ministerial or discretionary depends upon the underlying statute or regulatory scheme (see Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach v. Gavalas, 81 NY2d at 325; Matter of Ziemba v. City of Troy, 37 AD3d 68, 73). ”Discretionary or quasi-judicial acts involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result” (Tango v. Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41; see Matter of Filmways Communications of Syracuse v. Douglas, 106 AD2d 185, 186, affd 65 NY2d 878). Generally, determinations that involve an agency’s expertise, the application of law, and exercise of judgment are nonministerial (see New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 184; Tango v. Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41; see also Tarter v. State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518-519). ”[W]hen an agency has some discretion, but that discretion is circumscribed by a narrow set of criteria which do not bear any relationship to the environmental concerns that may be raised in an EIS, its decisions will not be considered ‘actions’ for purposes of SEQRA’s EIS requirements” (Incorporated Vil. of Atlantic Beach v. Gavalas, 81 NY2d at 326).Here, while ECL 15-1501(9) states that the DEC “shall issue” an initial permit to an existing operator for its self-reported maximum water withdrawal capacity, the statute provides that such initial permit is “subject to appropriate terms and conditions as required under this article.” Notably, the WRPA specifically provides the DEC with the power “to grant or deny a permit or to grant a permit with conditions” (ECL 15-1503[2] [emphasis added]). The statutory factors that the DEC is required to consider when reviewing an application and imposing conditions on the permittee do not lend themselves to mechanical application. For instance, whether “the proposed water withdrawal will be implemented in a manner that incorporates environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures” (ECL 15-1503[2][g]) will almost certainly vary from operator to operator, or from water source to water source. The DEC’s own regulations state that an “initial permit” must include “environmentally sound and economically feasible water conservation measures to promote the efficient use of supplies” (6 NYCRR 601.7[e]). Whether a condition is “appropriate” for a given operator is a matter that falls within the DEC’s expertise and involves the exercise of judgment, and, therefore, implicates matters of discretion (see New York Civ. Liberties Union v. State of New York, 4 NY3d at 184; Tango v. Tulevech, 61 NY2d at 41; see also Tarter v. State of New York, 68 NY2d at 518-519).While ECL 15-1501(9) may be mandatory with respect to the maximum volume of water an operator receiving an initial permit is authorized to withdraw, i.e., its pre-WRPA maximum withdrawal capacity, the statute clearly authorizes the DEC to act in a discretionary manner with respect to the imposition of “appropriate terms and conditions as required under [ECL article 15].” Thus, while the phrase “shall issue” implies a nondiscretionary act, “[s]tatutory language, however strong, must yield to what appears to be intention and that is to be found not in the words of a particular section alone but by comparing it with other parts or provisions of the general scheme of which it is part” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §97, Comment at 213 [1971 ed]).In light of our determination, the parties’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic.Accordingly, the initial permit, as amended, must be annulled, and the matter remitted to the DEC for further proceedings on TC Ravenswood’s permit application in accordance with SEQRA. Therefore, the judgment is reversed, on the law, that branch of the petition which was to annul the determination dated November 15, 2013, as amended March 7, 2014, is granted, the petition is otherwise denied as academic, and the matter is remitted to the DEC for further proceedings in accordance herewith.HALL, J.P., AUSTIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, that branch of the petition which was to annul the determination dated November 15, 2013, as amended March 7, 2014, is granted, the petition is otherwise denied as academic, and the matter is remitted to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation for further proceedings in accordance herewith.By Rivera, J.P.; Hall, Miller and Duffy, JJ.MATTER of Underhill-Washington Equities, LLC, ap, v. Division of Housing and Community Renewal, respondent-respondent res — (Index No. 7977/14)Santo Golino, New York, NY (Brian W. Shaw of counsel), for appellant.Adam H. Schuman, New York, NY (Jack Kuttner of counsel), for respondent-respondent.In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal dated April 4, 2014, which denied a petition for administrative review and affirmed a Rent Administrator’s finding that the respondent Michael Leeke was entitled to succession rights to a rent-controlled apartment, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated April 14, 2015, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.The respondent Michael Leeke (hereinafter the tenant) has resided in the subject apartment since 1972. The tenant’s sister is the original tenant of record of the apartment. In 2009, the petitioner, the owner of the apartment (hereinafter the owner), commenced a holdover proceeding in the housing court to evict the tenant and his sister on the ground that the sister was no longer using the apartment as her primary residence. In their answer in that proceeding, the tenant and his sister each maintained that they had co-resided at the apartment since on or about 1971. That proceeding was dismissed by the housing court on the ground that the owner had failed to comply with the notice and filing requirements for eviction (see 9 NYCRR 2204.3). Thereafter, in August 2011, the tenant commenced an administrative proceeding in the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (hereinafter the DHCR) seeking a determination that the apartment was subject to the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations and that he was a valid successor to this rent-controlled apartment. The owner commenced a second holdover proceeding against the tenant and his sister and they again interposed an answer maintaining that they had resided together at the apartment since approximately 1971.In the administrative proceeding before the DHCR, the tenant provided an affidavit from his sister in which she averred that she had vacated the apartment in December 2005 and that the owner, through its staff, was aware of the vacatur. She averred that she purchased a home in Florida in 2005 due to health concerns involving her daughter, who had lupus and kidney disease and was awaiting a liver transplant. In response the owner argued, among other things, that the tenant’s sister continued to pay the rent through 2009. In an order dated November 7, 2012 (hereinafter the November 2012 order), a Rent Administrator for the DHCR determined that the apartment was rent controlled and the tenant was entitled to succeed to the rights and protections afforded under the rent control laws.In December 2012, the owner filed a petition for administrative review of the November 2012 order. The Deputy Commissioner of the DHCR reviewed the record and concluded that the documentary evidence, along with the affidavit of the tenant’s sister, sufficiently established, inter alia, that the tenant’s sister permanently vacated the apartment in December 2005 when she moved to Florida and the minimum two-year co-residency requirement in Rent and Eviction Regulations (9 NYCRR) §2204.6(d) was satisfied given that the tenant had resided in the apartment since 1972. In an order dated April 4, 2014 (hereinafter the April 2014 order), the Deputy Commissioner denied the owner’s petition for administrative review and affirmed the November 2012 order granting the tenant succession rights as a rent-controlled tenant.The owner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to review the April 2014 order. In a judgment dated April 14, 2015, the Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, finding that the DHCR’s determination to grant succession rights to the tenant was rationally based on the administrative record and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. We affirm.“Judicial review of administrative determinations that were not made after a quasi-judicial hearing is limited to whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (Matter of Riverside Tenants Assn. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 133 AD3d 764, 766, citing CPLR 7803[3]; see Matter of 9215 Realty, LLC v. State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 136 AD3d 925). ”An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” (Matter of Murphy v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 21 NY3d 649, 652 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The determination by the DHCR, if reasonable, must be upheld (see Matter of 85 E. Parkway Corp v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 297 AD2d 675, 676), even if a different result would not be unreasonable (see Matter of Deerpark Farms, LLC v. Agricultural & Farmland Protection Bd. of Orange County, 70 AD3d 1037, 1038). ”[I]n an article 78 proceeding, the reviewing court may not weigh the evidence, choose between conflicting proof, or substitute its assessment of the evidence or witness credibility for that of the administrative factfinder” (Matter of Porter v. New York City Hous. Auth., 42 AD3d 314, 314; see Matter of Prestige Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. State of New York, 74 AD3d 1606, 1607).Here, the Supreme Court properly found the determination of the DHCR that the tenant was entitled to succeed to the apartment under the protection of the Rent Control Law was not arbitrary and capricious and was rationally based on the administrative record (see Matter of 9215 Realty, LLC v. State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 136 AD3d at 925-926; Matter of Blue Star Props, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 133 AD3d 461, 461).Contrary to the owner’s contention, the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not preclude the DHCR from crediting the affidavit of the tenant’s sister regarding her vacatur of the apartment. As the holdover proceedings were not litigated to a conclusion on the merits in favor of the sister, her contentions in those proceedings about continued residency in the apartment—a position of which the DHCR was aware—is not subject to judicial estoppel (see Kalikow 78/79 Co. v. State of New York, 174 AD2d 7, 11-12), and the DHCR was within its discretion in crediting the sister’s affidavit and rejecting the contentions that she had asserted in the holdover proceedings (see Matter of Porter v. New York City Hous Auth, 42 AD3d at 314).Moreover, when determining succession rights, the focus is on preventing displacement of family members when they have been residing with tenants at housing accommodations for long periods of time (see Matter of Herzog v. Joy, 74 AD2d 372, 375-376, affd 53 NY2d 821; see also Matter of Murphy v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 21 NY3d at 653-654; Festa v. Leshen, 145 AD2d 49, 58-59). Here, the owner did not contest the tenant’s status as a family member or that he had resided in the apartment since approximately 1972. The tenant is entitled to possession by virtue of his relationship to, and contemporaneous occupancy of the apartment with, his sister, the original tenant, even if the tenant does not pay rent and the rent is paid by a non-occupant (see Matter of Herzog v. Joy, 74 AD2d at 376). Since the tenant had resided in the subject apartment for more than 30 years, the determination of the DHCR that he was entitled to succession rights to the apartment was rationally based (see id. at 376-377; see also Festa v. Leshen, 145 AD2d at 63).The owner’s remaining contentions are without merit.Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.RIVERA, J.P., HALL, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Glen Campbell, ap — (Ind. No. 2576/10)Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated March 22, 2017 (People v. Campbell, 148 AD3d 1044), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, rendered December 18, 2014.ORDERED that the application is denied.The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel (see Jones v. Barnes, 463 US 745; People v. Stultz, 2 NY3d 277).DILLON, J.P., SGROI, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.By Chambers, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Duffy, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Jesus Tendilla-Fuentes, ap — (Ind. No. 3847/09)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Del Giudice, J.), rendered July 22, 2013, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and attempted gang assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to consecutive determinate terms of imprisonment of 25 years plus 5 years of postrelease supervision on the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and 15 years plus 5 years of postrelease supervision on the conviction of attempted gang assault in the first degree.ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by providing that the sentences imposed shall run concurrently with each other; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court improperly permitted a witness to identify him in court is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Boone, 84 AD3d 1108, 1109). In any event, the in-court identification was proper, as was the witness’s previous confirmatory identification of the defendant from a police-arranged photo array (see People v. Shepard, 138 AD3d 895, 896).The defendant contends that the prosecution was improperly allowed to elicit testimony from witnesses that bolstered each other’s identifications of the defendant and testimony from a police officer that bolstered those witnesses’ identification of the defendant (see People v. Trowbridge, 305 NY 471). However, no objection to the contested testimony was made, and thus, the issue is not preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. West, 56 NY2d 662, 663). In any event, any error in the admission of the testimony was harmless, since there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v. Johnson, 57 NY2d 969, 970; People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242).The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecution to introduce the grand jury testimony of one of its witnesses as evidence in its case-in-chief because the witness’s trial testimony did not tend to disprove or affirmatively damage its case is also unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). The defendant also contends that the court’s questioning of that witness was improper because it evinced the court’s disbelief of his testimony (see People v. Mendes, 3 NY2d 120, 121-122). However, any error that may have been occasioned by the admission of the impeachment evidence, the court’s improper questioning or the court’s failure to immediately provide the jury with a limiting instruction regarding the proper evaluation of the impeachment evidence was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the errors contributed to his convictions (see People v. Saez, 69 NY2d 802, 804; People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 241-242; cf. People v. Mendes, 3 NY3d at 122).The failure of defense counsel to object to the introduction of the witness’s grand jury testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, a single error by defense counsel will not be deemed to have deprived a defendant of the effective assistance of counsel, unless that error is “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152; see People v. Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 480). Moreover, the record as a whole establishes that defense counsel competently represented the defendant and provided him with meaningful representation (see People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147).The defendant’s contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the Supreme Court erred by charging manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). In any event, a reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense of manslaughter in the first degree rather than the greater one of murder in the second degree. As such, the question of the defendant’s intent was properly left for the jury (see People v. Butler, 57 NY2d 664; People v. Albert, 213 AD2d 414, 414-415).The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).The defendant’s remaining contention raised in his pro se supplemental brief is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.CHAMBERS, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., plf, v. Pedro Parrales, def — (Ind. No. 1194/10)Application by the defendant for a writ of error coram nobis seeking leave to file a late notice of appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Holder, J.), rendered February 11, 2014.ORDERED that the application is denied.The defendant has not established his entitlement to the relief requested (see People v. Syville, 15 NY3d 391).DILLON, J.P., BALKIN, AUSTIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Wilmer Torres, ap — (Ind. No. 3255/06)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), rendered February 5, 2016, convicting him of bail jumping in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Hall, Cohen and Iannacci, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Rashed McNeil, ap — (Ind. No. 5607/15)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Murphy, J.), rendered March 30, 2016, convicting him of assault in the third degree and petit larceny, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).MASTRO, J.P., HALL, COHEN and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Austin, Roman, Hinds-Radix and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Ronald Walker, ap — (Ind. Nos. 5797/15, 4431/16)Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gubbay, J.), both rendered July 5, 2016, convicting him of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree under Indictment No. 5797/15, and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree under Indictment No. 4431/16, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on the appeals. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).RIVERA, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN, HINDS-RADIX and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.MATTER of Johnnie Charles, pet, v. Rockland County Sheriff res — (Index No. 2075/15)Johnnie Charles, Beacon, NY, petitioner pro se.Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of Captain John C. Liska dated July 28, 2015, which affirmed a determination of a civilian disciplinary hearing panel, made after a disciplinary hearing, finding the petitioner guilty of the charges of “unhygienic acts towards other inmates,” “causing unrest in housing unit,” “failure to comply with a direct order,” “reckless eyeballing or intimidate by staring,” “conduct which causes a disturbance,” and “being found guilty of [three] or more class C infractions,” and imposing a penalty.ADJUDGED that the petition is granted, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent that so much of the determination dated July 28, 2015, as affirmed the finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charge of “unhygienic acts towards other inmates” is annulled, that charge is dismissed, the respondents are directed to expunge all references to that finding from the petitioner’s institutional record, the petition is otherwise denied, the determination dated July 28, 2015, is otherwise confirmed, and the proceeding is otherwise dismissed on the merits.On June 24, 2015, the petitioner, an inmate at the Rockland County Correctional Facility, returned to the housing unit after having a tooth extracted. A correction officer observed the petitioner spit blood into a garbage can within the housing unit, and the officer directed the petitioner to remove the garbage bag. The petitioner complied with the officer’s direction to remove the garbage bag, but thereafter, the petitioner, among other things, repeatedly refused the officer’s direction to return to his cell. The petitioner was charged with several infractions, including “unhygienic acts towards other inmates,” “causing unrest in housing unit,” “failure to comply with a direct order,” “reckless eyeballing or intimidate by staring,” “conduct which causes a disturbance,” and “being found guilty of [three] or more class C infractions.”Following a disciplinary hearing, a civilian disciplinary hearing panel found the petitioner guilty of the charges and imposed a penalty. On July 28, 2015, the hearing panel’s determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination. In an order entered July 1, 2016, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).Prior to transferring the proceeding to this Court for consideration of whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court should have addressed the petitioner’s contentions that the determination was rendered in violation of his due process rights, as those objections, if established, could have terminated the proceeding (see Matter of Sellers v. Stanford, 144 AD3d 691, 691-692; Matter of Burgess v. Bellnier, 138 AD3d 989, 990). However, since the full record is now before this Court, we will decide the entire proceeding on the merits in the interest of judicial economy (see Matter of Sellers v. Stanford, 144 AD3d at 692; Matter of Burgess v. Bellnier, 138 AD3d at 990; Matter of Vaughn v. Orlando, 79 AD3d 1048, 1049).Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, there is no evidence in this record that he was denied his right to call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing (see Matter of Mabry v. Maddox, 57 AD3d 1000). The petitioner’s remaining contentions regarding lack of due process are likewise without merit (see Matter of Fisher v. Garvey, 214 AD2d 564, 565; see also Matter of Burgess v. Bellnier, 138 AD3d at 990).“A prison disciplinary determination made as a result of a hearing at which evidence was taken pursuant to direction by law must be supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Adamson v. Barto, 37 AD3d 597, 598; see CPLR 7803[4]; Matter of Farooq v. Fischer, 99 AD3d 709, 711). ”[S]ubstantial evidence… means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180; see Matter of Jackson v. Gerbing, 150 AD3d 734, 736). Here, the evidence was insufficient to support the charge alleging that the petitioner committed unhygienic acts toward other inmates. However, the hearing panel’s determination that the petitioner was guilty of the remaining charges was supported by substantial evidence in the record (see Matter of Jackson v. Gerbing, 150 AD3d at 736; Matter of Phillips v. Lee, 115 AD3d 957).Inasmuch as the petitioner has already served the penalty and there was no recommended loss of good-time credit, the matter need not be remitted to the respondents for a redetermination of the penalty insofar as it relates to the charges which have been sustained (see Matter of Hollmann v. Department of Corr. & Community Supervision, 139 AD3d 1225; Matter of Farooq v. Fischer, 99 AD3d at 711; Matter of Maybanks v. Goord, 306 AD2d 839, 840).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Sgroi, Barros and Christopher, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Wilhem Jean-Louis, ap — (Ind. No. 11-00527)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Nelson, J.), rendered October 23, 2012, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v. Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 341-342; People v. Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256-257) precludes appellate review of his contention that the sentence imposed was excessive (see People v. Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 9).DILLON, J.P., SGROI, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Sgroi, Lasalle and Connolly, JJ.MATTER of Government Employees Insurance Company, res, v. Joseph Tucci, ap — (Index No. 85004/15)In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, Joseph Tucci appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Dollard, J.), dated June 19, 2015, which granted the petition to the extent of temporarily staying arbitration pending a framed-issue hearing, and (2) an order of the same court (Quirk, Ct. Atty. Ref.) dated October 26, 2015, which, after the framed-issue hearing, granted the petition and permanently stayed arbitration.ORDERED that the order dated June 19, 2015, is reversed, on the law, the petition is denied, the proceeding is dismissed, and the order dated October 26, 2015, is vacated; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated October 26, 2015, is dismissed as academic in light of our determination on the appeal from the order dated June 19, 2015; and it is further,ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellant.On February 1, 2014, Joseph Tucci was driving his vehicle east on SR 23A in the Town of Jewett, when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. On the date of the accident, the vehicle was insured by the petitioner, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO). Tucci alleged that while he was driving, a vehicle tried to pass him on the roadway and struck the left front section of his vehicle. As a result, Tucci lost control of his vehicle, which hit the guardrail and flipped over four times. Tucci alleged that the other driver fled the scene. Police arrived at the accident scene, and Tucci was taken by helicopter to Albany Medical Center, where he remained for approximately 17 days.On January 7, 2015, Tucci demanded arbitration of his claim for supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits from GEICO. Thereafter, GEICO commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, seeking, inter alia, a permanent stay of arbitration. GEICO alleged that Tucci failed to satisfy a condition precedent to arbitration as required by the insurance policy, namely, reporting the accident to the police within 24 hours or as soon as reasonably possible, and that there was no evidence of actual physical contact with a hit-and-run vehicle. In an order dated June 19, 2015, the Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent of temporarily staying arbitration pending a framed-issue hearing “to determine insurance coverage” and referred the matter to a Court Attorney Referee to hear and determine the issue. On October 26, 2015, after the framed-issue hearing, the Court Attorney Referee granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration.“‘The party seeking a stay of arbitration has the burden of showing the existence of sufficient evidentiary facts to establish a preliminary issue which would justify the stay’” (Matter of Hertz Corp. v. Holmes, 106 AD3d 1001, 1002, quoting Matter of AutoOne Ins. Co. v. Umanzor, 74 AD3d 1335, 1336; see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 140 AD3d 743, 744; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v. Hua Huang, 139 AD3d 950, 951; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v. Arciello, 129 AD3d 1083, 1084; Matter of Farmers Ins./Truck Ins. Exch. v. Terzulli, 112 AD3d 628). ”Thereafter, the burden shifts to the party opposing the stay to rebut the prima facie showing” (Matter of Merchants Preferred Ins. Co. v. Waldo, 125 AD3d 864, 865). Where a triable issue of fact is raised, the Supreme Court, not the arbitrator, must determine it in a framed-issue hearing, and the appropriate procedure under such circumstances is to temporarily stay arbitration pending a determination of the issue (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Aizin, 102 AD3d 679, 681).Here, GEICO failed to show the existence of evidentiary facts regarding Tucci’s failure to satisfy the reporting requirement or whether there was physical contact with a hit-and-run vehicle, since, as to those issues, it only provided the unsupported, conclusory assertions of its attorney (see Matter of Merchants Preferred Ins. Co. v. Waldo, 125 AD3d at 865; Matter of AutoOne Ins. Co. v. Umanzor, 74 AD3d at 1336; see also Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v. Hua Huang, 139 AD3d at 951). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have granted a temporary stay of arbitration and directed a framed-issue hearing.In light of our determination, the parties’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic.MASTRO, J.P., SGROI, LASALLE and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Leventhal, Austin and Iannacci, JJ.Joseph DeBlasi res-ap, v. City of New York, appellant-res, John S. Gannone, et al., res — (Index No. 101897/12)In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant City of New York appeals, as limited by its brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated June 25, 2015, which, inter alia, denied its motion to enforce a stipulation of settlement dated March 27, 2015, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as granted the motion of the defendant John S. Gannone for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him and that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Winrock Plumbing, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the motion of the defendant City of New York to enforce the stipulation of settlement dated March 27, 2015, and substituting therefor a provision granting the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable by the plaintiffs.The plaintiff Joseph DeBlasi (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injured when he tripped and fell over a crack in the sidewalk abutting 604 Lamont Avenue in Richmond County. The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for his injuries against the defendant John S. Gannone, who owned and occupied the subject premises, the defendant City of New York, and the defendant Winrock Plumbing, Inc. (hereinafter Winrock), a contractor that performed work on a portion of the sidewalk. After discovery, Gannone moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, and Winrock cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.In March 2015, the plaintiffs’ attorney and the City’s attorney agreed to settle the matter with respect to the City for $35,000. A stipulation of settlement was prepared and signed by the attorneys on March 27, 2015. Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ attorney sought to renege on the stipulation on the ground that he had failed to inform the plaintiffs that the award would be reduced by a worker’s compensation lien. The City moved to enforce the stipulation of settlement. In an order dated June 25, 2015, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the City’s motion, granted Gannone’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, and granted that branch of Winrock’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The City appeals, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal.The Supreme Court properly granted Gannone’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Administrative Code of the City of New York §7-210, which shifted tort liability for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks from the City to the abutting property owners, does “not apply to one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes” (Administrative Code §7-210[b]; see Meyer v. City of New York, 114 AD3d 734, 734). Gannone demonstrated, prima facie, that he was exempt from liability by establishing that the subject dwelling was a one-family, owner-occupied residence (see DeSilvio v. Lin Zheng, 150 AD3d 679, 680; Boorstein v. 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703, 703-704). Gannone also established, prima facie, that he did not perform any work on the sidewalk prior to the incident, and that he did not create the alleged defect (see Ippolito v. Innamorato, 136 AD3d 624, 625; Angulo v. City of New York, 5 AD3d 707). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, Gannone’s use of the dwelling to store his son’s landscaping equipment was merely incidental to the residential use of the property (see Koronkevich v. Dembitzer, 147 AD3d 916; Coogan v. City of New York, 73 AD3d 613). Moreover, we do not find that the pictures contained in the record depict repairs that were made to the sidewalk.The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of Winrock’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Although a contractor may be liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in the creation of a dangerous condition upon a public street or sidewalk (see Huerta v. 2147 Second Ave., LLC, 129 AD3d 668), Winrock established, prima facie, that it did not create or cause the alleged dangerous condition. Approximately six years prior to the accident, Winrock performed work near or about where the injured plaintiff fell. It received no complaints, and its work was approved by the City (see Zorin v. City of New York, 137 AD3d 1116; Santelises v. Town of Huntington, 124 AD3d 863, 865). In opposition, no triable issue of fact was raised.The Supreme Court, however, erred in denying the City’s motion to enforce the stipulation of settlement dated March 27, 2015. ”Stipulations of settlement between parties are binding contracts… and, as such, they are favored and not lightly cast aside” (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Wielgus, 131 AD3d 510, 510 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ”The parties to a stipulation may have it set aside only for reasons which would allow a contract to be set aside, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident” (Bailey v. New York City Tr. Auth., 196 AD2d 854, 854). Here, the plaintiffs failed to show that the stipulation of settlement was the product of fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident. Nor was there any showing that the plaintiffs’ attorney did not have authority to enter into the stipulation of settlement (see Ortiz v. Brooks, 135 AD3d 921).In light of our determination, we need not reach the City’s remaining contention.BALKIN, J.P., LEVENTHAL, AUSTIN and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Austin, Connolly and Iannacci, JJ.MATTER of Anaisa Jackson, res, v. Walter Jackson, ap — (Docket No. V-16614-14)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Elizabeth Barnett, J.), dated July 7, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, granted the mother’s petition for sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ child.ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.The parties, who never married each other, are the parents of a son born in 2006. The parties lived together when the son was born, and separated approximately 10 months later. Thereafter, the son lived with the father for most of his life until the Administration for Children’s Services (hereinafter the ACS) filed a neglect petition against the father in June 2014, alleging that he neglected the son by inflicting excessive corporal punishment, and the son was temporarily released to the mother’s care. Shortly thereafter, the mother filed a petition seeking custody of the son. The custody petition was held in abeyance until resolution of the neglect petition. In a fact-finding order dated December 8, 2014, the Family Court found that the father had neglected the son, as alleged by the ACS, and this Court affirmed (see Matter of Tarelle J. [Walter J.], 152 AD3d 593, 594). Subsequently, after a hearing, in an order dated July 7, 2016, the Family Court, inter alia, awarded sole legal and physical custody to the mother. The father appeals from that portion of the order.“There is no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent” (Matter of Wallace v. Roberts, 105 AD3d 1053, 1053 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 93). In custody matters, the paramount concern is the best interests of the child (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171; Matter of Stokes v. Stokes, 154 AD3d 952; Matter of Pena v. Cordero, 152 AD3d 697, 697). In determining what custody arrangement is in the child’s best interests, courts consider several factors, including “the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child’s relationship with the other parent” (Matter of Stokes v. Stokes, 154 AD3d at 952; see Salvatore v. Salvatore, 68 AD3d 966, 966; Miller v. Pipia, 297 AD2d 362, 364). The existence or absence of any one factor is not determinative; rather, the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 171, 174; Matter of Pena v. Cordero, 152 AD3d at 697-698; Miller v. Pipia, 297 AD2d at 364).In custody matters, this Court’s authority is as broad as that of the hearing court (see Matter of Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 NY2d 946, 947; Matter of Larkin v. White, 64 AD3d 707, 708). Nevertheless, “[s]ince custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament and sincerity of the parties, the Family Court’s determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Wallace v. Roberts, 105 AD3d at 1053 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Tori v. Tori, 103 AD3d 654, 655). Here, contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court’s determination that the child’s best interests would be served by an award of sole legal and physical custody to the mother has a sound and substantial basis in the record based upon the totality of the evidence, and should not be disturbed on appeal (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 167; Matter of Pena v. Cordero, 152 AD3d at 698; Matter of Wallace v. Roberts, 105 AD3d at 1053; Matter of Riccio v. Riccio, 21 AD3d 1107, 1108).The father’s contention that his substantive due process was violated by the Family Court’s custody determination is without merit (see Matter of Marie B., 62 NY2d 352, 358; Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546; Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 NY2d 196, 204).The father’s remaining contentions are either beyond the scope of review on this appeal or without merit.RIVERA, J.P., AUSTIN, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.Total Telcom Group Corp., ap, v. Kendal on Hudson, res — (Index No. 34817/12)In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Berliner, J.), dated April 18, 2016, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for breach of contract. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract in which the defendant agreed to purchase satellite television equipment from the plaintiff. The defendant, which operates a senior continuing care residence facility in Sleepy Hollow, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that the contract was indefinite as to a material term and constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.“To create a binding contract, there must be a manifestation of mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms” (Matter of Express Indus. & Term. Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 NY2d 584, 589; see Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109). ”[A] court cannot enforce a contract unless it is able to determine what in fact the parties have agreed to” (Matter of 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v. 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 78 NY2d 88, 91). Accordingly, “[i]f an agreement is not reasonably certain in its material terms, there can be no legally enforceable contract” (Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482; see Carione v. Hickey, 133 AD3d 811, 811). ”While there are some instances where a party may agree to be bound to a contract even where a material term is left open… there must be sufficient evidence that both parties intended that arrangement” (Matter of Express Indus. & Term. Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 NY2d at 590 [citation omitted]). ”[A] mere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable” (Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 52 NY2d at 109; see New York Military Academy v. NewOpen Group, 142 AD3d 489, 490; Northern Stamping, Inc. v. Monomoy Capital Partners, L.P., 129 AD3d 448, 449; Kolchins v. Evolution Mkts. Inc., 128 AD3d 47, 61), unless “a methodology for determining the material terms can be found within the four corners of the agreement or the agreement refers to an objective extrinsic event, condition, or standard by which the material terms may be determined” (Carmon v. Soleh Boneh Ltd., 206 AD2d 450, 450; see Cobble Hill Nursing Home v. Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d at 481-483).Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by submitting evidence establishing that the contract lacked a material term regarding the price or fees to be paid to the plaintiff for Internet-related service, and therefore constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree (see DirectTV Latin Am., LLC v. RCTV Intl. Corp., 115 AD3d 539, 540; Parkway Group v. Modell’s Sporting Goods, 254 AD2d 338). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.PEOPLE, res, v. Gregory Santogual, ap — Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Wayne M. Ozzi, J.), dated November 21, 2012, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.In this proceeding pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), the Supreme Court assessed the defendant 130 points on the risk assessment instrument (hereinafter RAI), within the range for a presumptive designation as a level three sex offender. Additionally, the court denied the defendant’s request for a downward departure from that presumptive risk level, and it designated him a level three sex offender. The defendant challenges the assessment of 15 points under risk factor 11 (drug or alcohol abuse), as well as the court’s denial of his request for a downward departure.The Supreme Court erred in assessing the defendant 15 points under risk factor 11. Assessment of points in that category may be appropriate if the offender has a “history” of substance abuse or if the defendant “was abusing drugs and or alcohol at the time of the offense” (SORA: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 15 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; see People v. Palmer, 20 NY3d 373, 379-380). Here, there was no contention that the defendant was abusing drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense, and the case summary itself stated that there “was no evidence of a substance abuse history.” The court’s assessment of points under this factor was based on proof of a single disciplinary adjudication for drug use. This adjudication in itself was insufficient to establish that the defendant had a “history” of substance abuse within the meaning of this risk factor (Guidelines at 15; cf. People v. Palmer, 20 NY3d at 378; People v. Marsh, 116 AD3d 680, 681).Nevertheless, even with the subtraction of the 15 points erroneously assessed under risk factor 11, the defendant’s point total on the RAI was in the range for a presumptive level three designation. The defendant contends that the Supreme Court should have granted his request for a downward departure. A court determining a defendant’s risk level under SORA may not downwardly depart from the presumptive risk level unless the defendant first identifies and proves by a preponderance of the evidence the facts in support of “a mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise adequately taken into account by the SORA Guidelines” (People v. Lathan, 129 AD3d 686, 687 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guidelines at 4; People v. Moultrie, 147 AD3d 800, 801). An offender’s rehabilitation as evidenced by the totality of the record may, under some circumstances, constitute a proper mitigating factor for a downward departure (see People v. Williams, 148 AD3d 540, 541; People v. Moultrie, 147 AD3d at 801; People v. Rivera, 109 AD3d 805, 806; People v. Madison, 98 AD3d 573, 574). In this case, however, the defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts in support of this mitigating factor (see People v. Moultrie, 147 AD3d at 801). Accordingly, the court properly denied the defendant’s request for a downward departure and properly designated the defendant a level three sex offender (see id.).BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.Constantin Simion res, v. Franklin Center for Rehabilitation & Nursing, Inc., ap — (Index No. 701888/14)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nahman, J.), entered September 21, 2015, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.The plaintiff Constantin Simion (hereinafter the plaintiff), a resident at the defendant nursing facility, allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on water on the floor near the sink in his room. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant negligently created the condition when one of its nurses spilled water on the floor while giving the plaintiff’s roommate a bed bath shortly before the plaintiff fell. The plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages allegedly caused by the defendant’s negligence. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court denied the motion.“In a [slip]-and-fall case, a defendant may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his or her fall” (Buglione v. Spagnoletti, 123 AD3d 867, 867). ”However, that a defective or dangerous condition was the proximate cause of an accident can be established in the absence of direct evidence of causation and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances underlying the injury” (id.). ”Cases grounded on circumstantial evidence require a showing of sufficient facts from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence can be reasonably inferred” (Bettineschi v. Healy Elec. Contr., Inc., 73 AD3d 1109, 1110). ”However, the record must render the other possible causes sufficiently remote to enable the trier of fact to reach a verdict based upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence, not upon speculation” (Thomas v. New York City Tr. Auth., 194 AD2d 663, 664; see Bradish v. Tank Tech Corp., 216 AD2d 505).In moving for summary judgment, the defendant argued, inter alia, that there was no evidence that water was on the floor. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted, inter alia, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which he testified that a nurse washes his roommate every morning, he has personally observed water spill on the floor when that happens, and he has complained about such condition at least 10 times in the past. The plaintiff further testified that he heard his roommate being cared for and someone walking back and forth from the sink to his roommate that morning, and that the roommate’s shirt was wet after the accident. Such evidence, although circumstantial, permits a reasonable inference that the nurse washed the plaintiff’s roommate that morning and spilled water on the floor, which proximately caused the plaintiff to fall (see Quiroz v. 176 N. Main, LLC, 125 AD3d 628; Dunleavy v. Tuttle, 83 AD3d 995; Bettineschi v. Healy Elec. Contr., Inc., 73 AD3d 1109). Accordingly, the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden on its motion for summary judgment, and the Supreme Court properly denied its motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ opposition papers (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.Margaret E. Trela, res, v. City of Long Beach, appellant def — (Appeal No. 1) Margaret E. Trela, plf-res, v. City of Long Beach, def-res, Christensen Management, Inc. ap — (Appeal No. 2) (Index No. 2532/15)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of Long Beach appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered February 10, 2017, as denied that branch of its cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the defendants Christensen Management, Inc., and Board of Managers of the Oceanwalk Condominium Association separately appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same order as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the plaintiff by the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell while riding her bicycle on a sidewalk abutting the premises of the defendants Christensen Management, Inc., and Board of Managers of the Oceanwalk Condominium Association (hereinafter together Oceanwalk). Approximately 1 months prior to the incident, the defendant City of Long Beach had excavated a portion of the sidewalk and backfilled it with a temporary patch, cordoning off the area with safety barrels and yellow caution tape. At the time of the incident, the safety barrels and yellow caution tape were not present.Oceanwalk moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, contending that it had no duty to maintain the sidewalk where the accident occurred and, in any event, that it did not have notice of the alleged defect. The City cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, contending that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defect and that it did not affirmatively create it. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied both motions. Oceanwalk and the City separately appeal.With respect to Oceanwalk, “[g]enerally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous condition on a public sidewalk is placed on the municipality, and not on the owner of the abutting land” (James v. Blackmon, 58 AD3d 808, 808). ”The exceptions to this rule are when the landowner actually created the dangerous condition, made negligent repairs that caused the condition, created the dangerous condition through a special use of the sidewalk, or violated a statute or ordinance imposing liability on the abutting landowner for failing to maintain the sidewalk” (Buonviaggio v. Parkside Assoc., L.P., 120 AD3d 460, 461; see Gelstein v. City of New York, 153 AD3d 604, 604; Metzker v. City of New York, 139 AD3d 828, 829). The Charter of the City of Long Beach imposes a duty on landowners to maintain and repair abutting sidewalks (see Charter of City of Long Beach §256). Here, Oceanwalk failed to establish, prima facie, that it had no duty to maintain the abutting sidewalk where the incident occurred (see Charter of City of Long Beach §256; Code of Ordinances of City of Long Beach §1-2). Oceanwalk also failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have constructive notice of the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall (see Jeremias v. Lake Forest Estates, 147 AD3d 742, 743; James v. Orion Condo-350 W. 42nd St., LLC, 138 AD3d 927, 927; Pryzywalny v. New York City Tr. Auth., 69 AD3d 598, 599). Since Oceanwalk failed to meet its initial burden, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion, without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).With respect to the City, “[w]here, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition which comes within the ambit of the law unless it has received prior written notice of the alleged defect or dangerous condition, or an exception to the prior written notice requirement applies” (Palka v. Village of Ossining, 120 AD3d 641, 641; see Amabile v. City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474). There are two “recognized exceptions to the rule—that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality” (Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 NY3d 726, 728). The affirmative act exception, the only exception at issue here, is limited to work by the municipality that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition (id. at 728; Oboler v. City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889; Beiner v. Village of Scarsdale, 149 AD3d 679, 680).“[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings” (Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 AD3d 210, 214). The plaintiff alleged, in her pleadings, that the City negligently maintained and repaired the sidewalk and affirmatively created the dangerous condition that caused the accident. Thus, to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the City was required to demonstrate, prima facie, both that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defect, and that it did not create the alleged defect (see Loghry v. Village of Scarsdale, 149 AD3d 714, 715; Beiner v. Village of Scarsdale, 149 AD3d at 680; McManus v. Klein, 136 AD3d 700, 701; Lima v. Village of Garden City, 131 AD3d 947, 948; Steins v. Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958).Although the City demonstrated that it did not receive prior written notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the sidewalk, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the allegedly dangerous condition. The City’s evidentiary submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether its work on the sidewalk immediately left it in a condition that was dangerous to pedestrians and bicyclists (see Kiernan v. Thompson, 73 NY2d 840, 841-842; Lewak v. Town of Hempstead, 147 AD3d 919, 920; Kelley v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 138 AD3d 931, 933; Monaco v. Hodosky, 127 AD3d 705, 707; cf. Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 NY3d at 728). Since the City did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the City’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Bank of America, N.A., res, v. Marva Cudjoe, appellant def — (Index No. 630/11)In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Marva Cudjoe appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), dated February 20, 2015, which, inter alia, denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel discovery and granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against her.ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage given by the defendant Marva Cudjoe (hereinafter the defendant) to secure a note in the sum of $348,000. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendant defaulted on the note and mortgage by failing to make the monthly payment due June 2010. The defendant, appearing pro se, answered the complaint with a general denial as to the allegations in the complaint. When no settlement was reached and the action was released from the mandatory settlement part, the defendant moved to compel disclosure relating to the plaintiff’s ownership of the note. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved, among other things, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff’s cross motion.Generally, on a motion for summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default (see DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Sosa, 153 AD3d 666, 667). When the defendant has placed standing in issue, the plaintiff must also, as part of its prima facie showing, demonstrate that it has standing (see Onewest Bank, N.A. v. Mahoney, 154 AD3d 770; Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v. Caserta, 154 AD3d 691). If the plaintiff meets its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to raise a triable issue of fact (see Bank of Am., N.A. v. DeNardo, 151 AD3d 1008, 1010). Here, the defendant’s mere general denial of the allegations in the complaint did not raise the issue of the plaintiff’s standing, so the defense of lack of standing was waived, and the plaintiff was not required to demonstrate, prima facie, its ownership of the note at the time the action was commenced (see Citigroup v. Kopelowitz, 147 AD3d 1014, 1015). Thus, the plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing the mortgage, the note, and evidence of the defendant’s default. In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Emigrant Bank v. Marando, 143 AD3d 856, 857). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant.In light of the defendant’s waiver of the issue of the plaintiff’s standing to commence the action and the defendant’s failure to seek leave to amend her answer to raise that issue (cf. US Bank, N.A. v. Primiano, 140 AD3d 857, 857), the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel discovery on that issue (cf. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Ventura, 130 AD3d 919, 920).The defendant’s contentions that the plaintiff’s submissions were insufficient to demonstrate that it complied with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 and that the plaintiff failed to comply with the condition precedent set forth in RPAPL 1306 are improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Barton, 149 AD3d 676, 679; 40 BP, LLC v. Katatikarn, 147 AD3d 710, 711).The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Marva Cudjoe, ap, v. Sara Z. Boriskin respondents def — (Index No. 2052/15)In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), entered March 9, 2016, which granted the motion of the defendants Sara Z. Boriskin, Persia M. Kinraich, and Kim Walker pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and denied her cross motion for relief pursuant to CPLR 3024(b) and denied her separate cross motion to disqualify those defendants’ attorney and his law firm.ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for relief pursuant to CPLR 3024(b) is dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right therefrom (see CPLR 5701[b][3]), and we decline to grant leave to appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.In 2006, the plaintiff, Marva Cudjoe, executed a note in favor of Countrywide Bank, N.A. (hereinafter Countrywide), and, as security, gave a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (hereinafter MERS), as nominee for the lender. Cudjoe subsequently defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage by failing to make the payment due. Thereafter, MERS, as nominee for Countrywide, assigned the mortgage to the defendant BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (hereinafter BAC). The written assignment was executed by the defendant Sara Z. Boriskin, Assistant Secretary, MERS, as nominee for Countrywide, and was notarized by the defendant Kim Walker. BAC later commenced a foreclosure action against Cudjoe, alleging, inter alia, that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. The defendant Persia M. Kinraich allegedly signed the complaint in the foreclosure action commenced against Cudjoe.While the foreclosure action remained pending, Cudjoe commenced the instant action to quiet title, alleging that Boriskin was without authority to execute the assignment of mortgage and, thus, that “the defendants have engaged in a wrongful foreclosure action, based upon fraud.” Boriskin, along with Kinraich and Walker (hereinafter collectively the defendants), made a pre-answer motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted the motion. Cudjoe appeals.To maintain a cause of action to quiet title, a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title to the property, such as in a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative (see Zuniga v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 147 AD3d 882, 883). Here, Cudjoe does not dispute the validity of the note and mortgage. Instead, she, in effect, challenges BAC’s standing to commence the foreclosure action. That challenge is misplaced in this action, which seeks not to foreclose a mortgage, but to quiet title. Standing to commence the foreclosure action is not properly raised in this action to quiet title (see id. at 883; Jahan v. U.S. Bank N.A., 127 AD3d 926, 927). That issue should have been raised, if at all, in the foreclosure action. Accordingly, Cudjoe’s contentions regarding standing did not provide a basis for relief in this action, and the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them (see CPLR 3211[b]).The Supreme Court also properly denied Cudjoe’s separate cross motion to disqualify the defendants’ attorney and his law firm (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Caro, 82 AD3d 880, 881).BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Cohen, Maltese and Iannacci, JJ.MATTER of Johanna B. (Anonymous). Suffolk County Department of Social Services, res; Grace B. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Josiah B. (Anonymous). Suffolk County Department of Social Services, res; Grace B. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 2) (Docket Nos. B-5826-16, B-5830-16)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Theresa Whelan, J.), dated January 4, 2017. The order denied the mother’s motion to vacate an order of fact-finding and disposition of that court dated August 3, 2016, which, upon her failure to appear at a hearing after an inquest, terminated her parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, and transferred custody and guardianship of the subject children to the Suffolk County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption.ORDERED that the order dated January 4, 2017, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.In these two related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law §384-b to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother was sent written notice that if she failed to appear in court on a scheduled hearing date, an inquest would be held in her absence. The mother failed to appear and the Family Court conducted an inquest in her absence. The court found that the mother did not satisfy the requirement, imposed on her in a prior order, that she successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program, including follow-up treatment, and did not visit with the children regularly. The court found that the mother had permanently neglected the children, and committed guardianship and custody of the children to the Suffolk County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption. The mother moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the order entered upon her default. The court denied the mother’s motion, finding that she had failed to set forth a reasonable excuse or a potentially meritorious defense to warrant vacatur of the order. The mother appeals.The determination of whether to relieve a party of a default is within the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Isabella R.W. [Jessica W.], 142 AD3d 503, 504; Matter of Kimberly S.K. [Kimberly K.], 138 AD3d 853, 854; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.-A.], 122 AD3d 837, 839). A parent seeking to vacate an order entered upon his or her default in a termination of parental rights proceeding must establish a reasonable excuse for the default, as well as a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Matter of Isabella R.W. [Jessica W.], 142 AD3d at 504; Matter of Kimberly S.K. [Kimberly K.], 138 AD3d at 854; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.-A.], 122 AD3d at 839).Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother’s motion to vacate the order entered upon her default. The mother failed to show a reasonable excuse for her default. The court determined that the mother’s excuse that she was unaware of the court date was not credible. This determination is supported by the record, and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 276; Matter of Iris G. [Angel G.], 144 AD3d 908, 908; Matter of Bullard v. Clark, 154 AD3d 846). Because the mother did not have a reasonable excuse for her default, this Court need not determine whether she established that she had a potentially meritorious defense (see Matter of Brandon G. [Tiynia D.], 155 AD3d 626, 627; Matter of Nathalie D.N. [Nathaniel H.], 149 AD3d 750).RIVERA, J.P., COHEN, MALTESE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Ronell Bonds, ap — (Ind. No. 4684/10)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mangano, Jr., J.), rendered August 14, 2013, convicting him of murder in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, intimidating a witness in the first degree, and tampering with a witness in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to discharge a sworn juror who, prior to empanelment, stated that she was experiencing anxiety related to her employment, since the court’s inquiry established that the juror’s concerns would not adversely impact her ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror (see CPL 270.15[3]; People v. DeFreitas, 116 AD3d 1078, 1080-1081; People v. Morales, 36 AD3d 631, 632; People v. Echevarria, 30 AD3d 537; cf. People v. Wells, 63 AD3d 967, 968, affd 15 NY3d 927; People v. Huntley, 237 AD2d 533, 534; People v. Bolden, 197 AD2d 528, 529; People v. Vasquez, 141 AD2d 880, 881). The defendant’s related assertion that his trial counsel was not afforded an adequate opportunity to question the juror is without merit.The defendant’s contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions because the testimony of his accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]) and, in any event, without merit (see People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 149; People v. Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673, 683; People v. Montefusco, 44 AD3d 879, 880). Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348-349), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).The defendant’s contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the Supreme Court failed to comply with the procedure for addressing jury notes set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v. O’Rama (78 NY2d 270, 277-278) is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Ramirez, 15 NY3d 824, 825-826; People v. Fabers, 133 AD3d 616, 617). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the alleged failure to comply with the O’Rama procedure did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which would obviate the preservation requirement because it is evident from the record that the court fulfilled its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30 by providing defense counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the jury note (see People v. Nealon, 26 NY3d 152; People v. Gibson, 147 AD3d 779, 780; People v. Deokoro, 137 AD3d 1297, 1298; People v. Fabers, 133 AD3d at 618). In any event, the contention is without merit.MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Joseph Evans, ap — (Ind. No. 8785/11)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (William M. Harrington, J.), rendered August 5, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Miriam Cyrulnik, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.The defendant’s contentions regarding that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence are without merit. The hearing court properly found that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his home (see People v. Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128-130; People v. Quagliata, 53 AD3d 670, 671). Although the defendant contended that he informed the police officers that they did not have consent to search his home, the hearing court credited a police officer’s testimony to the contrary, and there is no basis to disturb that credibility finding on appeal (see People v. Visich, 57 AD3d 804, 806). The failure of the officers to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent was not sufficient to render the defendant’s consent involuntary (see People v. Gonzalez, 39 NY2d at 130; People v. Artis, 201 AD2d 488, 489; People v. Buggs, 140 AD2d 617, 617-618). Furthermore, the defendant cooperated with the officers before consenting to the search, the number of officers present when the defendant consented does not compel a finding that his consent was involuntary, and there was no evidence that the officers in any way exerted “unjustified psychological pressure” over the defendant in order to obtain consent to search (People v. Litt, 71 AD2d 926, 929; see People v. Gonzalez, 39 NY2d at 129; People v. Burno, 130 AD3d 747, 747; People v. Leiva, 33 AD3d 1021, 1023).The defendant’s contention that the testimony of an analyst from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner violated his right to confrontation is without merit, as the analyst’s testimony established that she used “her independent analysis on the raw data” to conclude that it was 11.4 million times more likely than not that the defendant’s DNA was included in the mixture found on the trigger and trigger guard of the subject gun (People v. John, 27 NY3d 294, 315). Thus, the analyst did not act “as a conduit for the conclusions of others,” (id. at. 315), and the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated.The defendant’s contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is without merit (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668; People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137). The defendant’s remaining contention is not preserved for appellate review, and we decline to review it pursuant to our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v. Padro, 75 NY2d 820, 821; People v. Stewart, 71 AD3d 797, 798; People v. Hewlett, 133 AD2d 418, 419, affd 71 NY2d 841).DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.PEOPLE, res, v. Jerome Michaux, ap — Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Susan Cacace, J.), dated November 2, 2016, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.The defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of two counts of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree relating to repeated sexual acts against his two biological daughters. The conduct with respect to the younger daughter commenced when she was seven years old and extended over a period of more than five years.The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders determined that the defendant was presumptively a level two sex offender based upon the assessment of 100 points against him. The defendant did not contest his point assessment or presumptive risk level. However, the People requested an upward departure from the defendant’s presumptive risk level to risk level three, on the ground that the defendant sexually abused his own children, with whom he cohabitated as a father figure, in their home. The Supreme Court granted the People’s request for an upward departure and designated the defendant a level three sex offender.As noted by the Court of Appeals in People v. Gillotti (23 NY3d 841, 861), a court must follow three analytical steps to determine whether to order a departure from the presumptive risk level indicated by the points assessment made pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary (2006; hereinafter Guidelines). First, “the court must decide whether the aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged by a party seeking a departure are, as a matter of law, of a kind or to a degree not adequately taken into account by the [G]uidelines” (People v. Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861). Second, the court must decide whether the party seeking the departure has adduced sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof establishing the alleged aggravating or mitigating factor (see id.). In this case, the People were seeking an upward departure and were required to establish the aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence (see id. at 861-862). If the party seeking the departure surmounts the first two steps, “the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an over- or under-assessment of the defendant’s dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism” (id. at 861).The upward departure in this case was based upon the defendant’s relationship with the victims. Risk factor 7 of the Guidelines provides for the assessment of 20 points if the victim was a stranger or a “person with whom a relationship had been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization,” or if the offense “arose in the context of a professional or avocational relationship” (Guidelines at 12). The fact that the victims were the defendant’s biological daughters was not taken into account by the Guidelines (see People v. Mantilla, 70 AD3d 477). The defendant’s incestuous relationship with his two daughters, one of whom was only seven years old when the abuse began, warranted an upward departure from his presumptive risk level to risk level three (see People v. Ziliox, 145 AD3d 925).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly designated the defendant a level three sex offender.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Paul Sellers, ap — (Ind. No. 30/12)Paul Sellers, Attica, NY, appellant pro se.William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Bridget R. Steller of counsel), for respondent.Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J.), rendered July 18, 2013, convicting him of conspiracy in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree (two counts), assault in the first degree, attempted assault in the first degree, gang assault in the first degree, attempted gang assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).The defendant’s contention that the prosecutor presented perjured testimony is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]) and, in any event, without merit (see People v. Robinson, 138 AD3d 764, 766; People v. Tate, 110 AD3d 1013, 1014; People v. Jordan, 181 AD2d 745).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Timothy Ramirez, ap — (Ind. No. 30/12)Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, NY, for appellant.William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Bridget R. Steller of counsel), for respondent.Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J.), rendered August 12, 2013, convicting him of conspiracy in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree (two counts), assault in the first degree, and attempted assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.Contrary to the defendant’s contention, his right to be present during a material stage of the trial was not violated when, in his absence, and in the absence of defense counsel and the prosecutor, the County Court notified the jurors that they were going to be sequestered and delivered sequestration instructions. While a defendant has a statutory right to be present when the jury is given instructions or information by the court (see CPL 310.30; People v. Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760), not every communication with a deliberating jury requires the presence of the defendant (see People v. Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26, 30). Here, the court gave no instructions or information pertinent to the case which would have required the defendant’s presence. The colloquy was purely ministerial and wholly unrelated to the substantive legal and factual issues of the trial (see People v. Hameed, 88 NY2d 232, 241). Therefore, the challenged discussion bore no substantial relationship to the defendant’s opportunity to defend against the charges, and it did not violate his right to be present (see id. at 241; People v. Bonaparte, 78 NY2d at 30; People v. Harris, 76 NY2d 810, 812).The defendant’s contention that the County Court improperly failed to repeat in its final charge cautionary instructions to the jury concerning note-taking is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Wellington, 84 AD3d 984, 985; People v. Harris, 72 AD3d 1110, 1112; People v. Hudson, 54 AD3d 774, 775; People v. Ramos, 306 AD2d 295; People v. Caraballo, 221 AD2d 553, 554). In any event, any error was harmless, since there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and no significant probability that any error contributed to the defendant’s conviction (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237; People v. Hudson, 54 AD3d at 775; People v. Caraballo, 221 AD2d at 554).The defendant’s contention that the County Court erred in admitting evidence of a prior uncharged crime is unpreserved for appellate review. The defendant made only a general objection to that line of questioning and failed to advise the court that the present claimed error was the basis for his objection. The word “objection” alone was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review (see People v. Tevaha, 84 NY2d 879; People v. Croswell, 63 AD3d 754; People v. Young, 278 AD2d 261), since the evidence was not inherently incompetent (see People v. Till, 87 NY2d 835, 836-837; People v. Vidal, 26 NY2d 249, 254). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit.The defendant’s contention that certain comments made by the prosecutor during his summation were improper and deprived him of a fair trial is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Grant, 137 AD3d 938, 938). In any event, the challenged remarks were either within the broad bounds of permissible rhetorical comment, fair comment on the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, or otherwise did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial (see People v. Hawley, 112 AD3d 968, 969; People v. McGowan, 111 AD3d 850, 851; People v. Cromwell, 99 AD3d 1017, 1018). Further, there is no merit to the defendant’s contention that the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors, combined with the prosecutor’s comments, deprived him of a fair trial (see People v. Racks, 125 AD3d 692, 694).Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the sentence imposed by the County Court did not improperly penalize him for exercising his right to a jury trial. The fact that the sentence imposed after trial was greater than the sentence offered during plea negotiations is not, standing alone, an indication that the defendant was punished for asserting his right to proceed to trial (see People v. Stevenson, 129 AD3d 998, 1000; People v. Murray, 116 AD3d 1068, 1069). A review of the record reveals no retaliation or vindictiveness against the defendant for electing to proceed to trial (see People v. Murray, 116 AD3d at 1069; People v. Griffin, 98 AD3d 688, 690). Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Roman, Lasalle and Barros, JJ.HSBC Bank USA, National Association, etc., res, v. Archibong Archibong def, Delia Archibong, ap — (Index No. 25/14)Delia Archibong, Westbury, NY, appellant pro se.Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, NY (David Dunn, Chava Brandriss, and Shawna C. MacLeod of counsel), for respondent.In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Delia Archibong appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered May 12, 2015, as denied that branch of her motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction.ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing on the issue of whether the defendant Delia Archibong was properly served with process pursuant to CPLR 308(2), and a new determination thereafter of that branch of her motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her.“A process server’s affidavit of service ordinarily constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service” (Rosemark Contrs., Inc. v. Ness, 149 AD3d 1115, 1115 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Emigrant Bank v. Ramasir, 145 AD3d 856, 857; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tauber, 140 AD3d 1154, 1155; FV-1, Inc. v. Reid, 138 AD3d 922, 923). ”Bare and unsubstantiated denials are insufficient to rebut the presumption of service” (Rosemark Contrs., Inc. v. Ness, 149 AD3d at 1115; see Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Greenberg, 138 AD3d 984, 985; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Christie, 83 AD3d 824, 825). ”However, a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the affidavit of service and necessitates a hearing” (Rosemark Contrs., Inc. v. Ness, 149 AD3d at 1115; see Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Greenberg, 138 AD3d at 985; FV-1, Inc. v. Reid, 138 AD3d at 923). ”If an issue regarding service turns upon a question of credibility, a hearing should be held to render a determination on this issue” (Rosemark Contrs., Inc. v. Ness, 149 AD3d at 1115; see FV-1, Inc. v. Reid, 138 AD3d at 924).Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining that branch of the motion of the defendant Delia Archibong (hereinafter the defendant) which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction without first conducting a hearing. The defendant demonstrated her entitlement to a hearing on the issue of service through her affidavit, in which she denied that she knew anyone by the name of Tom Jonel, the person allegedly served at her house, that no one by that name or with that physical description lived in her house, and that she was the only person at home when the summons and complaint were allegedly served (see Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Greenberg, 138 AD3d at 985; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Christie, 83 AD3d at 825).RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, LASALLE and BARROS, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Austin, Connolly and Iannacci, JJ.MATTER of Thomas Russel Gangi, res, v. Ginamarie Sanfratello, ap — (Docket No. V-10465-15)Amy E. King, Amagansett, NY, for appellant.Kevin G. McClancy, Central Islip, NY, for respondent.Jordan Freundlich, Lake Success, NY, attorney for the child.Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (George F. Harkin, J.), dated August 22, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the father’s petition to modify an order of custody of that court dated June 2, 2014, entered on consent, so as to award him sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ child.ORDERED that the order dated August 22, 2016, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.In 2014, the parties entered into an order of custody on consent in which they agreed to share legal custody of their child, with primary residential custody to the mother. In 2015, the father filed a petition to modify the order so as to award him sole legal and physical custody of the child. After a hearing, and after conducting an in camera interview with the child, the Family Court granted the father’s petition. The mother appeals.Where modification of an existing custody arrangement is sought, the petitioner must make a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is necessary to protect the best interests of the child (see Matter of Harrison v. McClellan, 151 AD3d 723, 723; Matter of Scott v. Powell, 146 AD3d 964, 965; Matter of Zall v. Theiss, 144 AD3d 831, 832). The best interests of the child are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171-173; Anonymous 2011-1 v. Anonymous 2011-2, 136 AD3d 946, 948; McAvoy v. Hannigan, 107 AD3d 960, 962-963). Since the Family Court’s determination with respect to custody and visitation depends to a great extent upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, deference is accorded to its findings in this regard, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Estrada v. Palacios, 148 AD3d 804; Matter of Hargrove v. Langenau, 138 AD3d 846; Matter of Saldana v. Lopresti, 133 AD3d 669, 670; Matter of Mack v. Kass, 115 AD3d 748, 749).Here, there was testimony at the hearing that the parties had failed to follow various terms of the order of custody, and had repeatedly engaged in heated verbal disputes in the presence of the child. In addition, since the time of entry of the order of custody, the child had been absent from school numerous times, his grades had dropped, and he had exhibited signs of depression. In light of this testimony, the Family Court properly determined that joint custody was no longer appropriate because the parents were unable to sufficiently communicate and cooperate on matters concerning the child (see Matter of Lee v. Fitts, 147 AD3d 1058, 1059; Matter of Zall v. Theiss, 144 AD3d 831, 833). In addition, contrary to the mother’s contention, the court’s determination that the child’s interests would be best served by awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record and, therefore, will not be disturbed (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d at 173-174; Matter of Harrison v. McClellan, 151 AD3d at 723-724; Matter of DeVita v. DeVita, 143 AD3d 981, 982-983; Matter of Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt, 129 AD3d 1091, 1092-1093).RIVERA, J.P., AUSTIN, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Miller, Duffy, Lasalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Khayyan Tyrrell, ap — (Ind. No. 3352/14)Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY, for appellant.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Jodi L. Mandel of counsel), for respondent.Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (W. Miller, J.), rendered October 1, 2015, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631).BALKIN, J.P., MILLER, DUFFY, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Leventhal, Austin and Cohen, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Francis A. Zarrro, Jr., ap — (Ind. No. 23/03)Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated October 27, 2009 (People v. Zarro, 66 AD3d 1050), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County, rendered November 18, 2004.ORDERED that the application is denied.The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel (see Jones v. Barnes, 463 US 745; People v. Stultz, 2 NY3d 277).MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, AUSTIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.Yuemei Wu, res, v. Automotive Rentals, Inc., et al., ap — (Index No. 274/16)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera, J.), dated February 17, 2017, which granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.On January 4, 2016, at approximately 11:55 a.m., the plaintiff, with the pedestrian signal in her favor, was crossing 3rd Avenue at its intersection with 37th Street in Brooklyn. A vehicle owned by the defendant Automotive Rentals, Inc., and driven by the defendant Jonathan Kus, struck her as it was turning right from 37th Street onto 3rd Avenue. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries.The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, submitting her deposition testimony and the deposition testimony of the defendant driver. The plaintiff testified that she looked in both directions and saw no vehicles. When the pedestrian signal changed in her favor, she waited “a bit,” looked around to her right and left three to four times, and then started walking while looking around as she walked. She had taken about 10 steps before the subject accident occurred. She did not see the defendants’ vehicle prior to impact. The defendant driver testified at his deposition that he started his right turn and did not realize there was an accident until he felt contact, and heard his front-seat passenger yell that someone was there. He admitted that he never saw the plaintiff prior to contact with the front of his vehicle. He was cited for the traffic violation of failing to yield the right-of-way, and pleaded guilty to that violation.In opposition, the defendants submitted the affidavit of an expert, stating that in his opinion, the plaintiff did not stop and wait for the light, and she did not look to the left or the right. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.The plaintiff established, prima facie, through admissible evidence, that the defendant driver failed to yield the right-of-way to her (see Huang v. Franco, 149 AD3d 703; Gomez v. Novak, 140 AD3d 831; Benedikt v. Certified Lbr. Corp., 60 AD3d 798), and that she was observant while crossing the intersection. The conclusion of the defendants’ expert to the contrary was based upon speculation (see Johnson v. Robertson, 131 AD3d 670, 673). We note that the facts of this action are distinguishable from Castiglione v. Kruse (130 AD3d 957, revd 27 NY3d 1018) and Thoma v. Ronai (189 AD2d 635, affd 82 NY2d 736).As neither the plaintiff’s submissions nor the defendants’ opposition papers revealed any triable issue of fact regarding the plaintiff’s comparative negligence, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability (see Huang v. Franco, 149 AD3d at 704).DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. John Thomas, ap — (Ind. Nos. 4142/13, 6821/15)Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Meredith S. Holt of counsel), for appellant.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Jodi L. Mandel of counsel; Felix O. De Jesus on the brief), for respondent.Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), both rendered May 4, 2016, convicting him of sex trafficking under Indictment No. 4142/13, and attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Indictment No. 6821/15, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.ORDERED that the judgment rendered under Indictment No. 4142/13 is modified, on the law, by vacating the sentence imposed; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith; and it is further,ORDERED that the judgment rendered under Indictment No. 6821/15 is affirmed.The defendant pleaded guilty under Kings County Indictment No. 4142/13 to sex trafficking (Penal Law §230.34[2]) for acts he committed when he was 17 to 18 years old. He also pleaded guilty under Kings County Indictment No. 6821/15 to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law §§110.00, 265.03[3]) for acts he committed when he was 22 years old. The Supreme Court sentenced him under both indictments on May 4, 2016. The defendant appeals from both judgments of conviction, contending that the court erred in failing to consider whether he should be treated as a youthful offender for his sex trafficking conviction (see People v. Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497), and that the sentence imposed on his conviction of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was excessive (see CPL 470.15[6][b]).CPL 720.20(1) provides, in relevant part, that upon the conviction of an eligible youth, “at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender.” Compliance with this statutory mandate requires that the sentencing court actually consider and make a determination of whether an eligible youth is entitled to youthful offender treatment, “even where [the] defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request” (People v. Rudolph, 21 NY3d at 499; see People v. T.E., 131 AD3d 1067, 1068; People v. Dawkins, 131 AD3d 482, 483; People v. Stevens, 127 AD3d 791, 792). The People correctly concede that the defendant was an eligible youth with respect to the sex trafficking conviction, and the record here does not demonstrate that, at the time of the sentencing, the Supreme Court considered whether the defendant should be afforded youthful offender treatment as required by CPL 720.20 (see People v. Rudolph, 21 NY3d at 503; People v. Henry, 143 AD3d 1001; People v. T.E., 131 AD3d at 1068; People v. Stevens, 127 AD3d at 792). Where, as here, the sentencing court failed to comply with CPL 720.20, this Court must vacate the sentence and remit the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing after determining whether the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender (see People v. Henry, 143 AD3d 1001; People v. Youmans, 140 AD3d 1097; People v. Eric P., 135 AD3d 882, 883; People v. Worrell, 134 AD3d 1137, 1138; People v. Ayende, 133 AD3d 771; cf. CPL 470.15[2][c]; [4][c]). The People’s reliance on People v. Brooks (120 AD3d 1255) and People v. Newman (137 AD3d 1306) for the proposition that the sentence need not be vacated is misplaced inasmuch as, in each of those cases, the sentence had been served by the time of the appeal and thus was not subject to vacatur. We also reject the People’s contention that this appeal should be held in abeyance pending the court’s determination of whether the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender. The defendant has raised no issue on appeal that is not fully decided herein, and thus there is nothing upon which to reserve decision.Contrary to the People’s contention, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s purported waiver of the right to appeal does not preclude appellate review of his claim that the sentence imposed under Indictment No. 6821/15 was excessive. The plea colloquy fails to establish that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal the severity of his sentence (see People v. Maracle, 19 NY3d 925, 927-928; People v. Mitchell, 153 AD3d 939; see also People v. Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 340; People v. Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264; People v. Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256). However, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence under Indictment No. 4142/13 must be vacated and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of whether the defendant should be afforded youthful offender treatment, and thereupon, resentencing.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Pedro Soto, plf-res, v. CBS Corporation, et al., defendants third-party plaintiffs-ap; Principal Building Services, LLC; third-party defendant- res — (Index No. 4870/11)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated February 2, 2016, as granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, denied their cross motion for leave to renew their opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to compel discovery, which was granted in an order of the same court dated April 22, 2015, and compelled them to produce that discovery as directed in the order dated April 22, 2015.ORDERED that the order dated February 2, 2016, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.The plaintiff allegedly was injured when an interior stairway on which he was standing partially collapsed. In February 2011, the plaintiff commenced this negligence action against the defendants to recover damages for his injuries, alleging that the defendants owned, operated, maintained, managed, and controlled the stairway. Throughout the discovery phase of the action, the Supreme Court issued several orders compelling the defendants to produce certain evidence identifying the entity responsible for the control and maintenance of the stairway up to and including the time of the accident. In the most recent of those orders, dated April 22, 2015, the court directed the defendants to produce the identity of the entity that repaired the stairway after the plaintiff’s accident and provide documentation of payment to that entity within 45 days. The defendants did not produce the information, and instead, in May 2015, commenced a third-party action against the third-party defendant, the defendants’ cleaning contractor. The plaintiff thereafter moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, and the defendants cross-moved for leave to renew their opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to compel discovery of the post-accident repair records. The court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, denied the defendants’ cross motion for leave to renew, and directed the defendants to produce the discovery set forth in its order dated April 22, 2015. The defendants appeal.“CPLR 1010 provides a safety valve for cases in which the third-party claim ‘will unduly delay the determination of the main action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party’”(Annanquartey v. Passeser, 260 AD2d 517, 517, quoting CPLR 1010 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gomez v. City of New York, 78 AD3d 482, 483-484; Cipollina v. Kent, 52 AD2d 632, 632). Where the record indicates that a third-party plaintiff knowingly and deliberately delayed in commencing the third-party action, the Supreme Court acts within its discretion to dismiss the third-party complaint (see Skolnick v. Max Connor, LLC, 89 AD3d 443, 444; Grant v. Wainer, 179 AD2d 364, 365; cf. Range v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 150 AD3d 515, 516). Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the court correctly granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint because the defendants deliberately and intentionally delayed commencing the third-party action for more than four years.“CPLR 3101(a) requires full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” (Del Vecchio v. Danielle Assoc., LLC, 94 AD3d 941, 942; see Giordano v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 84 AD3d 729, 730-731). ”‘Evidence of subsequent repairs and remedial measures is not discoverable or admissible in a negligence case unless there is an issue of maintenance or control’” (Del Vecchio v. Danielle Assoc., LLC, 94 AD3d at 942, quoting Cleland v. 60-02 Woodside Corp., 221 AD2d 307, 308; see DeRoche v. Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn, 249 AD2d 438, 439). Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, an issue exists as to the identity of the entity responsible for the structural maintenance and control of the stairway. Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly directed the defendants to produce discovery concerning the post-accident repairs.The parties’ remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Miller, Duffy, Lasalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Omar Rowe, ap — (Ind. No. 3759/16)Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY, for appellant.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Jodi L. Mandel of counsel), for respondent.Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cassandra Mullen, J.), rendered September 21, 2016, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; People v. Paige, 54 AD2d 631; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).BALKIN, J.P., MILLER, DUFFY, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.Angelo Mandarano, ap, v. PND, LLC res — (Index No. 1574/14)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Buggs, J.), dated June 23, 2016, which granted the motion of the defendants PND, LLC, and AN & Brothers, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and, upon searching the record, awarded summary judgment to the defendants BBCN Bancorp, Inc., and BBCN Bank, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on a large piece of wet cardboard during a rainstorm. The cardboard was located on the public sidewalk adjacent to a building in Manhattan owned by the defendants PND, LLC, and AN & Brothers, Inc. (hereinafter together the PND defendants), and leased in part to the defendants BBCN Bancorp, Inc., and BBCN Bank (hereinafter together the BBCN defendants). Following discovery, the PND defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted the motion and, upon searching the record, awarded summary judgment in favor of the BBCN defendants. The plaintiff appeals.A defendant that moves for summary judgment in a trip-and-fall case has the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that it neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition (see Jackson v. Jamaica First Parking, LLC, 91 AD3d 602, 603; Freiser v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 84 AD3d 1307, 1308; Birnbaum v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d 598). To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit the defendant’s employees to discover and remedy it (see Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 838; Birnbaum v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d at 598-599; Bykofsky v. Waldbaum’s Supermarkets, 210 AD2d 280).Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the PND defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence of their trash collection and disposal practices, deposition testimony regarding the routine cleaning of the sidewalk each morning, and deposition testimony from several witnesses who walked through the area shortly before the plaintiff’s accident and did not observe the condition that allegedly caused his fall (see e.g. Mehta v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 129 AD3d 1037, 1038; Freiser v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 84 AD3d at 1308). In opposition, the plaintiff presented speculative arguments that were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Arslan v. Richmond N. Bellmore Realty, LLC, 79 AD3d 950, 951; Kaufman v. Man-Dell Food Stores, 203 AD2d 532, 533).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the PND defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Moreover, given the evidence presented on the motion, the court properly exercised its authority pursuant to CPLR 3212(b) in searching the record and awarding summary judgment to the nonmoving BBCN defendants with respect to an issue that was the subject of the motion before the court (see Sang Woon Lee v. Il Mook Choi, 132 AD3d 969, 971; Bernal v. 521 Park Ave. Condo, 128 AD3d 750, 751).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Hesham Taha, res, v. Abier Elzemity, ap — (Index No. 50819/13)Catherine S. Bridge, Staten Island, NY, for appellant.Kuharski, Levitz & Giovinazzo (Arnold E. DiJoseph, P.C., New York, NY, of counsel), for respondent.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.), dated December 31, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the parties’ prenuptial agreement and granted the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment determining that the prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable.ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion to set aside the parties’ prenuptial agreement is granted and the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment determining that the prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable is denied.The parties were married in 2007, and have three children. Shortly before their marriage, they entered into a prenuptial agreement. The agreement provided, inter alia, that, in the event of separation or divorce, each party waived the right to the other’s separate property, including property acquired from the proceeds of separate property acquired during the marriage; each party would keep separate bank accounts; and the plaintiff’s maintenance obligation would be limited to a lump sum payment of $20,000. In 2008, the parties moved into the marital residence, which was purchased with funds from the plaintiff’s bank account, and the deed and mortgage were placed solely in his name. The plaintiff has been practicing medicine since 1987 and earns approximately $300,000 annually. The defendant, who had been employed part-time as a sales person when the parties met, did not work outside the home during the marriage but dedicated herself to the care of the household and the parties’ children, one with special needs.In October 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. The defendant moved to set aside the prenuptial agreement on the ground, inter alia, that it is unconscionable. The plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment determining that the prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable. After a hearing, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s cross motion and denied the defendant’s motion, finding, inter alia, that the prenuptial agreement is not unconscionable. The defendant appeals.“An agreement between spouses or prospective spouses should be closely scrutinized, and may be set aside upon a showing that it is unconscionable, or the result of fraud, or where it is shown to be manifestly unfair to one spouse because of overreaching on the part of the other spouse” (Bibeau v. Sudick, 122 AD3d 652, 654-655; see Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 73; Lombardi v. Lombardi, 127 AD3d 1038, 1041). ”An agreement is unconscionable if it ‘is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense’” (Sanfilippo v. Sanfilippo, 137 AD3d 773, 774; quoting Label v. Label, 70 AD3d 898, 899 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see McKenna v. McKenna, 121 AD3d 864, 865). An agreement that might not have been unconscionable when entered into may become unconscionable at the time a final judgment would be entered (see Domestic Relations Law §236[B][3]; Maddaloni v. Maddaloni, 142 AD3d 646, 649; Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 138 AD3d 30, 46; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 123 AD3d 581, 584). The burden of proof as to unconscionability is on the party seeking to set aside the agreement (see Ku v. Huey Min Lee, 151 AD3d 1040, 1041; Matter of Fizzinoglia, 118 AD3d 994, 996, affd 26 NY3d 1031).Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant sustained her burden of establishing that the prenuptial agreement was, at the time this action was before the court, unconscionable. Enforcement of the agreement would result in the risk of the defendant’s becoming a public charge. The defendant, who is unemployed, largely without assets, and the primary caregiver for the parties’ young children, would, under the prenuptial agreement, receive only $20,000, in full satisfaction of all claims, even though the plaintiff earns approximately $300,000 annually as a physician (see Maddaloni v. Maddaloni, 142 AD3d at 649-650; Kessler v. Kessler, 33 AD3d 42, 46; Tartaglia v. Tartaglia, 260 AD2d 628, 629). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement should have been granted and the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment should have been denied.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Joel Grossbarth, etc., res, v. Dankner, Milstein and Ruffo, P.C., ap — (Index No. 31526/15)In a proceeding to recover an attorney’s fee, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Loehr, J.), dated April 30, 2015, which granted the petition to the extent of finding that the petitioner was entitled to a determination of his fee on a quantum meruit basis and his disbursements and directing the commencement of discovery.ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of a judgment in the action entered December 16, 2016 (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (Matter of Grossbarth v. Dankner, Milstein and Ruffo, P.C., __ AD3d __ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2017-00389; decided herewith]; see CPLR 5501[a][1]; Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d at 248).BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Joel Grossbarth, etc., res, v. Dankner, Milstein and Ruffo, P.C., ap — (Index No. 31526/15)In a proceeding to recover an attorney’s fee, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Loehr, J.), entered December 16, 2016, which, after a hearing, awarded the petitioner fees and expenses in the total sum of $23,493.16.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.The appellant law firm, Dankner, Milstein and Ruffo, P.C. (hereinafter DMR), was substituted for the petitioner as the attorney for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action after the petitioner was suspended from the practice of law. The malpractice action later settled in favor of the plaintiff. The petitioner was disbarred effective March 19, 2013 (see Matter of Grossbarth, 113 AD3d 14). Neither the petitioner’s suspension nor his disbarment related to his representation of the plaintiff in the underlying medical malpractice action.In April 2015, the petitioner commenced this proceeding against DMR pursuant to 22 NYCRR former 691.10(b), now 1240.15(g), “the rule which governs compensation for a disbarred or suspended attorney based on work done prior to the effective date of suspension or disbarment” (Matter of Grossbarth v. Danker, Milstein & Ruffo, P.C., 142 AD3d 706, 707). The petitioner sought to recover fees on a quantum meruit basis, and expenses allegedly due to him for legal work he performed for the plaintiff in the medical malpractice action prior to his suspension. The Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to recover a fee in quantum meruit and, following a hearing, determined that the petitioner was entitled to fees in quantum meruit and expenses in the sum of $21,316.05. A judgment was thereafter entered in the total sum of $23,493.16, which included interest and disbursements.Contrary to DMR’s contention, the petitioner was not precluded from recovery on the ground that he failed to file a retainer statement with the Office of Court Administration in accordance with 22 NYCRR 691.20(a)(1), since the petitioner did not seek the recovery of fees on a breach of contract theory, but solely on a quantum meruit basis (see Siracusa v. Fitterman, 110 AD3d 1055, 1056; Micro-Spy, Inc. v. Small, 69 AD3d 687, 689; Law Off. of Howard M. File, Esq., P.C. v. Ostashko, 60 AD3d 643, 644-645; cf. Giano v. Ioannou, 78 AD3d 768, 771; Rabinowitz v. Cousins, 219 AD2d 487). The lack of a fee-sharing agreement between the petitioner and DMR also did not preclude the petitioner from seeking the recovery of fees against DMR (see Biagioni v. Narrows MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 127 AD3d 800; Padilla v. Sansivieri, 31 AD3d 64, 66-67; Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco v. Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, 304 AD2d 86, 90-91). Moreover, the petitioner did not forfeit his right to recover fees for the work he performed in the medical malpractice action prior to his suspension (see Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco v. Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, 304 AD2d at 91).Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in determining that the petitioner was entitled to an award of fees on a quantum meruit basis (see 22 NYCRR former 691.10[b], now 1240.15[g]; see generally Biagioni v. Narrows MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 127 AD3d at 801; Padilla v. Sansivieri, 31 AD3d at 66-67; Rosenzweig v. Gomez, 250 AD2d 664, 664).DMR’s remaining contention is without merit.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ.MATTER of McKain W. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, res; Coreen M. (Anonymous), ap — (Docket No. N-5239-15)Appeals from (1) an order of fact-finding of the Family Court, Queens County (Mary R. O’Donoghue, J.), dated August 24, 2016, and (2) an order of disposition of that court (Diane Costanzo, J.), dated January 24, 2017. The order of fact-finding, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the mother neglected the subject child. The order of disposition, after a dispositional hearing, returned the child to the custody of the mother with supervision by the Administration for Children’s Services for 12 months.ORDERED that the appeal from the order of fact-finding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order of disposition and is brought up for review on the appeal from the order of disposition; and it is further,ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, alleging that the mother neglected her child by failing to provide her with adequate education as demonstrated by the child’s excessive absences from school. After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the mother had neglected the child.At a fact-finding hearing in an abuse or neglect proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, a petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused or neglected (see Family Ct Act §1046[b][i]; Matter of Tammie Z., 66 NY2d 1, 3; Matter of Mariah C. [Frey C.-M.], 84 AD3d 1372; Matter of Isaac J. [Joyce J.], 75 AD3d 506, 506-507). Here, contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court’s determination that she neglected the child by failing to provide her with an adequate education was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The petitioner met its prima facie burden of establishing educational neglect by submitting unrebutted evidence of excessive school absences combined with the child’s failing grades (see Matter of Joyitha M. [Reshmi M.], 121 AD3d 900, 901; Matter of Eric C. [Barbara C.], 79 AD3d 1037; Matter of John N., 19 AD3d 497, 498; Matter of Fatima A., 276 AD2d 791). The mother failed to offer a reasonable justification for the absences and did not actively engage with the school or the child’s teacher in planning alternative means for the child’s education (see Matter of Joyitha M. [Reshmi M.], 121 AD3d at 901; Matter of Alexander D., 45 AD3d 264; Matter of Amanda K., 13 AD3d 193, 194).BALKIN, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ.MATTER of Catalina A. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, ap; Evelyn C. (Anonymous), res — (Docket No. N-23177-16)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Anne-Marie Jolly, J.), dated April 24, 2017. The order granted the mother’s motion, made at the conclusion of the petitioner’s case, to dismiss the petition alleging that she neglected the subject child.ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the mother’s motion is denied, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, alleging, inter alia, that the mother neglected the then three-month-old subject child due to a mental illness. At the close of the petitioner’s case, the Family Court granted the mother’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to establish a prima facie case. The petitioner appeals.A finding of neglect may be entered in the absence of actual harm when a preponderance of the evidence proves that the child’s “physical, mental or emotional condition… is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his [or her] parent… to exercise a minimum degree of care” (Family Ct Act §1012[f][i]). ”Moreover, a neglect finding is proper upon proof of the causal connection between a parent’s mental illness and requisite potential harm to the child” (Matter of Kiemiyah M. [Cassiah M.], 137 AD3d 1279, 1280; see Matter of David L.S. [Caprice L.T.], 155 AD3d 633; Matter of Lanijah J.L. [Omisa C.L.], 146 AD3d 784, 786).Here, contrary to the Family Court’s determination, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, and affording it the benefit of every inference which could be reasonably drawn from the evidence (see Matter of Jaivon J. [Patricia D.], 148 AD3d 890, 892; Matter of Marques B. [Eli B.], 133 AD3d 654, 654), the petitioner presented a prima facie case of neglect. At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioner introduced into evidence a recording of two 911 calls made by the mother’s stepdaughter, in which she reported, among other things, that the mother, while holding the child, was hitting and slapping the mother’s sister. She further stated that the mother was manic, yelling, throwing things, and getting violent. Additionally, the petitioner presented the testimony of the attending psychiatrist in the emergency room at Queens Hospital Center who, based upon his assessment of the mother’s mental condition, found that she was unable to care for the child and ordered her admission into a psychiatric emergency program that requires frequent observation for at least 24 hours. The mother’s hospital records, which the petitioner also introduced into evidence, demonstrated that the mother’s mental condition, which was described as paranoid, violent, and lacking in insight and impulse control, had not resolved within 24 hours and necessitated her admission into the extended observation unit. Moreover, “[t]he absence of a diagnosed condition does not preclude a finding of neglect” (Matter of Danielle M., 151 AD2d 240, 243; see Matter of Caress S., 250 AD2d 490, 490). Therefore, although the petitioner did not show that the mother had a specific diagnosed mental illness, the petitioner was not required to make such a showing to avoid dismissal.Consequently, the Family Court erred in granting the mother’s motion to dismiss the petition. Since the court terminated the proceedings at the close of the petitioner’s direct case upon an erroneous finding that a prima facie case had not been established, a new hearing, and a new determination of the petition, is required (see Matter of Jaivon J. [Patricia D.], 148 AD3d at 892; Matter of Marques B. [Eli B.], 133 AD3d at 654).BALKIN, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.By Roman, J.P.; Maltese, Lasalle and Barros, JJ.MATTER of Adam D. (Anonymous), ap — SCO Family of Services petitioners-respondents; Victoria C. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Ann M. C. (Anonymous), ap — SCO Family of Services petitioners-respondents; Victoria C. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 2)MATTER of Kashawn D. (Anonymous), ap — SCO Family of Services petitioners-respondents; Victoria C. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 3) (Docket Nos. B-11846-15, B-11847-15, B-11848-15)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Marybeth S. Richroath, J.), dated July 22, 2016. The order, after a fact-finding hearing, and upon a finding that the petitioner SCO Family of Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between the mother and the children and to reunite the family, dismissed those branches of the petitions which were to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect.ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petitions are reinstated, those branches of the petitions which were to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect are reinstated, findings are made that the mother permanently neglected the subject children, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for a dispositional hearing to be held with all convenient speed and the issuance of a dispositional order thereafter.In June 2015, the petitioner SCO Family of Services (hereinafter the agency) commenced these proceedings to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect based on her alleged failure to maintain contact with and plan for the future of the children from June 2014 through June 2015. Following a hearing, and upon finding that the agency failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, the Family Court dismissed those branches of the petitions which were to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect. The children appeal.The mother’s contention that the attorney for the children improperly substituted his judgment for that of the children is without merit (see Matter of Isobella A. [Anna W.], 136 AD3d 1317, 1320).Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, the agency demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it exercised diligent efforts to strengthen the mother’s relationship with the children by, inter alia, developing a service plan, providing her with referrals, maintaining contact with her by telephone and in person, and providing paid transportation for visits with the children (see Matter of Chanel C. [Vanessa N.], 118 AD3d 826, 827; Matter of Tashameeka Valerie P. [Priscilla P.], 102 AD3d 614, 615). Notably, the agency advised the mother that therapy and anger management were part of her service plan, and that if she failed to complete them, she risked termination of her parental rights.The Family Court did not reach the issue of the mother’s maintaining contact with the children and planning for their future because of its erroneous threshold determination that the agency did not make diligent efforts (see Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 NY2d 136, 142). However, on this sufficiently developed record, we find that, despite the agency’s diligent efforts, the mother failed to maintain regular visitation with the children. Further, although she obtained suitable housing and completed parenting skills classes, the mother failed over several years to complete necessary anger management classes, failed to fully submit to random drug testing, and failed to complete a course of counseling (see Matter of Jamie M., 63 NY2d 388, 393). Significantly, the mother admitted that she stopped going to anger management classes merely because she was tired of answering the same questions over and over. Further, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed to adequately plan for the return of the children. Among other things, there was evidence that the mother did not sign a consent form for one of the children, who had been diagnosed with autism, and as a result, the child lost therapy and speech therapy services for a period of time.The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit.Accordingly, the Family Court erred in dismissing those branches of the petitions which were to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect (cf. Matter of Elijah W.L. [Omisa S.C.], 146 AD3d 782, 784), and we remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a dispositional hearing to be held with all convenient speed and the issuance of a dispositional order thereafter.ROMAN, J.P., MALTESE, LASALLE and BARROS, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Miller, Barros and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Tymel P. (Anonymous), a/k/a Tyemel J. P. (Anonymous). Coalition for Hispanic Family Services respondents; Tyrone P. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Tyequal P. (Anonymous), a/k/a Tyeqail E. P. (Anonymous). Coalition for Hispanic Family Services respondents; Tyrone P. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 2) (Docket Nos. B-9943-13, B-9944-13)Appeal from an order of fact-finding of the Family Court, Kings County (Ilana Gruebel, J.) dated January 6, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the father permanently neglected the children Tymel P., a/k/a Tyemel J. P., and Tyequal P., a/k/a Tyqail E. P., within the meaning of Social Services Law §384-b.ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.The portions of the order appealed from were superseded by two orders of disposition of the Family Court, each dated March 15, 2017, and are brought up for review on the appeals from the orders of disposition (see Matter of Tymel P. [Anonymous], __AD3d__ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2016-13354; decided herewith]).DILLON, J.P., MILLER, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Miller, Barros and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Tymel P. (Anonymous), a/k/a Tyemel J. P. (Anonymous). Coalition for Hispanic Family Services, res; Tyrone P. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Tyequal P. (Anonymous), a/k/a Tyeqail E. P. (Anonymous). Coalition for Hispanic Family Services, res; Tyrone P. (Anonymous), ap — (Proceeding No. 2) (Docket Nos. B-9943-13, B-9944-13)Appeals from two orders of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Ilana Gruebel, J.), both dated March 15, 2017 (one as to each child), and a decision of that court dated May 16, 2016. The orders of disposition, insofar as appealed from, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, and upon a fact-finding order of that court dated January 6, 2016, and the decision dated May 16, 2016, terminated the father’s parental rights and transferred guardianship and custody of the children to the petitioner, Coalition for Hispanic Family Services, and to the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption.ORDERED that the appeal from the decision dated May 16, 2016, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from a decision (see Schicchi v. J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509); and it is further,ORDERED that the orders of disposition are affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.The appellant is the father of two children, who have been in a non-kinship foster home since 2010, when their sister was fatally abused by their mother and maternal grandmother. The father and mother were not married to each other. After fact-finding and dispositional hearings, the Family Court found that the father had permanently neglected the subject children, terminated his parental rights, and transferred guardianship and custody of the children to the petitioner, Coalition for Hispanic Family Services (hereinafter the agency) and to the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption.Contrary to the father’s contentions, the Family Court did not err in finding that he had permanently neglected the children (see Social Services Law §384-b). There was clear and convincing proof that, despite the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, the father, for a period of one year following the children’s placement with the agency, failed to substantially and continuously maintain contact with the children, and failed to plan for the future of the children, although physically and financially able to do so (see Social Services Law §384-b; Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 NY2d 136). The father’s mere participation in classes and programs was not enough to meet the requirement to plan for the children’s future when he did not benefit from the services, programs, and support offered and did not utilize the tools or lessons learned in those classes in order to successfully plan for the children’s future (see Matter of Jessica U. [Stephanie U.], 152 AD3d 1001; Matter of Aniya L. [Samatha L.], 124 AD3d 1001, 1004).A dispositional order suspending judgment is a dispositional alternative, upon a finding of permanent neglect, that affords “a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” (Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 311; see Family Ct Act §633). In essence, an order suspending judgment provides the parent with a second chance, but it may be utilized only when the court determines that a second chance is in the child’s best interests (see Family Ct Act §§631, 633; Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d at 311; Matter of Jalil U. [Rachel L.---U.], 103 AD3d 658, 659). Contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court properly determined that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children, and that a suspended judgment was not appropriate given the father’s lack of insight into his problems and his failure to address the primary issues which led to the children’s removal (see Matter of Lasuree A.B. [Carla S. B.], 141 AD3d 578, 579; Matter of Aaliyah L.C. [Jamie A.], 128 AD3d 955, 956; Matter of Kayla S.-G. [David G.], 125 AD3d 980, 981; Matter of Justice C. [Wanda C.], 124 AD3d 885, 885-886; Matter of Chanel C. [Vanessa N.], 118 AD3d 826, 828; Matter of Christopher T. [Margarita V.], 94 AD3d 900, 901).Further, the record supports the Family Court’s determination that the best interests of the children would be served by freeing them for adoption by their foster mother, with whom they had bonded and resided for seven years (see Matter of Xiomara D. [Faith D.], 141 AD3d 585, 585; Matter of Corey S. [Angel S.], 112 AD3d 641, 642; Matter of Anthony R. [Juliann A.], 90 AD3d 1055, 1056-1057; Matter of “Baby Boy” E., 42 AD3d 536, 536-537; Matter of Juanita F., 291 AD2d 496).The father’s remaining contention is without merit.DILLON, J.P., MILLER, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Miller, Barros and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Joseph McCray, pet, v. Danny K. Chun, etc. res — Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of mandamus, inter alia, to compel the respondent Danny K. Chun, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, to determine the petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of that court rendered November 30, 2016, in a criminal action entitled People v. McCray, commenced in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Indictment No. 5847/15, and to dismiss the indictment, and application by the petitioner for poor person relief.ORDERED that the application for poor person relief is granted to the extent that the filing fee imposed by CPLR 8022(b) is waived, and the application is otherwise denied as academic; and it is further,ADJUDGED that the branch of the petition which is to compel the determination of the motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 is denied as academic, and the petition is otherwise denied on the merits and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.The branch of the petition which is to compel the determination of the petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 has been rendered academic in light of the determination of that motion in an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 18, 2017.The extraordinary remedy of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial act, and only where there exists a clear legal right to the relief sought (see Matter of Legal Aid Socy. of Sullivan County v. Scheinman, 53 NY2d 12, 16). The petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought.DILLON, J.P., MILLER, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., plf, v. Bruce H. Kaplan, appellant def — (Index No. 11319/08)Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (W. Gerard Asher, J.), dated August 27, 2015. The order, sua sponte, vacated an order of that court dated January 6, 2015, and provided that an order of that court dated August 5, 2015, “stands as the Order and Decision of this Court.”ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated August 27, 2015, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.The appeal must be dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right from an order that does not decide a motion made on notice (see CPLR 5701[a][2]), and, under the particular circumstances of this case, we decline to grant leave to appeal.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Roman, J.P.; Miller, Duffy and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Joshua Worrell, ap — (Ind. No. 9960/10)Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Foley, J.), imposed April 20, 2016, upon his conviction of attempted robbery in the second degree,upon his plea of guilty, after remittitur from this Court for resentencing (see People v. Worrell, 134 AD3d 1137).ORDERED that the resentence is affirmed.The record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v. McCray, 145 AD3d 740; see generally People v. Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 341-342; People v. Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738). The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes review of his contention that the sentencing court should have resentenced him as a youthful offender (see People v. Pacherille, 25 NY3d 1021, 1024; People v. McCray, 145 AD3d 740; People v. White, 141 AD3d 463, 464; People v. Drammeh, 100 AD3d 650, 651; People v. Franko, 98 AD3d 525).ROMAN, J.P., MILLER, DUFFY and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.Liberato Pena, res, v. 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp., appellant-res, YS Farm County Corp., res-res — (Index No. 10193/12)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, (1) the defendant 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. appeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (King, J.), dated August 14, 2015, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and the defendant YS Farm County Corp. cross-appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the same order as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. which was for summary judgment on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action, and (2) YS Farm County Corp. appeals from an order of the same court, also dated August 14, 2015, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the cross claim of the defendant 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. By stipulation dated October 5, 2017, the parties stipulated that so much of the appeals and cross appeal as relate to the denial of those branches of the defendants’ respective motions which were to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them were withdrawn upon the consent of all of the parties.ORDERED that the appeal by the defendant 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. is dismissed as withdrawn, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal by the defendant YS Farm County Corp. from so much of the second order dated August 14, 2015, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is dismissed as withdrawn, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,ORDERED that the first order dated August 14, 2015, is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from by the defendant YS Farm County Corp., without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the motion of the defendant 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. which was for summary judgment on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the second order dated August 14, 2015, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants 104 North 6th Street Realty Corp. (hereinafter 104 North) and YS Farm County Corp. (hereinafter YS) to recover damages for personal injuries that he alleges he sustained when he fell on a sidewalk adjacent to a building owned by 104 North and leased to YS. YS answered and asserted a cross claim against 104 North. 104 North answered and asserted a cross claim against YS.104 North moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action. YS moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the cross claim of 104 North.In an order dated August 14, 2015, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of 104 North’s motion which was for summary judgment on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action, and denied that branch of 104 North’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In a second order dated August 14, 2015, the court denied YS’s motion. 104 North and YS both appeal.“The right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the contract… The intent to indemnify must be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding circumstances” (Canela v. TLH 140 Perry St., LLC, 47 AD3d 743, 744 [citation omitted]). Here, the subject lease provided that the tenant, YS, was required to indemnify the owner, 104 North, from all liabilities, including attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of YS’s negligence. Since it has not been established whose negligence, if any, caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, 104 North failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action (see Sawicki v. GameStop Corp., 106 AD3d 979, 981; George v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 61 AD3d 925, 930). For the same reason, YS failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing 104 North’s cross claim insofar as asserted against it.Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of YS’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claim insofar as asserted against it, and should have denied that branch of 104 North’s motion which was for summary judgment on so much of its cross claim as was for contractual indemnification with respect to all past and future attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses incurred in the defense of this action.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.Douglas Stein, etc. ap, v. Ted Doukas, et al., respondents def — (Index No. 9909/08)Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Thomas F. Whelan, J.), dated December 23, 2014. The order denied the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default in appearing at a conference on June 9, 2014.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.In April 2008, the plaintiff Douglas Stein, individually and as executor of his mother’s estate, and the plaintiff Wander Nelson Realty, LLC, an entity formed by Stein’s mother for estate planning purposes, commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the defendant Ted Doukas “wrongfully manufactured” a deed recorded in April 2004 conveying certain real property from Stein’s mother to Doukas’s company, Telcor Co., LLC. In an amended order dated February 7, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the motion of the plaintiffs’ counsel for leave to withdraw as counsel. The action was stayed until February 27, 2014, to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to retain new counsel. The plaintiffs did not retain new counsel during the stay period. A conference scheduled for March 25, 2014, was adjourned until May 15, 2014, and then to June 9, 2014. The plaintiffs failed to appear for the conference, and in an order dated June 9, 2014, the court dismissed the action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27(b). In November 2014, the plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default. In an order dated December 23, 2014, the court denied the motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear at the June 9, 2014, conference, and, therefore, it was unnecessary to determine the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action. The plaintiffs appeal.In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 AD3d 809, 809; Mazzio v. Jennings, 128 AD3d 1032, 1032; Hanscom v. Goldman, 109 AD3d 964, 965). A determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see GMAC Mtge., LLC v. Guccione, 127 AD3d 1136, 1138; Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 AD3d 962, 963).Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs did not offer a reasonable excuse for their default. Neither the fact that Stein was proceeding pro se nor his claim that he was unaware of the consequences of failing to appear constitute a reasonable excuse (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Slavinski, 78 AD3d 1167, 1167; Dorrer v. Berry, 37 AD3d 519, 520). The plaintiffs’ remaining arguments to support their contention that their default should be excused are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and have not been considered by this Court (see Tulino v. Tulino, 148 AD3d 755, 757; Point Holding, LLC v. Crittenden, 119 AD3d 918, 920).As the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their default, the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a potentially meritorious cause of action need not be addressed (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dorvelus, 140 AD3d 850, 852; Vested Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Ragone, 131 AD3d 1232, 1234; Abdelqader v. Abdelqader, 120 AD3d 1275, 1276). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Lasalle, JJ.Douglas Stein, etc., et al, ap, v. Davidow, Davidow, Siegel & Stern, LLP, et al., res — (Index No. 40420/09)Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Thomas F. Whelan, J.), dated December 23, 2014. The order denied the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default in appearing at a conference on March 25, 2014.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.In October 2009, the plaintiff Douglas Stein, individually and as executor of his mother’s estate, and the plaintiff Wander Nelson Realty, LLC, an entity formed by Stein’s mother for estate planning purposes, commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants provided negligent legal advice to Stein’s mother with regard to her estate planning. In an amended order dated February 7, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the motion of the plaintiffs’ counsel for leave to withdraw as counsel. The action was stayed until February 27, 2014, to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to retain new counsel. The plaintiffs did not retain new counsel during the stay period. Thereafter, the plaintiffs failed to appear for a conference scheduled on March 25, 2014, and in an order dated March 25, 2014, the court dismissed the action pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27(b). In November 2014 the plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default. In an order dated December 23, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear at the March 25, 2014, conference and, therefore, it was unnecessary to determine the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action.In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 AD3d 809, 809; Mazzio v. Jennings, 128 AD3d 1032, 1032; Hanscom v. Goldman, 109 AD3d 964, 965). A determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see GMAC Mtge., LLC v. Guccione, 127 AD3d 1136, 1138; Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 AD3d 962, 963).Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs did not offer a reasonable excuse for their default. Neither the fact that Stein was proceeding pro se nor his claims that he was unaware of the consequences of failing to appear constitute a reasonable excuse (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Slavinski, 78 AD3d 1167, 1167; Dorrer v. Berry, 37 AD3d 519, 520). The plaintiffs’ remaining arguments to support their contention that their default should be excused are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and have not been considered by this Court (see Tulino v. Tulino, 148 AD3d 755, 757; Point Holding, LLC v. Crittenden, 119 AD3d 918, 920).As the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their default, the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a potentially meritorious cause of action need not be addressed (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dorvelus, 140 AD3d 850, 852; Vested Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Ragone, 131 AD3d 1232, 1234; Abdelqader v. Abdelqader, 120 AD3d 1275, 1276). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and LASALLE, JJ., concur.By Chambers, J.P.; Cohen, Barros and Christopher, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Andrew Crimmins, ap — (Ind. No. 2363-15)Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Alfred J. Cicale of counsel), for appellant.Timothy Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Martin Efman, J.), rendered May 24, 2016, convicting him of burglary in the third degree (two counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was invalid (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265; People v. Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256; People v. Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 280). However, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).CHAMBERS, J.P., COHEN, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Chambers, J.P.; Cohen, Barros and Christopher, JJ.Gail M. Everett, etc. ap, v. Eastchester Police Department respondents def — (Index No. 27659/10)Richard L. Sullivan, Buffalo, NY (Ameer Benno of counsel), for appellants.Cerussi & Spring, P.C., White Plains, NY (Christa D’Angelica of counsel), for respondents.In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), dated August 22, 2013, as granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Eastchester Police Department and Town of Eastchester which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against them, and (2) so much of a judgment of the same court dated May 13, 2015, as, upon the order, dismissed the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against them.ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.The appeal from the order dated August 22, 2013, must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1]).The defendant James Pileggi, Jr., was a police officer employed by the defendants Eastchester Police Department and Town of Eastchester (hereinafter together the defendants). On November 3, 2009, while off duty, Pileggi was handling his off-duty weapon when it went off and Andre LaSalle was killed (see Everett v. Eastchester Police Department, 127 AD3d 1131). Pileggi subsequently was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. This action was commenced by LaSalle’s mother, (individually and as administrator of his estate), grandmother, and sister. The plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action against the defendants alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC §1983.In order to maintain an action under 42 USC §1983, two essential elements must be present: (1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (see Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F3d 545, 547 [2d Cir]). Moreover, a municipality may only be held liable pursuant to 42 USC §1983 for constitutional violations committed by its employees where the municipality’s failure to train, and/or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, were “the moving force of the constitutional violation” (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694; see Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 US 796, 799; Hudson Valley Mar., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d 700, 703).Where the conduct complained of was committed by an off-duty police officer, a constitutional violation may be found if, for instance, the officer, albeit off-duty, nonetheless is engaged in some activity arguably invoking the real or apparent power of the police department, or is engaged in the performance of duties prescribed generally for police officers (see Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F3d at 548). Here, the amended complaint alleged only, in the most conclusory fashion, that Pileggi was “acting under the color of law” when the shooting occurred. Since nothing in the amended complaint suggested that Pileggi identified himself or was recognizable as a police officer, or was otherwise engaged in any activity arguably invoking the real or apparent power of the police department, the seventh cause of action was fatally defective. In turn, because the plaintiffs failed sufficiently to allege that Pileggi was acting under color of state law, it follows that there was no factual basis upon which to hold the defendants liable under Monell (see Claudio v. Sawyer, 409 Fed Appx 464, 466 [2d Cir]).In any event, even if the amended complaint had properly pleaded that Pileggi was acting under color of state law and not engaged in purely personal pursuits at the time of the shooting, the seventh cause of action was also fatally defective in that it failed to allege specific facts supporting the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants had a policy or custom of encouraging or sanctioning the type of reckless behavior that led to the shooting (see Martin v. City of New York, 153 AD3d 693; Cozzani v. County of Suffolk, 84 AD3d 1147; Pang Hung Leung v. City of New York, 216 AD2d 10).In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants’ remaining contention.Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the seventh cause of action.CHAMBERS, J.P., COHEN, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Lasalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.People ex rel. Christopher Booth, on behalf of Dwayne Blackwood, pet, v. Warden, Otis Bantum Correctional Center, etc., res — Christopher Booth, New York, NY, petitioner pro se.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application pursuant to CPL 170.70 to release the defendant in a criminal action entitled People v. Blackwood, pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Indictment No. 8422/17, and application by the petitioner for leave to prosecute the proceeding as a poor person.ORDERED that the application for leave to prosecute the proceeding as a poor person is granted to the extent that the filing fee imposed by CPLR 8022(b) is waived, and the application is otherwise denied as academic; and it is further,ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.The issues raised on this writ of habeas corpus are academic, as the detainee has been indicted (see People ex rel. Scoralick, 140 AD2d 658). Under the circumstances of this case, review of the issues raised is not warranted under any exception to the mootness doctrine (see e.g. Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715; People ex rel. Kneitel v. Warden, Rikers Is. Corr. Facility, 120 AD3d 1274; People ex rel. Crow v. Warden, Anna M. Kross Detention Ctr., 76 AD3d 646). Accordingly, we dismiss the writ as academic.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ.MATTER of Douglas G. Heintzman, res, v. Jennifer C. Heintzman, ap — (Appeal No. 1)MATTER of Douglas G. Heintzman, res-ap, v. Jennifer C. Heintzman, appellant-res — (Appeal No. 2) (Docket Nos. F-14662-13, F-16417-13)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Arlene E. Katz, J.), dated March 25, 2016, and appeal and cross appeal from an order of that court dated June 30, 2016. The order dated March 25, 2016, denied the mother’s objections to so much of an order of that court (Michele Reed Bowman, S.M.), dated September 21, 2015, as directed the parties to provide information concerning certain tuition and room and board expenses and directed the mother to produce a copy of her income tax return for the year 2012. The order dated June 30, 2016, insofar as appealed from, denied the mother’s objections to (1) stated portions of an order of that court (Michele Reed Bowman, S.M.), dated March 7, 2016, which, inter alia, after a hearing, awarded her child support arrears only for the period between August 2013 and August 2014 and imputed income to her in the sum of $152,000 for the year 2014, and (2) so much of an order of that court (Michele Reed Bowman, S.M.), dated March 18, 2016, as dismissed, without prejudice, her petition alleging a violation of a prior order of support, granted the father’s petition for a downward modification of his child support obligation, and directed the father to pay the sum of only $871 per month in child support for the parties’ unemancipated child. The order dated June 30, 2016, insofar as cross-appealed from, denied the father’s objections to (1) stated portions of the order dated March 7, 2016, which, inter alia, after a hearing, assessed the father’s child support obligation at the sum of $4,791 per month for the period between August 2013 and October 2013 and at the sum of $4,743 per month for the period between November 2013 and August 2014, and directed the entry of a money judgment against the father in the principal sum of $20,243.81, (2) a second order of that court (Michele Reed Bowman, S.M.), also dated March 7, 2016, which granted the mother’s motion for an award of counsel fees and directed the father to pay counsel fees in the sum of $5,700, and (3) so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as recalculated his child support obligation effective April 16, 2015.ORDERED that the order dated March 25, 2016, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,ORDERED that the order dated June 30, 2016, is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying the mother’s objection to so much of the first order dated March 7, 2016, as imputed income to her in the sum of $152,000 for the year 2014, and substituting therefor a provision granting that objection and vacating that portion of the first order dated March 7, 2016, (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying the mother’s objection to so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as directed the father to pay the sum of $871 per month in child support for the parties’ unemancipated child, and substituting therefor a provision granting that objection and vacating that portion of the order dated March 18, 2016, and remitting the matter to the Support Magistrate for a new determination of the father’s child support obligation with respect to the parties’ unemancipated child, (3) by deleting the provision thereof denying the father’s objections to so much of the first order dated March 7, 2016, as assessed his child support obligation at the sum of $4,791 per month for the period between August 2013 and October 2013 and at the sum of $4,743 per month for the period between November 2013 and August 2014, and directed the entry of a money judgment against the father in the principal sum of $20,243.81, and substituting therefor a provision granting those objections and vacating those portions of the first order dated March 7, 2016, and (4) by deleting the provision thereof denying the father’s objection to the second order dated March 7, 2016, and substituting therefor a provision granting that objection and vacating the second order dated March 7, 2016, and thereupon denying the mother’s motion for an award of counsel fees; as so modified, the order dated June 30, 2016, is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, for a new determination of the parties’ respective incomes for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and their proportionate shares of college education expenses, a new determination concerning the average costs of tuition and room and board at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton for the school years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016, and a recalculation of the father’s child support obligation and the amount of child support arrears owed for the period between August 2013 and August 2014.The parties were married in August 1989, and have three children together. In October 2004, the parties entered into a separation agreement, which was incorporated but not merged into their subsequent judgment of divorce. The separation agreement provided, in relevant part, that “[c]hild support shall be recalculated pursuant to the CSSA” upon the occurrence of an emancipation event, which included “a child attaining the age of 21 years, or, in the event that a child is attending college or other accredited institute of higher learning on a full time basis, until the earlier happening of the child’s graduation or attaining the age of 22 years.” Pursuant to the separation agreement, the parties agreed that they would each pay their proportionate share of “each child’s college education expenses, based upon the proportion of the respective incomes of the parties established in the calendar year preceding each child’s commencing college studies.” They agreed that neither party would be required to contribute more than “his or her proportionate share of the average cost of tuition, room and board, and books” at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton. The parties also agreed that the father was entitled to a credit toward his basic child support obligation in an amount equal to “the amount of room and board expenses paid by the [father] for the child residing at college,” capped at a fractional amount “of the then child support.”In May 2010, an order of support was entered in the Supreme Court against the father upon the termination of his obligation to pay maintenance to the mother. The court applied the statutory percentage of 29 percent to parental income capped at $250,000, resulting in an annual child support obligation of $72,500. The court concluded that the father’s pro rata share was 92 percent, or $66,700, based on the parties’ respective income for the year 2009, but mistakenly fixed the father’s monthly child support at the sum of $5,588 instead of the sum of $5,558.In November 2013, the father filed a petition in the Family Court seeking a downward modification of his child support obligation on the ground, inter alia, that the parties’ oldest child was emancipated. In December 2013, the mother filed an enforcement petition in the Family Court, alleging that the father owed the sum of $15,235.36 in child support arrears. In January 2014, an interim order was entered by the Family Court, directing the father to pay child support in the sum of $4,817 per month effective February 2014.In an order dated December 15, 2014, the Support Magistrate denied the mother’s enforcement petition and granted the father’s modification petition to the extent of reducing his child support obligation to the sum of $3,258.33 per month for the period between November 7, 2013, and December 5, 2013, and to the sum of $2,215.66 per month effective December 6, 2013, when the oldest child became emancipated. The Support Magistrate reasoned that, pursuant to the separation agreement, the father was entitled to a credit in an amount equal to 12/29ths of the basic child support obligation for the period between November 7, 2013, and December 5, 2013, when child support was payable for three children and two children were residing at college. The Support Magistrate further reasoned that as of December 6, 2013, the father was entitled to a credit in an amount equal to 8/25ths of his “new annual child support” obligation of $39,100, since as of that date child support was payable for only two children and one was in college.Both parties filed objections to the Support Magistrate’s order. In an order dated April 6, 2015, the Family Court denied the father’s objections and granted the mother’s objections to the extent of remitting the matter to the Support Magistrate “for a recalculation of the monthly support payments consistent with the determination herein,” and “for a determination on the merits” of the mother’s enforcement petition. The court, after examining the relevant provisions of the separation agreement, determined that “[t]o properly calculate the changes to payments from the father to the mother as each child goes away to college and becomes emancipated, it is critical to first compute the average cost of room and board at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton.” It noted that under the separation agreement, the father “is permitted a credit in an amount up to the appropriate fractional portion of the direct support… however, this credit cannot be greater than the amount of the room and board actually paid by the father.” The court stated that if there was insufficient evidence to determine “the proper room and board credit to apply, the issue must be [remitted] for a rehearing on that limited issue only.”On April 16, 2015, the father filed a petition for a downward modification of his child support obligation on the ground, inter alia, that the parties’ middle child was emancipated. In July 2015, the mother filed a violation petition alleging that the father failed to pay child support as ordered and that his violation was willful.By order dated September 21, 2015, the Support Magistrate directed the parties to provide information concerning, among other things, tuition and room and board expenses at SUNY Binghamton for the year 2013-2014, and tuition and room and board expenses at SUNY Albany for the years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016. The Support Magistrate also directed the mother to provide a copy of her income tax return for the year 2012. The mother filed objections to the Support Magistrate’s order, which were denied in an order of the Family Court dated March 25, 2016. The mother appeals from that order.Meanwhile, a hearing was held on October 5, 2015, at which the mother moved for an award of counsel fees. The parties agreed that the motion would be heard on papers and that no appearance was necessary. By order dated March 7, 2016 (hereinafter Order No. 1), the Support Magistrate directed that “pursuant to a Decision and Order… dated May 11, 2010, support is modified to $5,558 per month, thereby correcting a computational error,” and “granted [the mother] a money judgment for $20,243.81.” The Support Magistrate calculated each party’s income for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and their proportionate shares of college education expenses for the years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016. In calculating the mother’s income for the year 2014, the Support Magistrate imputed $152,000 in income to the mother based on her exercise of certain stock options. The Support Magistrate also determined, based on documents that were purportedly submitted by the mother, that the average cost of tuition and room and board at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton was $9,799 for 2013-2014, $11,890.35 for 2014-2015, and $15,283.50 for 2015-2016. The Support Magistrate then granted the father’s petition “based upon the emancipation of” the oldest child. The Support Magistrate noted that the mother did not dispute that after the oldest child began residing at college, the father was entitled to a credit of 4/29ths of his then child support obligation, thereby reducing his monthly child support obligation to the sum of $4,791, and that the mother “consents to credit [the father] with $9,790 in room and board payments in 2013-2014 for” the middle child, who began residing at college in August 2013. The Support Magistrate then assessed the father’s child support obligation at the sum of $4,791 per month for the period between August 2013 and October 2013, and at the sum of $4,743 per month for the period between November 2013 and August 2014. The Support Magistrate explained that application of the $9,790 credit related to room and board reduced the father’s child support obligation to the sum of $4,743 per month. She further found that “[b]ecause [the father] filed his modification petition on November 7, 2013, the adjustment to support is effective retroactive to the date of his petition.” Both parties filed objections to Order No. 1.In another order dated March 7, 2016 (hereinafter Order No. 2), the Support Magistrate granted the mother’s motion for an award of counsel fees and directed the father to pay the mother’s attorney a fee in the sum of $5,700. The father filed objections to Order No. 2.By order dated March 18, 2016, the Support Magistrate granted the father’s petition for a downward modification of his child support obligation on the ground that the middle child was emancipated, and directed the father to pay the sum of $871 per month in child support for the parties’ remaining unemancipated child, effective April 16, 2015. The Support Magistrate also dismissed, without prejudice, the mother’s violation petition. In her findings of fact, the Support Magistrate stated that the middle child, who “turned 21 years old,” was emancipated since it was “undisputed that [he] is not a full time student.” The Support Magistrate then concluded that the parties’ “pro rata contributions for 2015 based on income as should have been reported on their 2014 income tax returns [are] $194,578.00 annually for [the mother] and $147,262.00 annually for [the father].” The Support Magistrate noted that she attributed income of $152,000 to the mother based on her exercise of certain stock options. The Support Magistrate also noted that the father’s proportionate share of the basic child support obligation was 53 percent and that the mother’s proportionate share was 47 percent. The Support Magistrate then determined that “[c]hild support based on NYS Child Support Standard[s] Act (CSSA) guidelines [is] $871.00 per month based on the parties['] income capped at $143,000 and $1,963.00 per month based on the parties['] total combined earnings.” Both parties filed objections to the order dated March 18, 2016.In an order dated June 30, 2016, the Family Court denied the mother’s objections to Order No. 1 and the order dated March 18, 2016, and denied the father’s objections to Orders No. 1 and 2 and the order dated March 18, 2016. The mother appeals and the father cross-appeals from the order dated June 30, 2016.The Family Court properly denied the mother’s objections to so much of the order dated September 21, 2015, as directed the parties to submit information concerning tuition and room and board expenses at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton for certain years and directed the mother to provide a copy of her income tax return for the year 2012 (see Kahn v. Oshin-Kahn, 43 AD3d 253, 256; Matter of Fisher v. Fritzch, 35 AD3d 1146, 1147). Those documents were relevant to determining the parties’ proportionate shares “of the average cost of tuition, room and board, and books” at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton. Contrary to the mother’s contention, the matter was not remitted to the Support Magistrate solely for the purpose of calculating the father’s room-and-board-related credit against his basic child support obligation. Rather, in the order dated April 6, 2015, the Family Court remitted the matter to the Support Magistrate for “a recalculation of the monthly support payments consistent with the determination herein.”The Family Court erred in denying the father’s objection to so much of Order No. 1 as calculated the average cost of tuition and room and board at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton for the years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016. Both parties submitted documents to the Support Magistrate demonstrating the costs of tuition and room and board, yet the Support Magistrate relied only upon the documents submitted by the mother. There is no explanation in the record for the Support Magistrate’s failure to consider the documents submitted by the father. Although the Support Magistrate stated in one part of the order that the “average tuition, room and board cost” at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton for the year 2013-2014 was $9,799, she stated in a footnote in another part of the order that “[t]he average cost of room and board for 2013-14 is $9,799.” It is unclear, based on the record, whether the sum of $9,799 is inclusive of the cost of tuition. In addition, a document, the source of which is unclear, was attached to the mother’s financial disclosure affidavit, and stated that, at SUNY Binghamton for the year 2015, the cost of tuition was $6,470 and the cost of room and board was $13,820. The Support Magistrate determined that for 2015-2016, “room and board charges” for SUNY Binghamton were the sum of $20,290, a sum which incorrectly included the cost of tuition. Accordingly, the Family Court erred in determining that “the Support Magistrate made no error in fact or law in her determinations regarding SUNY costs… based upon evidence properly before her.” The matter must therefore be remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, for a new determination of the average cost of tuition and room and board at SUNY Albany and SUNY Binghamton for the years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, and 2015-2016.The Family Court also erred in denying the father’s objection to so much of Order No. 1 as determined that his monthly child support obligation was the sum of $4,791 for the period between August 2013 and October 2013, and the sum of $4,743 for the period between November 2013 and August 2014, and thereupon determined that he owed the mother the sum of $20,243.81 in child support arrears. As for the period between August 2013 and October 2013, the Support Magistrate correctly determined that the father was entitled to a credit for room and board payments made on behalf of the oldest child which reduced his child support obligation to the sum of $4,791 per month. However, the Support Magistrate also determined that the middle child “began attending college in August 2013,” and stated that the mother “consents to credit [the father] with $9,790.00 in room and board payments in 2013-2014 for” the middle child. While that would entitle the father to an additional credit of $815 per month for room and board payments made on behalf of the middle child, the Support Magistrate failed to apply that additional credit when determining the father’s monthly child support obligation for the period between August 2013 and October 2013. Although the mother argues on appeal that she did not agree that the father was entitled to a credit of $9,790 for 2013-2014, that contention is unpreserved for appellate review, as she failed to raise that issue in her objections before the Family Court (see Matter of Hall v. Pancho, 149 AD3d 735, 738; Matter of Best v. Hinds, 113 AD3d 676, 677).As for the period between November 2013 and August 2014, the father alleged in his modification petition that the oldest child had become emancipated, and contended that the parties’ separation agreement provided that “[c]hild support shall be recalculated pursuant to the CSSA upon the emancipation of a child.” The Support Magistrate granted the father’s modification petition “based upon the emancipation of” the oldest child, but failed to recalculate the father’s child support obligation pursuant to the CSSA. In concluding that the father’s child support obligation was $4,743 for the period between November 2013 and August 2014, the Support Magistrate simply deducted the father’s credit of $815 for room and board payments made on behalf of the middle child from the sum of $5,558, which was the father’s child support obligation for three children, not two. Accordingly, the Family Court erred in denying the father’s objection to that portion of Order No. 1, and the matter must be remitted to the Family Court, Westchester County, to recalculate the father’s child support obligation and the amount of child support arrears owed for the period between August 2013 and August 2014.The Family Court also erred in denying the father’s objection to so much of Order No. 1 as determined that his income was $363,764.71 for the year 2012, $1,155,850 for the year 2013, and $147,262 for the year 2014. Family Court Act §413(1)(b)(5)(vii)(H) provides that “federal insurance contributions act (FICA) taxes actually paid” shall be deducted from income prior to determining the combined parental income (see Belkhir v. Amrane-Belkhir, 118 AD3d 1396). The Support Magistrate, without explanation, declined to deduct FICA tax payments from the father’s gross income for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014 prior to determining each party’s proportionate share of the combined parental income (see Holterman v. Holterman, 3 NY3d 1, 10; Castello v. Castello, 144 AD3d 723, 727-728; Shamp v. Shamp, 133 AD3d 1213, 1216). Although the father contends that the Support Magistrate erred in failing to reduce his gross income for the year 2014 by certain unreimbursed business expenses, no testimony was adduced at the hearing concerning those expenses and there is no proof in the record, other than his income tax return for the year 2014, to support his claim for those alleged expenses (see Matter of Sena v. Sena, 65 AD3d 1244, 1245; Matter of Castillo v. Castillo, 302 AD2d 458, 459; La Porte v. La Porte, 263 AD2d 585, 587).The Support Magistrate erred in addressing for child support purposes the income the parties derived from the exercise in 2013 of stock options with a value of approximately $304,000. The father exercised the options, which were held in his name, and reported the full value of the options on his income tax return for 2013. He then transferred to the mother her half of the resulting proceeds. The Support Magistrate did not deduct the sum of $152,000 from the father’s gross income for 2013, did not impute the sum of $152,000 in income to the mother for 2013, and imputed the sum of $152,000 in income to the mother for 2014. Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Support Magistrate properly imputed income to her, since the proceeds she received after the options were exercised did not constitute a distributive award as defined by the Domestic Relations Law (see Domestic Relations Law §236[B][1][b]). However, the Support Magistrate erred in imputing the income to her in 2014. Rather, for the purposes of determining the parties’ proportionate shares of college education expenses, the Support Magistrate should have treated the exercise of the options as $152,000 in income to each party in 2013 (see Matter of Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 147 AD3d 845, 848). Accordingly, the Family Court erred in denying the mother’s objections to so much of Order No. 1 and the order dated March 18, 2016, as imputed the sum of $152,000 in income to her for the year 2014, and in denying the father’s objections to so much of Order No. 1 as failed to impute the sum of $152,000 in income to the mother for the year 2013, and failed to deduct the sum of $152,000 from his gross income for the year 2013.The Family Court properly denied the mother’s objection to so much of Order No. 1 as recalculated the parties’ proportionate shares of college education expenses. The parties’ separation agreement explicitly provided that the father and the mother “agree to contribute to and pay a proportionate share of each child’s college education expenses, based upon the proportion of the respective incomes of the parties established in the calendar year preceding each child’s commencing college studies” (emphasis added). The Family Court also properly denied the mother’s objection to so much of Order No. 1 as calculated arrears only for the period between August 2013 and August 2014, and not through December 2014. As the Family Court noted, those arrears cannot be accurately calculated at this time due to “the number of petitions and overlapping objections filed by the parties.” To the extent that the mother objected to Order No. 1 on the ground that the Support Magistrate erred in “retroactively reducing arrears,” the Family Court properly denied that objection. In calculating the arrears owed by the father to the mother, the Support Magistrate simply applied the credits related to room and board that had already been applied by the mother against the father’s child support obligation. Moreover, there is no language in the parties’ separation agreement requiring the father to petition the court for a downward modification of support in order to receive a room-and-board-related credit against his child support obligation.The Family Court should have granted the father’s objections to Order No. 2. In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the court, in its discretion, may award counsel fees to the attorney representing the person claiming a right to support on behalf of the child (see Family Ct Act §438; Matter of Funaro v. Kudrick, 128 AD3d 695, 697). ”As with an award of an attorney’s fee made pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §237(b), the court will base its decision primarily upon both parties’ ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services required to deal with the support dispute, and the reasonableness of their performance under the circumstances” (Matter of Nieves-Ford v. Gordon, 47 AD3d 936, 937; see Matter of Tuglu v. Crowley, 96 AD3d 862, 863). In this case, while it is true that there is a significant disparity in the parties’ respective incomes, the record demonstrates that both parties misinterpreted the terms of the separation agreement, and that the protracted nature of this litigation was due, in large part, to errors made by both parties, as well as the Support Magistrate, in calculating the room-and-board-related credit to be applied against the father’s child support obligation. Under these circumstances, the award of counsel fees was an improvident exercise of discretion.The Family Court properly denied the mother’s objection to so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as determined that the middle child was emancipated (see Cleva v. Cleva, 139 AD3d 785). The parties’ separation agreement provided that “[c]hild support shall be recalculated pursuant to the CSSA” upon the occurrence of an emancipation event, which included “a child attaining the age of 21 years, or, in the event that a child is attending college or other accredited institute of higher learning on a full time basis, until the earlier happening of the child’s graduation or attaining the age of 22 years.” Here, the mother submitted a document from the university the middle child was attending which stated that “[y]ou are considered a part-time student if you are… [r]egistered in 20 to 40 percent of a full course load.” At a court appearance on July 20, 2015, the mother acknowledged that the middle child “took a 40-percent course [load] in the spring semester.” Since it is undisputed that the middle child turned 21 years old in February 2015, and that he was no longer enrolled in college as a full time student, the Support Magistrate properly determined that he was emancipated pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement.The Family Court also properly denied the mother’s objection to so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as, upon the emancipation of the middle child, applied a combined parental income cap of $143,000 when calculating the father’s monthly child support payment for the parties’ remaining unemancipated child. The Support Magistrate applied the factors set forth in Family Court Act §413(1)(f) when determining that the combined parental income should be capped at $143,000, and the reasons she articulated for capping the parental income at that level were adequately supported by the record (see Matter of Keith v. Lawrence, 113 AD3d 615, 616; Matter of Freeman v. Freeman, 71 AD3d 1143, 1144).The Family Court also properly denied the mother’s objection to so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as dismissed her violation petition “without prejudice.” The Family Court noted that, “[d]ue to the parties’ continuous filing of petitions and objections… the Support Magistrate has been as yet unable to determine whether a violation has occurred.”In addition, although we agree with the father that the Family Court erred in dismissing his objections to so much of the order dated March 18, 2016, as recalculated his child support obligation effective April 16, 2015, on the ground that he failed to file adequate proof of service of a copy of the objections on the mother (cf. Matter of Burger v. Brennan, 77 AD3d 828, 828), we nevertheless conclude that the father’s objection was without merit. The Support Magistrate properly calculated the father’s child support obligation retroactive to the date of the filing of his modification petition on April 16, 2015, and not retroactive to the date the middle child became emancipated (see Matter of Wrighton v. Wrighton, 61 AD3d 988; Johnston v. Johnston, 115 AD2d 520).Since the Support Magistrate erroneously imputed $152,000 in income to the mother for the year 2014, the Family Court should have granted the mother’s objection to the order dated March 18, 2016, to the extent of remitting the matter to the Support Magistrate for a new determination of the father’s child support obligation with respect to the parties’ unemancipated child.MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ.MATTER of Sitara Saleem, ap, v. Waqar Ahmed Chaudhry, res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Waqar Ahmed Chaudhry, res, v. Sitara Saleem, ap — (Proceeding No. 2) (Docket Nos. V-27647-10, V-29059-10)Appeal from a decision of the Family Court, Kings County (Dean Kusakabe, J.), dated August 30, 2016. The decision, insofar as appealed from, memorialized the court’s finding that the mother was in contempt of court for failing to comply with a prior order of that court dated April 1, 2014.ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.As the paper appealed from simply memorialized the Family Court’s prior findings, it constituted a decision. Since no appeal lies from a decision, this appeal must be dismissed (see Matter of Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 150 AD3d 1016, 1017; Schicchi v. J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Barros, Connolly and Iannacci, JJ.PEOPLE, res, v. Stephen J. Butler, Jr., ap — Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Michael J. Brennan, J.), dated March 25, 2015, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.By indictment in Gwinnett County, Georgia, dated September 6, 2001, the defendant was accused of violating Official Code of Georgia Annotated (hereinafter O.C.G.A.) §16-12-100, which prohibits the knowing production of sexually explicit photographs depicting children under the age of 18. The indictment arose out of the defendant’s alleged conduct of photographing female minors in provocative or seductive poses and in various stages of partial undress. Specifically, the defendant dropped off 99 rolls of film at a Kroger store for developing, insisting upon only receiving negatives rather than prints. When store employees accidentally developed some prints and saw the images depicted on them, they reported the matter to the police, which led to the indictment.On January 27, 2003, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of children (O.C.G.A. §16-12-100). He was sentenced to 5 years of incarceration and 15 years of probation.In 2014, the defendant established residence in Kings County, New York, and, as required, registered as a sex offender. Under the risk assessment instrument (hereinafter RAI), the defendant was assessed a total of 115 points, which is a presumptive level three designation.At a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law §168 et seq.; hereinafter SORA), the People’s evidence included an investigator’s report prepared by the detective assigned to the criminal case. The investigator’s report indicated that when the defendant dropped off the 99 rolls of film at Kroger, he gave a false name, “Steve Holbrook,” and a false telephone number, and said that the store need not call him as he would pick up the negatives on his own when the job was done. The report further indicated that when the detective first spoke with the defendant, the defendant admitted that he photographed girls at several locations in the metro Atlanta area, which included 10 or 15 of the rolls of film that he had picked up at Kroger. At another time during the interview, the defendant said that he had found the 99 rolls of film that were from his past and had them developed to see what was on them. The defendant admitted to the existence of some additional “inappropriate” photographs inside his automobile and consented to its search. The search of the automobile resulted in the discovery of negatives of girls in provocative poses. In addition, the automobile’s trunk contained “fabric, needles and thread used for making very small thong type underwear,” as well as “skimpy outfits,” bathing suits, and dresses, including a multicolored dress with heart shapes matching a dress worn by a girl in lewd positions in one of the Kroger rolls of film. During his interview, the defendant admitted to having been present when the photographs were taken of the girl in the multicolored dress with hearts but denied being the actual photographer. The detective spoke with a small number of girls whose identities could be ascertained. He also spoke to their mothers. One of the girls recounted a photo shoot where the defendant was described as pulling the girl’s bathing suit bottoms “up her ‘butt crack’” in a way that made her feel uncomfortable, and that the defendant had “asked her to show some of her ‘butt.’” In the same investigator’s report, the detective stated that the photographs from Kroger included those “of a young white female approximately 8-10 years of age,” and that one of the photographs showed the defendant with his arm around a girl.The defendant testified at the SORA hearing that he came into possession of the film by mail from a man in Texas for whom he was going to build a website. On cross-examination, the defendant testified that he had photographed girls of all ages at several Atlanta area locations, including girls under the age of 10, but denied that those photographs were among the ones for which he was convicted.The defendant’s SORA testimony is at odds with statements the defendant allegedly made to the detective—that he took the photographs on 10 or 15 of the Kroger rolls, and that he had “found” the 99 rolls. The defendant’s testimony did not reconcile with the multicolored dress in his car matching that which was worn by a girl in one of the Kroger rolls, nor with the Kroger photograph that depicted himself with an arm around a girl. During his testimony, the defendant did not contest the use of a false name and phone number at Kroger, his insistence that Kroger develop negatives only, and his desire to pick up the negatives without being called.The defendant’s counsel at the SORA hearing challenged the assessment of points under risk factor 3 (number of victims, three or more) on the ground that in child pornography cases, this factor has a tendency to produce an over-assessment of risk, and risk factor 7 (relationship with the victims) on the ground that there was no direct contact between the defendant and the victims. Defense counsel did not challenge the assessment of points under risk factor 5 (age of victim, 10 or less).In an order dated March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court determined that the People had presented clear and convincing evidence supporting the assessment of 115 points, which qualified the defendant as a level three sex offender. The court declined to grant a downward departure.On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence against him was insufficient on the specific ground that the investigator’s report failed to establish risk factors 3 and 5. However, at the SORA hearing, the defendant made no such arguments, rendering them unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Game, 131 AD3d 460; People v. Patterson, 51 AD3d 750). We decline to reach the defendant’s sufficiency arguments in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.The defendant also argues on appeal that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue at the SORA hearing the insufficiency of the evidence as to risk factors 3 and 5. Under the federal ineffective assistance of counsel standard, the defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different” (Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694; see People v. Georgiou, 38 AD3d 155, 160). New York applies a somewhat different two-pronged standard. Although the first prong is identical to its federal counterpart, the second prong focuses on prejudice and is based on the fairness of the process as a whole as distinguished from the impact of counsel’s errors on the outcome (see People v. Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 566; People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 714; People v. Georgiou, 38 AD3d at 160-161; People v. Brown, 300 AD2d 314, 315).Here, the defendant’s SORA counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue the insufficiency of risk factor 3 evidence that there were more than two victims. We find unpersuasive the defendant’s argument, as adopted by our dissenting colleague, that SORA counsel was unfamiliar with the investigator’s report by virtue of arguing that in child pornography cases, victims will always be strangers not put at risk by the defendant. In fact, counsel’s argument was factually consistent with the defendant’s own carefully crafted SORA testimony that he did not take the specific photographs that formed the basis for his conviction. Counsel’s better familiarity with the particulars of People v. Gillotti (23 NY3d 841) would have made no measurable difference to the outcome of the hearing. In any event, the investigator’s report constituted reliable hearsay that was properly admitted into evidence at the SORA hearing (see People v. Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 576; People v. Davis, 130 AD3d 598, 599-600), which the court could find persuasive since portions of the defendant’s SORA testimony were convincingly refuted by it. Ineffectiveness of counsel will not be found if an argument that could have been made in a proceeding would have had little or no chance of success (see People v. Ennis, 11 NY3d 403, 415; People v. Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287). The investigator’s report, which identified more than two victims for risk factor 3, was necessarily credited by the Supreme Court. Thus, any additional potential defense argument about risk factor 3 would have had little or no chance of success.As for risk factor 5 (age of victim, 10 and under), the investigator’s report provided an age range for a victim that fully fell within the age definition contained in risk factor 5. For this factor to apply, only one victim needed to be 10 years old or younger. The defendant admitted, in his own SORA testimony, that girls under the age of 10 were among those whom he photographed in the Atlanta area, while not admitting that those girls and photographs were within the scope of his guilty plea. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals has held that SORA courts assessing points for an offense are not limited to matters of the defendant’s current conviction, but may also assess points for other acts presented in the form of reliable evidence, such as victim statements, official reports, and, as relevant here, admissions of the offender (see People v. Sincerbeaux, 27 NY3d 683, 688-689). Indeed, in People v. Vasquez (149 AD3d 1584), where, as here, the defendant challenged the assessment of points under risk factors 3 and 5, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that in determining the number and age of victims, the SORA hearing court is not limited to the evidence of the crime of which the defendant was convicted (see id. at 1585; see also People v. Menjivar, 121 AD3d 660, 661; People v. Robertson, 101 AD3d 1671, 1671-1672; People v. Madera, 100 AD3d 1111, 1112; People v. Gardiner, 92 AD3d 1228, 1229; People v. D’Adamo, 67 AD3d 1132, 1133; People v. Thomas, 59 AD3d 783, 784).Based on the totality of the evidence here, we cannot conclude that SORA counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the insufficiency of the evidence with respect to a victim’s age. The evidence before the Supreme Court, consisting of the defendant’s hearing testimony that he photographed girls under the age of 10, combined with the age-qualifying contents of the investigator’s report which is deemed reliable hearsay (see People v. Mingo, 12 NY3d at 576), established risk factor 5 by clear and convincing evidence (see People v. Destio, 145 AD3d 1047, 1048). Under the federal standard for ineffectiveness of counsel, any age-related insufficiency argument that could have been made does not create a “probability” of a different SORA result (Strickland Washington, 466 US at 694; see People v. Georgiou, 38 AD3d at 160). Likewise, under the New York standard, the SORA hearing as a whole was not rendered unduly prejudicial or unfair (see People v. Henry, 95 NY2d at 566; People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d at 714; People v. Georgiou, 38 AD3d at 160-161; People v. Brown, 300 AD2d at 315).Accordingly, we affirm the order appealed from.DILLON, J.P., CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.BARROS, J., dissents, and votes to reverse the order, on the law, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new risk level assessment hearing and a new determination, with the following memorandum:On January 27, 2003, the defendant was convicted in the State of Georgia, upon his plea of guilty, of one count of sexual exploitation of children (O.C.G.A. §16-12-100), in that on June 28, 2001, he did knowingly create and reproduce photographs of girls under the age of 18 years engaged in sexually explicit conduct.The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board) prepared a risk assessment instrument (hereinafter the RAI) dated May 6, 2014, in which it assessed the defendant 115 points and presumptively designated him a level three sex offender. At a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), the People relied primarily upon an investigator’s report from the Gwinnett County Police Department in Georgia to support the assessment of a total of 115 points, including 30 points under risk factor 3 for “three or more” victims and 30 points under risk factor 5 for “age of victim” being 10 years old or less. The Georgia police investigator’s report detailed allegations that the defendant represented himself as a photographer for a modeling agency, actively recruited young girls as models, and took inappropriate photographs of the girls. The defendant challenged the assessment of points under risk factor 3 for “three or more” victims and risk factor 7 for the nature of his relationship with the victims, arguing that in child pornography cases generally, the defendants and victims are strangers, and the victims are not placed directly at risk by the defendants. After the hearing, the Supreme Court designated the defendant a level three (high risk) sex offender.The defendant did not argue at the SORA hearing, as he does now, that the points assessed under risk factors 3 and 5 were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Since the defendant did not object to the designation on the grounds he now raises, I agree with the majority that the defendant’s contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Benitez, 140 AD3d 1140; People v. Angelo, 3 AD3d 482), and that we should decline to reach them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.However, I vote to reverse the order since the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the SORA hearing. ”A sex offender facing risk level classification under SORA has a right to the effective assistance of counsel” (People v. Willingham, 101 AD3d 979, 979; see People v. Bowles, 89 AD3d 171, 173). Defense counsel was admittedly unfamiliar with the case upon which he expressly relied at the SORA hearing, People v. Gillotti (23 NY3d 841), and unsuccessfully sought an adjournment of the SORA hearing for the purpose of reviewing that case. Counsel then proceeded to argue that Gillotti stood for the proposition that “the anomaly in all child pornography cases [is that] they are always going to be strangers and these are people who are not being put directly at risk by the defendant.” However, in Gillotti, the Court of Appeals held just the opposite: ”Given that child pornography offenders substantially harm the mental health of abused children and, via the consumption of child pornography, encourage others to commit the hands-on sexual abuse needed to produce that material, it is difficult to credit defendants’ claims that, due to their failure to personally physically abuse children, the risk of harm caused by their offenses should not be accounted for in the manner authorized by the plain language of factors 3 and 7″ (id. at 857). Moreover, counsel’s argument demonstrated that he was not sufficiently familiar with the Gwinnett County Police Department investigator’s report, which alleged that the defendant was an active participant in the creation of child pornography and had personally physically abused children. Given those allegations against the defendant and his plea of guilty to the charges, counsel’s argument was patently absurd.Most significantly, counsel failed to contest the assessment of 30 points under risk factor 5 for “age of victim” being 10 years old or less, which was based upon the Georgia investigator’s estimate of the approximate age range of one of the unidentified victims shown in the photographs (see People v. Cephus, 128 AD3d 656). Counsel did not request the Georgia criminal file, including the photographs upon which the age range estimate was based, or contend that an estimate of an approximate age range did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the unidentified victim was 10 years old or less. In People v. Cephus, this Court found that “the equivocal grand jury testimony of a physician who examined the complainant… did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the complainant was 10 years old at the time of the offenses” (id.). Here, the People relied upon an unavailable witness’s estimate of an unknown victim’s age range, which was based upon inspection of photographs that were not produced in court.While the majority relies upon the defendant’s SORA hearing testimony to support its determination, the record shows that neither the People nor the Supreme Court relied upon the defendant’s SORA hearing testimony to establish any of the assessed points. Indeed, the Board prepared the RAI and assessed the 30 points under risk factor 5 months before the SORA hearing was held. Moreover, even though the defendant admitted on cross-examination that he took photographs of children aged 10 years old or younger, there was no evidence introduced or argument made that those photographs, or the circumstances involved in the taking of those photographs, involved sexual conduct such that any of those children may be considered victims for purposes of SORA (see People v. Izzo, 26 NY3d 999, 1002). Indeed, the investigator’s report identified only the one unknown girl who was estimated to be under the age of 10, and acknowledged that many of the film rolls in the defendant’s possession did not contain inappropriate images of the children shown therein.It was undisputed that one of the identified victims who was interviewed by the Georgia investigator was, in fact, 12 years old. As such, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the assessment of 20 points under risk factor 5 for victims aged 11 to 16, rather than the 30 points that were assessed for victims aged 10 or less. The 10 point difference reduces the defendant’s overall score to 105, which corresponds with a level two (moderate risk) sex offender.“To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, first, ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and additionally, ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different’” (People v. Casey, 149 AD3d 771, 771-772, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694). ”Under the New York State Constitution, ‘a defendant must demonstrate that counsel failed to provide meaningful representation based on the totality of the representation’ and ‘does not have to establish prejudice, as required under the federal standard’” (People v. Casey, 149 AD3d at 772, quoting People v. Hogan, 26 NY3d 779, 790; see People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147).Overall, counsel’s unfamiliarity with the evidence and the law, and his failure to challenge the points assessed under risk factor 5, demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and establish that counsel did not provide meaningful representation to the defendant (see People v. Willingham, 101 AD3d at 979; People v. Reid, 59 AD3d 158, 158-159). Given that the assessment of 30 points under risk factor 5 was based upon a mere age range estimate, there is a reasonable probability that a challenge to the points assessed under that risk factor would have resulted in an overall lower presumptive risk level designation at the SORA hearing.Accordingly, I vote to reverse the order appealed from and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new risk level assessment hearing and a new determination.By Rivera, J.P.; Roman, Duffy and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Eric DeBerry, ap — (Ind. No. 6281/99)Eric DeBerry, Napanoch, NY, appellant pro se.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Rhea A. Grob of counsel), for respondent.Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated April 11, 2005 (People v. DeBerry, 17 AD3d 480), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 28, 2000.ORDERED that the application is denied.The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel (see Jones v. Barnes, 463 US 745; People v. Stultz, 2 NY3d 277).RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, DUFFY and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Roman, Duffy and Connolly, JJ.MATTER of Jennifer Royster, res, v. Jeanine Murray, ap — (Docket No. O-292-15)Appeals from (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Westchester County (Mary Anne Scattaretico-Naber, J.), entered September 26, 2016, and (2) an order of that court entered May 12, 2017. The order of fact-finding and disposition, after a hearing, found that Jeanine Murray committed the family offenses of menacing in the third degree and disorderly conduct, and directed that an order of protection be entered in favor of the petitioner and against Jeanine Murray for a period of six months. The order denied Jeanine Murray’s motion to settle the transcript of the fact-finding hearing pursuant to CPLR 5525(c) by striking the testimony of her brother, who is also the petitioner’s live-in boyfriend.ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed as academic, without costs and disbursements; and it is further,ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.The petitioner is the live-in girlfriend of the appellant’s brother. The petitioner and the appellant live in the same building, on different floors. The petitioner filed a family offense petition against the appellant, alleging that she had physically attacked and verbally threatened her. After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court determined that the petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant had committed the family offenses of menacing in the third degree and disorderly conduct. The court directed that a six-month order of protection be entered in favor of the petitioner against the appellant. The appellant thereafter moved pursuant to CPLR 5525(c) to settle the hearing transcript by striking the testimony of her brother, who testified during the trial in support of his own family offense petition against the appellant. The court denied the appellant’s motion.Initially, although the order of protection directed by the Family Court in connection with the petitioner’s family offense petition expired by its own terms, the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as directed that a six-month order of protection be entered against the appellant has not been rendered academic “‘given the totality of the enduring legal and reputational consequences of the contested order of protection’” (Matter of Pierre v. Dal, 142 AD3d 1021, 1022, quoting Matter of Veronica P. v. Radcliff A., 24 NY3d 668, 673; see Matter of Sommella v. Kimble, 150 AD3d 1018; Matter of Crenshaw v. Thorpe-Crenshaw, 146 AD3d 951, 951-952).The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and “cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute” (Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366). ”Pursuant to Family Court Act §812(1), the Family Court’s jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed criminal acts that occur ‘between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household’” (Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 AD3d 975, 976 [emphasis omitted], quoting Family Ct Act §812[1]). “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” (Family Ct Act §812[1][e]; see Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 AD3d at 976). Expressly excluded from the ambit of “intimate relationship” are “casual acquaintance[s]” and “ ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts” (Family Ct Act §812[1][e]). Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act §812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis (see Matter of Seye v. Lamar, 72 AD3d at 976). Relevant factors include “the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship” (Family Ct Act §812[1][e]; see Matter of Riedel v. Vasquez, 88 AD3d 725, 726).Here, the parties have no direct relationship and are only connected through a third party, who is the petitioner’s live-in boyfriend and the appellant’s brother. Additionally, the parties have never resided together and their contact with one another has been purely by happenstance, as they live in the same building. Accordingly, they do not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act §812(1)(e).Since the parties did not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act §812(1)(e), the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the family offense petition and to issue the order of protection (see Matter of Parrella v. Freely, 90 AD3d 664, 665).In light of our determination, the appellant’s remaining contention with respect to the order of fact-finding and disposition, and the appeal from the order entered May 12, 2017, have been rendered academic.RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, DUFFY and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ.MATTER of Boston G. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, ap; Jennifer G. (Anonymous), res — (Docket No. N-17781-15)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Lillian Wan, J.), dated December 7, 2016. The order granted the mother’s motion to vacate so much of a prior order of fact-finding and disposition of that court dated October 5, 2015, as, upon her consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without admission pursuant to Family Court Act §1051(a), found that she neglected the subject child.ORDERED that the order dated December 7, 2016, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.On July 13, 2015, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 alleging that the mother neglected the subject child by leaving the child unattended and by misusing alcohol. The petition alleged that the child was removed from the mother’s home on July 11, 2015. In an order of fact-finding and disposition dated October 5, 2015, the Family Court, upon the mother’s consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without admission pursuant to Family Court Act §1051(a), found that she neglected the child and released the child to the mother’s custody under the supervision of the petitioner for a period of 12 months pursuant to certain terms and conditions. In May 2016, the parties consented to ending the period of supervision five months early.In November 2016, the mother moved pursuant to Family Court Act §1061 to vacate so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition dated October 5, 2015, as found that she neglected the child. In opposition to the mother’s motion, the petitioner argued that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion since the case was closed in May 2016, and that the neglect finding could not be vacated because it was entered on consent. The attorney for the child did not oppose the motion. In an order dated December 7, 2016, the court granted the mother’s motion. The petitioner appeals.On appeal, the petitioner contends that the mother failed to establish “good cause” within the meaning of Family Court Act §1061 to warrant vacatur of the prior finding of neglect. However, the petitioner’s contention is unpreserved for appellate review, as the petitioner did not raise this contention in opposition to the mother’s motion (see Matter of Keishaun P. [Tyrone P.], 140 AD3d 1171, 1173). In any event, the petitioner’s contention is without merit.Family Court Act §1061 provides that, for good cause shown, the Family Court may set aside, modify, or vacate any order issued in the course of a child protective proceeding (see Family Ct Act §1061; Matter of Jahred S. [Wilbert S.], 149 AD3d 963, 965; Matter of Inocencia W. [Yasha W.], 147 AD3d 865, 866; Matter of Bernalysa K. [Richard S.], 118 AD3d 885, 885). ”The statute expresses the strong Legislative policy in favor of continuing Family Court jurisdiction over the child and family so that the court can do what is necessary in the furtherance of the child’s welfare” (Matter of Kevin M.H. [Kevin H.], 102 AD3d 690, 691 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Mario D. [Marina L.], 147 AD3d 828). ”As with an initial order, the modified order must reflect a resolution consistent with the best interests of the child[ ] after consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, and must be supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Sutton S. [Abigail E.S.], 152 AD3d 608, 608 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Kenneth QQ. [Jodi QQ.], 77 AD3d 1223, 1224). Under the particular circumstances of this case, including the mother’s lack of any prior child protective history, her strict compliance with court-ordered services and treatment, and her commitment to ameliorating the issues that led to the finding of neglect, the mother demonstrated good cause to vacate the finding of neglect (see Matter of Leenasia C. [Lamarriea C.], 154 AD3d 1, 12-13; Matter of Daniella A. [Jessica A.], 153 AD3d 426, 427; Matter of Anoushka G. [Cyntra M.], 132 AD3d 867, 868; Matter of Araynah B., 34 Misc 3d 566, 582 [Fam Ct, Kings County]; cf. Matter of Inocencia W. [Yasha W.], 147 AD3d at 866).The petitioner’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.Accordingly, the Family Court properly granted the mother’s motion to vacate so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition dated October 5, 2015, as found that she neglected the child.In light of our determination, we need not reach the remaining contention of the attorney for the child.MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.By Chambers, J.P.; Cohen, Barros and Christopher, JJ.Richard Hanney, ap, v. White Plains Galleria, LP respondents (and a third-party action). (Index No. 51689/14)In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Jamieson, J.), entered August 9, 2016, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.On July 31, 2013, the plaintiff was working on a mechanical system on the roof of the Galleria Mall in White Plains, which was owned and/or managed by the defendants. The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when, as he descended a small set of wooden stairs, one of the steps cracked while he was on it, and he jumped from the step to avoid falling. The plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants negligently maintained the staircase. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion, and the plaintiff appeals.In a premises liability case, a defendant real property owner or a party in possession or control of real property who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence (see Kyte v. Mid-Hudson Wendico, 131 AD3d 452; Pampalone v. FBE Van Dam, LLC, 123 AD3d 988; Martino v. Patmar Props., Inc., 123 AD3d 890). A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it (see Gordon American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837-838). To meet its prima facie burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell (see Rong Wen Wu v. Arniotes, 149 AD3d 786; Birnbaum v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d 598, 598-599).Here, while the evidence submitted in support of the subject branch of the defendants’ motion may have demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not create the alleged condition or have actual notice thereof, it failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of it. Indeed, the evidence submitted on their motion failed to demonstrate when the subject staircase was last inspected relative to the plaintiff’s accident (see Torre v. Aspen Knolls Estates Home Owners Assn, Inc., 150 AD3d 789, 789; DeFelice v. Seakco Constr. Co., LLC, 150 AD3d 677, 678; James v. Orion Condo-350 W. 42nd St., LLC, 138 AD3d 927; Bruni v. Macy’s Corporate Servs., Inc., 134 AD3d 870, 871; Pryzywalny v. New York City Tr. Auth., 69 AD3d 598, 598). Thus, in the absence of any evidence as to when they last inspected the staircase prior to the accident, they failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition of the step (see Pryzywalny v. New York City Tr. Auth., 69 AD3d at 598). In light of the defendants’ failure to meet their prima facie burden on the subject branch of their motion, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.CHAMBERS, J.P., COHEN, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Rivera, J.P.; Roman, Duffy and Connolly, JJ.MATTER of Evans Tayson, ap, v. Ama Degraft-Johnson, res — (Docket No. V-11250-11)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Marybeth S. Richroath, J.), dated January 23, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied the father’s petition to modify an order of custody and visitation of that court (Margaret M. Mulrooney, Ct. Atty. Ref.) dated February 25, 2014, to allow him to relocate with the parties’ child to Georgia.ORDERED that the order dated January 23, 2017, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.The parties had one child together, a daughter who was born in 2007. The parties shared joint custody of their daughter pursuant to an order of custody and visitation dated February 25, 2014, and the daughter’s primary residence was with the father. In July 2016, the father filed a petition in the Family Court seeking to modify the February 25, 2014, order to allow him to relocate with the daughter from New York to Georgia. Following a hearing, the court denied the petition. The father appeals.When reviewing a custodial parent’s petition for permission to relocate, the court’s primary focus must be on the best interests of the child (see Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727; Matter of Steadman v. Roamer, 81 AD3d 653, 654). The parent seeking to relocate bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed move would be in the child’s best interests (see Bjornson v. Bjornson, 38 AD3d 816, 816-817). In determining whether relocation is appropriate, the court must consider a number of factors, including the child’s relationship with each parent, the effect of the move on contact with the noncustodial parent, the potential economic, emotional, and educational enhancement to the lives of the custodial parent and the child due to the move, and each parent’s motives for seeking or opposing the move (see Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d at 740-741). Inasmuch as “[t]he weighing of these various factors requires an evaluation of the testimony, character and sincerity of all the parties involved” (Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173), the Family Court’s determinations are entitled to deference and its decision will be upheld if supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Karen H. v. Maurice G., 101 AD3d 1005; Matter of McBryde v. Bodden, 91 AD3d 781, 782).Here, the Family Court’s determination that the child’s best interests would not be served by the relocation to Georgia is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. The court was properly concerned about the impact that the move would have on the mother’s relationship with the child. The relocation would deprive the mother of valuable parenting time with the child and impair her ability to participate in the child’s education, extracurricular activities, and medical care. Furthermore, the record strongly suggests that the father will not promote and encourage the mother-child relationship. Although relocation to Georgia might provide some economic benefits, it does not justify the reduction in the mother’s visitation or uprooting the child, who had always attended the same school where she was thriving academically and socially (see Matter of Detwiler v. Detwiler, 145 AD3d 778, 780).The father’s remaining contentions are without merit.The mother’s challenge to the order appealed from is not properly before this Court, since she did not cross-appeal from the order.RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN, DUFFY and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Austin, J.P.; Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Iannacci, JJ.Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., etc., res, v. Robert Shatles, etc. appellants def — (Index No. 7572/11)Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Paul J. Baisley Jr., J.), dated January 19, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the motion of the defendant Robert Shatles which was pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of that court entered August 27, 2014, upon his failure to answer the complaint.ORDERED that the appeal by the defendant Brooke Shatles is dismissed, as she is not aggrieved by the portion of the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v. TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156); and it is further,ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the defendant Robert Shatles; and it is further,ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.The defendant Robert Shatles executed a note in the sum of $640,000, which was secured by a mortgage on residential property located in Suffolk County. The mortgage was executed by him and the defendant Brooke Shatles. In March 2011, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage. In August 2014, upon, inter alia, Robert Shatles’s failure to answer the complaint, a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered.After a foreclosure sale was scheduled, Robert Shatles moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale entered August 27, 2014, alleging that the plaintiff submitted fraudulent evidence of standing to sue to obtain the judgment. In an order dated January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the motion. Robert Shatles appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of the order as denied that branch of his motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale.Robert Shatles claimed in support of his motion that the plaintiff obtained the judgment of foreclosure and sale through the submission of a fraudulent document, which amounts to an allegation of intrinsic fraud (see US Bank N.A. v. Galloway, 150 AD3d 1174, 1175; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Peters, 127 AD3d 742, 742-743). Where a defendant seeks to vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) based on intrinsic fraud, he or she must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see US Bank N.A. v. Galloway, 150 AD3d at 1175; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Karlis, 138 AD3d 915, 916; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Peters, 127 AD3d at 742-743; New Century Mtge. Corp. v. Corriette, 117 AD3d 1011, 1012). Since no excuse was presented for the default in answering the complaint, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale.AUSTIN, J.P., SGROI, HINDS-RADIX and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.By Priscilla Hall, J.P.; Cohen, Barros and Christopher, JJ.L.R., etc. res, v. City of New York, et al., ap — (Index No. 503536/14)In an action to recover damages for personal damages, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Genovesi, J.), dated September 9, 2016, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.On May 6, 2013, the then four-year-old infant plaintiff sustained injuries in her pre-kindergarten classroom when she tripped on the foot of a chair as she was carrying her food tray to a trash bin. As a result, the infant plaintiff, and her mother suing derivatively, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the City of New York, the New York City Board of Education, and the New York City Department of Education. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the defendants appeal.“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Mirand v. City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49; see Santos v. City of New York, 138 AD3d 968). ”Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students” (Mirand v. City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49; see Nash v. Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 83 AD3d 136, 146).Here, the defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the level of supervision afforded to the infant plaintiff was adequate (see Simonides v. Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 140 AD3d 728, 730; O’Brien v. Sayville Union Free School Dist., 87 AD3d 569; Paragas v. Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 65 AD3d 1111, 1111-1112). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, at the time of the accident, the infant plaintiff was in the midst of executing an age-appropriate task which she and her classmates had performed every single school day since the start of the 2012/2013 academic year (see Paragas v. Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 65 AD3d at 1111-1112). Additionally, the mother’s affidavit, which contradicted her own 50-h hearing testimony and the infant plaintiff’s deposition testimony, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.HALL, J.P., COHEN, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Roman, Miller and Connolly, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Robert T. Dieckmann, ap — (Ind. No. 14-00015)Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Robert H. Freehill, J.), rendered February 6, 2015, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California (386 US 738), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California (386 US 738), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see id.; People v. Williams, 144 AD3d 847, 848; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 AD3d 252; cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 NY2d 606).MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Cohen, Lasalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of 76 South Central Associates, LLC, res, v. Department of Assessment ap — (Index No. 403060/15)In a tax certiorari proceeding pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7, the Department of Assessment, the Assessment Review Commission, and the County of Nassau appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marano, J.), dated November 30, 2015, which granted the petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to complete service of process.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting, in the interest of justice, the petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to complete service of process on the appellants (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95, 105-106; Rosenzweig v. 600 N. St., LLC, 35 AD3d 705, 706). The petitioner’s time to effect service of process was properly extended since the verified petition demonstrated the merits of the proceeding, the petition was timely filed, the statute of limitations had expired by the time the petitioner moved to extend its time to complete service of process, and there was no demonstrable prejudice to the appellants which would militate against granting the extension of time to serve them (see CPLR 105[u]; Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 105-106; Gabbar v. Flatlands Commons, LLC, 150 AD3d 1084, 1084-1085; Abu-Aqlein v. El-Jamal, 44 AD3d 884, 885; Beague v. New York City Tr. Auth, 282 AD2d 416; Busler v. Corbett, 259 AD2d 13; cf. Bahadur v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 88 AD3d 629, 630).MASTRO, J.P., COHEN, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ.MATTER of Tracey LaChere, res, v. Thomas J. Maliszweski, ap — (Docket Nos. V-4334-12, V-4335-12)Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Matthew Hughes, J.), dated November 2, 2016. The order, after a hearing, granted the mother’s amended petition to modify a so-ordered stipulation of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated August 6, 2012, to the extent of awarding her therapeutic visitation with the subject children.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.The two children who are the subject of this proceeding were born in 2005 and 2007, respectively. Pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated August 6, 2012, the mother was granted at least 90 minutes per week of unsupervised visitation with the subject children as well as at least 10 hours per week of supervised visitation. In 2013, upon the mother’s conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Integrated Domestic Violence Part, issued an order of protection requiring the mother to stay away from the subject children through 2018. The order of protection was made subject to any custody or visitation order of the Supreme Court or the Family Court.In an amended petition filed in August 2015, the mother sought to modify the so-ordered stipulation dated August 6, 2012, so as to award her unsupervised visitation with the children as well as nightly telephone calls with them. At a hearing held on the amended petition, the mother testified that in 2015 she voluntarily entered an 11-month drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, that after she successfully completed that program she began participating in outpatient treatment and counseling, and that she was currently residing in a “sober housing” facility where she had consistently tested negative on random drug tests. In addition, the mother testified that she would be patient in seeking to reestablish a relationship with her children. The mother’s testimony was supported by letters from two of her therapists, who stated that the mother had successfully completed the rehabilitation program, had consistently tested negative for drugs and alcohol, and had readily participated in therapy. After the hearing, the Family Court granted the mother’s amended petition to the extent of awarding her therapeutic visitation with the children. The father appeals.An existing visitation order may be modified only “upon a showing that there has been a subsequent change of circumstances and modification is required” (Family Ct Act §467[b][ii]; see Matter of Boggio v. Boggio, 96 AD3d 834; Galanti v. Kraus, 85 AD3d 723). The paramount concern in any visitation determination is the best interests of the child, under the totality of the circumstances (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167; Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89; Matter of Skeete v. Hamilton, 78 AD3d 1187). The determination of visitation is entrusted to the sound discretion of the Family Court, and such determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Orellana v. Orellana, 112 AD3d 720; Matter of Fulmer v. Buxenbaum, 109 AD3d 822; Matter of Haimovici v. Haimovici, 73 AD3d 1058). A noncustodial parent should have reasonable rights of visitation, and the denial of those rights to a natural parent is a drastic remedy which should only be invoked when there is substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child (see Cervera v. Bressler, 90 AD3d 803; Matter of Lane v. Lane, 68 AD3d 995; Matter of Sinnott-Turner v. Kolba, 60 AD3d 774).Here, the determination of the Family Court that therapeutic visitation between the mother and the children was in the children’s best interests has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Castagnola v. Muller, 105 AD3d 954; Matter of Thompson v. Yu-Thompson, 41 AD3d 487). Contrary to the father’s contention, the court did not fail to take the children’s wishes into account. Although a child’s views should be considered, they are not controlling (see Matter of Ross v. Ross, 86 AD3d 615; Matter of Bond v. MacLeod, 83 AD3d 1304; Matter of Burola v. Meek, 64 AD3d 962; Matter of Cornell v. Cornell, 8 AD3d 718).BALKIN, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Nelson and Christopher, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., ex rel. Christopher W. Hoyt, on behalf of Igor Shamayev, pet, v. Commissioner of Corrections, res — Christopher W. Hoyt, New York, NY, petitioner pro se.Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Paul Wooten of counsel), for respondent.Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application for bail reduction upon Kings County Indictment No. 9476/17 to release Igor Shamayev on his own recognizance or to set reasonable bail.ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.The determination of the Supreme Court, Kings County, did not violate “constitutional or statutory standards” (People ex rel. Klein v. Kruger, 25 NY2d 497, 499; see People ex rel. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230).BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, BRATHWAITE NELSON and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Priscilla Hall, J.P.; Austin, Sgroi and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of David Coleman, ap, v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision res — (Index No. 458/17)David Lenefsky, New York, NY, for appellant.Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Steven C. Wu and David S. Frankel of counsel), for respondents.Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Christine A. Sproat, J.), dated June 28, 2017. The judgment denied a petition pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Board of Parole dated July 26, 2016, denying, after a hearing, the petitioner’s application to be released on parole, and dismissed the proceeding.ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is granted, the determination is annulled, and the matter is remitted to the New York State Board of Parole for further proceedings consistent herewith.In 1979, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree arising from his killing of a 14-year-old acquaintance who refused his sexual advances. The then-17-year-old petitioner strangled and beat the victim, then attempted to rape her. The petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 25 years to life. In July 2016, the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) denied the petitioner’s application for parole release. The petitioner subsequently commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the Parole Board’s determination. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioner appeals.Judicial review of a determination of the Parole Board is narrowly circumscribed (see Executive Law §259-i[5]; Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29; Matter of Marszalek v. Stanford, 152 AD3d 773, 773). While the Parole Board is required to consider the relevant statutory factors (see Executive Law §259-i[2][c][A]), it is not required to address each factor in its decision or accord all of the factors equal weight (see Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 791; Matter of Marszalek v. Stanford, 152 AD3d at 773; Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 AD3d 1068, 1069; Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 AD3d 948, 948).Here, the petitioner demonstrated his entitlement to having the determination of the Parole Board set aside. The Parole Board’s findings that there was a reasonable probability that, if released, the petitioner would not remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law, are without support in the record (see Matter of Marino v. Travis, 289 AD2d 493, 493).Contrary to the Parole Board’s determination that the petitioner “distance[d]” himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner took full responsibility for his actions, stating “ I don’t blame it on the drugs. I blame it on me. I’m responsible. I was responsible for taking drugs and ultimately I’m responsible for what happened while I was under the influence of those drugs.” The petitioner also acknowledged that he had not forgotten the reason he was in prison, he was aware of the damage he had done to the victim, her family, and his own family, and he deeply regretted that his “life took that turn at that time but [he was] not that 17 year old angry kid anymore.” Moreover, during his incarceration the petitioner earned three college degrees, received numerous commendations, including one for protecting a volunteer services secretary from an inmate and one for attempting to save the life of an inmate, and was assessed “low” for all risk factors on his COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) risk assessment.Thus, a review of the record demonstrates that in light of all of the factors, notwithstanding the seriousness of the underlying offense, the Parole Board’s “determination to deny the petitioner release on parole evinced irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Goldberg v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634 [internal quotations omitted]; see Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77; Correction Law §259-i[2][c][A]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the petition and annulled the determination denying the petitioner’s application to be released on parole.HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Nelson and Christopher, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., ex rel. Natalya Goberman, pet, v. New York City Department of Corrections res — Natalya Goberman, East Elmhurst, NY, petitioner pro se.Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application, inter alia, to release the petitioner on her own recognizance upon Queens County Indictment No. 3230/13.ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.The determination of the Supreme Court, Queens County, did not violate “constitutional or statutory standards” (People ex rel. Klein v. Kruger, 25 NY2d 497, 499; see People ex rel. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230).BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, BRATHWAITE NELSON and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.Motion List released on:January 10, 2018By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Heyward D. Reed pet, v. Demeza Delhomme, res — Motion by the respondent, inter alia, to confirm a report of a special referee dated June 14, 2017, in a proceeding pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 to remove the respondent from the public office of Mayor of the Village of Spring Valley.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that on the Court’s own motion, the parties are directed to show cause before this Court why an order should or should not be made and entered dismissing the proceeding on the ground that it has been rendered academic as the respondent no longer holds the public office of Mayor of the Village of Spring Valley (see Matter of Halsey v. Butler, 134 AD3d 842), by filing an affirmation or an affidavit on that issue in the office of the Clerk of this Court on or before January 31, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that the motion is held in abeyance in the interim; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court or her designee is directed to serve a copy of this order to show cause upon the parties to the proceeding by regular mail.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.MATTER of Josiah G. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, petitioner-res, Dominique G. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Dante G. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, petitioner-res, Dominique G. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 2) — Application by the appellant to withdraw appeals from three order of the Family Court, Kings County, all dated September 8, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeals are marked withdrawn.MATTER of Rosaura Pena, res, v. Barry G. Shepherd, ap — Appeal by Barry G. Shepherd from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated June 14, 2017. By dated November 13, 2017, the appellant was directed to file one of the following in the office of the Clerk of the Court, within 30 days after the date of the :(1) an affidavit or affirmation stating that there were no minutes of the Family Court proceedings to be transcribed for the appeal; or(2) if there were such minutes, an affidavit or affirmation that the transcript was received, and indicating the date that it was received; or(3) if the transcript was not received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it was ordered and paid for, the date thereof and the date by which the transcript was expected; or(4) an affidavit or an affirmation withdrawing the appeal.The appellant has failed to comply with the . Pursuant to §670.4(a)(5) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a][5]), it isORDERED that the parties are directed to show cause before this Court why an order should or should not be made and entered dismissing the appeal in the above-entitled proceeding for failure to comply with the dated November 13, 2017, by each filing an affirmation or affidavit on that issue in the office of the Clerk of this Court and serving one copy of the same on each other on or before January 31, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court, or her designee, is directed to serve a copy of this order to show cause upon the parties by regular mail.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Maria T. Olivari, res, v. Alan R. Bianco, ap — Appeal by Alan R. Bianco from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated December 1, 2016. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the respondent to serve and file a brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 9, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that no further enlargement of time shall be granted.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concurMATTER of Saad A. (Anonymous). Administration for Childrens Services, petitioner-res, Umda M. (Anonymous), respondent-appellant res — Appeal by Umda M. from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated October 11, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papers constituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 1, 2018.MATTER of Laquanda Parris, res, v. Isaac Wright, ap — Appeal by Isaac Wright from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (IDV Part), dated April 4, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the respondent to serve and file a brief on the appeal is enlarged until March 2, 2018.Photonics Industries International, Inc., ap, v. Xiaojie Zhao, res, et al., def — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated February 6, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until January 22, 2018, and the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellant’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.US Bank, res, v. Terrance Jackson, ap, et al., def — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated April 3, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until February 20, 2018, and the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellant’s brief must be served and filed on or before that date.MATTER of Sofia A. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner- appellant; Rubia A. (Anonymous), respondent- res — Appeal by Administration for Children’s Services from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated October 2, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the respondent and the attorney for the child to serve and file their respective briefs on the appeal is enlarged until February 9, 2018.Commercial Realty Services of Long Island, Inc., res, v. Mehran Enterprises, Ltd. appellants def — Applications pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to perfect appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated June 19, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the applications and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the applications are granted, the appellants’ time to perfect the appeals is enlarged until March 19, 2018, and the joint record or appendix on the appeals and the appellants’ respective briefs shall be served and filed on or before that date.Alan Wunderlich, ap, v. Liberty Meadows, LLC res, et al., def — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for a 60-day enlargement of time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 3, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until February 1, 2018, the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellant’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Kerin Manning, res, v. Nathan M. Lawrence, ap — Appeal by Nathan M. Lawrence from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated December 9, 2016. By dated November 21, 2017, the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal was enlarged until December 15, 2017. The appellant has failed to perfect the appeal.Now, on the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, for failure to timely perfect in accordance with the rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2],[4]) and prior order of the Court.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Andrena Alphonse, res, v. Alfred Alphonse, ap — Appeal by Alfred Alphonse from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated May 16, 2017. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated November 14, 2017, within 30 days after the date of the decision and order on motion, the appellant was directed to file in the office of the Clerk of this Court an affidavit or affirmation stating that the transcript had been received and indicating the date that it was received, or, if the transcript had not been received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it has been ordered and paid for, the date thereof and the date by which the transcript was expected. The appellant has failed to file the affidavit or affirmation.Now, on the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, for failure to comply with the decision and order on motion of this Court dated November 14, 2017 (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2],[4]).DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hirsch — Motion by the appellant to stay the foreclosure sale of the subject premises and all proceedings in the above-entitled action, pending hearing and determination of appeals from three orders of the Supreme Court, Orange County, one dated March 23, 2017, and two dated March 24, 2017, and, in effect, to deem the notice of appeal from the orders dated March 24, 2017, to be a premature notice of appeal from a judgment of the same court dated August 29, 2017, to the extent that the judgment brings the orders dated March 24, 2017, up for review and limit the issues raised in connection with the appeal from the judgment to the issues presented in connection with the appeals from the orders dated March 24, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that on the Court’s own motion, the appeal from the order dated March 23, 2017, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, on the ground that the appellant is not aggrieved (see CPLR 5511), as that order was vacated by one of the orders dated March 24, 2017; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion which is to stay the foreclosure sale of the subject premises and all proceedings in the above-entitled action is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the branch of the motion which is, in effect, to deem the notice of appeal from the orders dated March 24, 2017, to be a premature notice of appeal from the judgment to the extent that the judgment brings the orders dated March 24, 2017, up for review and to limit the issues raised in connection with the appeal from the judgment to the issues raised in connection with the appeals from the orders dated March 24, 2017, is granted, and the appeal will be prosecuted under Appellate Division Docket No. 2017-04574.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.Federal National Mortgage, plf, v. Donald J. Castoldi def — Motion by Donald J. Castoldi for leave to appeal to this Court from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated December 13, 2017, and, inter alia, to stay his eviction from the subject premises, pending hearing and determination of the appeal.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the branch of the motion which is for leave to appeal is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that the motion is otherwise denied as academic.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Leventhal, J.P.; Chambers, Miller and Duffy, JJ.MATTER of John S. Peters, res, v. Jasmine King, ap — Motion by the appellant to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County, dated January 6, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted, and the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papers constituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 13, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that no further enlargement of time shall be granted.LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHAMBERS, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Matthew Maldonado, ap, v. Nicole Maldonado, res — Appeal by Matthew Maldonado from an order of the Family Court, Richmond County, dated August 17, 2017. By order to show cause dated November 29, 2017, the parties were directed to show cause before this Court why an order should or should not be made and entered dismissing the appeal in the above-entitled proceeding for failure to comply with a dated October 4, 2017, issued pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]).Now, upon the order to show cause and the papers filed in response thereto, it isORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papers constituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until March 12, 2018.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Dominick Ippolito III, ap, v. Marisa Uriarte, res — Appeals by Dominick Ippolito III from two orders of the Family Court, Richmond County, both dated August 10, 2017. By order to show cause dated November 29, 2017, the parties were directed to show cause before this Court why an order should or should not be made and entered dismissing the appeals in the above-entitled proceeding for failure to comply with a dated October 4, 2017, issued pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]).Now, upon the order to show cause and the papers filed in response thereto, it isORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeals is denied; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), within 30 days after the date of this decision and order on motion, the appellant shall file in the office of the Clerk of this Court an affidavit or affirmation stating that the transcript has been received and indicating the date that it was received, or, if the transcript has not been received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it has been ordered and paid for, the date thereof, and the date by which the transcript is expected; and it is further,ORDERED that if the appellant fails to file the affidavit or affirmation within 30 days after the date of this decision and order on motion, as set forth above, the Court will dismiss the appeals, without further notice.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.By Leventhal, J.P.; Chambers, Miller and Duffy, JJ.Marc Rosenblatt, res, v. Elizabeth Karen Rosenblatt, appellant; Steven Sieratzki, etc., nonparty. — Motion by the respondent for a preference in the calendaring of appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, dated July 17, 2015, and November 13, 2015, respectively.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is denied.LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHAMBERS, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.Kendra Anderson, etc. res, v. State of New York, ap — (Claim No. 119385) — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Court of Claims, dated May 30, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Robert L. Johnson, ap — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, rendered May 16, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.MATTER of Andrew Devlin, res, v. Merry Eriksson, ap — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Orange County, dated November 15, 2016.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.MATTER of Andrew Devlin, res, v. Merry Eriksson, ap — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Orange County, dated August 23, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Rivaldo Vieira, res, v. 180 Orchard Owner, LLC ap — Application by the appellants 180 Orchard Owner, LLC, BCRE Services, LLC, and T.G. Nickel & Associates, LLC, to withdraw their appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated May 31, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal by the appellants 180 Orchard Owner, LLC, BCRE Services, LLC, and T.G. Nickel & Associates, LLC is marked withdrawn.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.Selenia Fusilli, etc. res, v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. def, Steven Harwin ap — Application by the appellant Daniel Klein for leave to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated December 22, 2016.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal by the appellant Daniel Klein is deemed withdrawn, without costs or disbursements.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.Thomas Desimone, res, v. Herbert Henken, appellant def — Application to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated April 6, 2017.Upon the stipulation of the attorneys for the respective parties to the appeal dated December 26, 2017, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is deemed withdrawn, without costs or disbursements.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Milton E. Wiggins, ap — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County, rendered October 3, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Victor Star, ap — (S.C.I. No. 10567/09) — Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 27, 2012.Upon the stipulation of the appellant and the attorneys for the respective parties to the appeal dated January 2, 2018, it isORDERED that the appeal is marked withdrawn.Tamara Cohen, ap, v. Ilan Cohen, res — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 30, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Alyse Moshe, ap, v. Euro – Pro Operating, LLC res — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated June 9, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Carole Johnson, ap, v. Owen Stewart, et al., res — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated May 19, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Melrose Credit Union, ap, v. Suleyman Yakubov res — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated June 23, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Anthony J. Pieragostini, res, Seashell Realty, LLC ap — Application by the appellants to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated June 27, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Denee Taylor, res, v. Wilder Balter Partners, Inc. ap — Application by the appellants to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated July 17, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.Andrew Rossi, res, v. Stonegate at Grasmere Homeowners Association, Inc., def, Van Alphen Bros., Inc., appellant (and a third-party action). — Application by the appellant to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated July 6, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.MATTER of Applications for Extensions of Time — Parties in the following causes have filed applications pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to extend the time to perfect or to serve and file a brief.Upon the papers filed in support of the applications, it isORDERED that the applications are granted and the following parties in the following causes are granted the specified extensions of time:Title Docket No. Applicant Name(s) Extended DeadlineBank of America, N.A. 2017-08293Bank of America, N.A.February 1, 2018 v. SinghBank of New York v. Morga2017-06946Bank of New York+1January 24, 2018Chase Home Finance, LLC2017-07911Chase Home Finance, LLC v. GuidoFebruary 28, 2018Dudnik v. 1055 Hylan 2017-043971055 Hylan Offices, LLCOffices, LLC February 7, 2018Dunn v. GGP Staten Island2017-08659GGP Staten Island Mall, LLC,Mall, LLC Tween Brans, Inc.Horizon Retail Construction,Inc.March 26, 2018Federal National v. Greenfeld2017-04712Federal National MortgageAssociationFebruary 20, 2018Great Homes Group LLC v. 2017-07279GMAC Mortgage, LLCGMAC Mortgage, LLCFebruary 8, 2018Title Docket No. Applicant Name(s) Extended DeadlineGreenpoint Bank v. 2017-07597Nicholas DestefanoFebruary 28, 2018DestefanoHernandes v. National 2017-06361Maria HernandesJanuary 26, 2018Wholesale LiquidatorsHorio Realty Corp. v. Hunts2017-08280Elton HeriPoint Flower Market, Inc.March 21, 2018HSBC Bank USA, National2017-07331Robert GordonAssociation v. Gordon Mindi GordonFebruary 26, 2018Jae Ok Noh v. Ki Hwan Kim 2017-07797Jae Ok NohMarch 15, 2018Kelly v. State of2017-09492Daryl Kelly, Sr.New YorkMarch 8, 2018Leake v. Romowners, Inc.2017-07194Henry LeakeElizabeth LeakeHank Leake Nursery& Landscaping January 19, 2018Matter of Adbelghany 2016-09793City of New York v. City of New YorkNew York City FireDepartmentFire Department of City ofNew YorkFebruary 1, 2018Matter of Hayes v. Nigro2017-07418City of New YorkDaniel A. NigroFebruary 15, 2018Matter of Mangels v. Zucker2017-07098Gayle MangelsFebruary 28, 2018Munoz v. Avant Guard2017-00587Victor MunozProperties, LLCFebruary 16, 2018Nuzzolese v. Ferrara Fire2017-07642County of NassauApparatus, Inc.Vocational Education andExtension Board of NassauCountyFebruary 6, 2018NYCTL 1998-2 Trust v. 2017-09013Adelphi F, LLCDR 226 Holdings, LLCApril 6, 2018Title Docket No. Applicant Name(s) Extended DeadlinePeople of State of New York2016-03753People of State of New York v. RobinsonFebruary 2, 2018Seidler v. Knopf 2017-08935Loft E, LLCRobert TeitelbaumFebruary 16, 2018State of New York 2017-07132Janine ViveritoMortgage Agency v. ViveritoFebruary 5, 2018U.S. Bank, National 2017-07223Sarah H. AinsleyAssociation v. Ainsley Spencer B. Ainsley March 12, 2018Weckbecker v. Skanska USA2017-03401Yvette WeckbeckerCivil Northeast Inc.Charles WeckbeckerJanuary 26, 2018Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.2017-07569Tracy James Harrigan v. HarriganFebruary 28, 2018Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2017-09421Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. StarrJanuary 18, 2018By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. James Faison, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 23, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Jose Hernandez, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 13, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Larry Young, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 3, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York, plf-res, v. Christ the King Regional High School, defendant-res, Christ the King Continuing Education, Inc., nonparty-ap, Middle Village Preparatory Charter School, nonparty-res — Application by the nonparty-appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to serve and file a reply brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated August 25, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the nonparty-appellant’s time to serve and file a reply brief is enlarged, and the reply brief submitted to the Clerk of the Court is accepted for filing and deemed timely served.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Marlow Alexander, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 4, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Sean Burgess, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered August 16, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Obalaji Cohen, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 15, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Christopher Williams, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered August 9, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Maradona Smith, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 11, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Quian Jones, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered June 8, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. G. (Anonymous), Joel, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 11, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Denisha (Anonymous), D.-L., ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 17, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Jonathan Figueroa, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 19, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Errol Irving, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 12, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Oliver Fareau, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 11, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Feliciano Perez, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered February 10, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc., res, v. Gail Palmore-Archer, appellant def — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for a 30-day enlargement of time to serve and file a reply brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered October 13, 2016.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the appellant’s time to serve and file a reply brief is enlarged until January 19, 2018, the reply brief shall be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.Anthony Hill, ap, v. Edgar Turrico, res — Application by the respondent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to serve and file a brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated July 28, 2016.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the respondent’s time to serve and file a brief is enlarged until January 25, 2018, and the respondent’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.Andrew I. Rossnagel, plf-res, v. Edward Kelly, defendant third-party plaintiff- res, Stationery Engineers ap, Lincoln Electric Products Co., Inc., defendant- res, Jayesh K. Patel, third-party defendant- res — Application by the appellants pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to serve and file a reply brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated September 15, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the appellants’ time to serve and file a reply brief is enlarged until January 12, 2018, and the reply brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.By Balkin, J.P.; Austin, Roman and Sgroi, JJ.Brian K. Murphy, res, v. Teresa E. Murphy, ap — Motion by the appellant to stay enforcement of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, dated December 22, 2017, pending hearing and determination of an appeal therefrom.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that on the Court’s own motion, the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, on the ground that the appellant is not aggrieved by the order dated December 22, 2017 (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,ORDERED that the motion is denied as academic.BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN and SGROI, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Christiane Pacheco, ap, v. Hugo Pacheco, res — F-10844-08/15I) — On the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the of this Court dated December 13, 2017, in the above-entitled matter, on an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated June 7, 2017, is amended by deleting from the first decretal paragraph thereof the date “January 8, 2018,” and substituting therefor the date “January 10, 2018.”SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.Motion List released on:January 11, 2018By Mastro, J.P.; Dillon, Hall and Duffy, JJ.33-37 Farrington, LLC, res, v. Global Universal Group, Ltd., ap, et al., def — Motion by the appellant, inter alia, to stay enforcement of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered December 23, 2016, pending hearing and determination of an appeal therefrom.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is denied.MASTRO, J.P., DILLON, HALL and DUFFY, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Sonia Thaxton, res, v. Luis Chapman, ap — Appeal by Luis Chapman from an order of the Family Court, Orange County, dated May 25, 2017. Pursuant to Family Court Act §§1118 and 1120, and upon the certification of Victor Guzman, Esq., dated December 27, 2017, it isORDERED that pursuant to Family Court Act §1120, the following named attorney is assigned as the attorney for the child on the appeal:Karen M. Jansen, Esq.445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 607White Plains, NY 10601914-821-5200and it is further,ORDERED that Victor Guzman, Esq., is directed to turn over all papers in the proceeding to the new attorney for the child herein assigned.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Rivera, Dillon, Balkin and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Sara Elizabeth Frankel, an attorney and counselor-at-law. (Attorney Registration No. 5063318) — Application by Sara Elizabeth Frankel, who was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on October 3, 2012, to change her name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law to Sara Frankel Kokkinidis.Upon the papers filed in support of the application, it isORDERED that the application is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall change the applicant’s name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law from Sara Elizabeth Frankel to Sara Frankel Kokkinidis, effective immediately.MASTRO, J.P., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON, BALKIN and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Rivera, Dillon, Balkin and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Laena Pahyam Keyashian, an attorney and counselor-at-law. (Attorney Registration No. 5123799) — Application by Laena Pahyam Keyashian, who was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on August 14, 2013, to change her name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law to Laena St. Jules.Upon the papers filed in support of the application, it isORDERED that the application is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall change the applicant’s name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law from Laena Pahyam Keyashian to Laena St. Jules, effective immediately.MASTRO, J.P., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON, BALKIN and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Rivera, Dillon, Balkin and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Patricia Ann Crehan, an attorney and counselor-at-law. (Attorney Registration No. 1925619) — Application by Patricia Ann Crehan, who was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on April 25, 1984, to change her name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law to Patricia Ann Taylor.Upon the papers filed in support of the application, it isORDERED that the application is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall change the applicant’s name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law from Patricia Ann Crehan to Patricia Ann Taylor, effective immediately.MASTRO, J.P., RIVERA, DILLON, BALKIN and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.By Mastro, J.P.; Rivera, Dillon, Balkin and Christopher, JJ.MATTER of Alexa Renee Klebanow, an attorney and counselor-at-law. (Attorney Registration No. 5494869) — Application by Alexa Renee Klebanow, who was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on May 3, 2017, to change her name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law to Alexa Renee Haertel.Upon the papers filed in support of the application, it isORDERED that the application is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall change the applicant’s name on the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law from Alexa Renee Klebanow to Alexa Renee Haertel, effective immediately.MASTRO, J.P., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON, BALKIN and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.MATTER of Alexandra Detore, res, v. Brian Detore, ap — Appeals by Brian Detore from two orders of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated October 6, 2017, and November 27, 2017, respectively. Pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]), it isORDERED that the appeals in the above-entitled proceeding shall be perfected within 60 days after the receipt by the appellant of the transcripts of the minutes of the proceedings in the Family Court, and the appellant shall notify this Court by letter of the date the transcripts are received, or, if there are no minutes of proceedings to be transcribed, within 60 days of the date of this ; and it is further,ORDERED that within 30 days after the date of this , the appellant shall file in the office of the Clerk of this Court one of the following:(1) an affidavit or affirmation stating that there are no minutes of the Family Court proceedings to be transcribed for the appeals; or(2) if there are such minutes, an affidavit or affirmation that the transcript has been received, and indicating the date that it was received; or(3) if the transcript has not been received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it has been ordered and paid for, the date thereof and the date by which the transcript is expected; or(4) an affidavit or an affirmation withdrawing the appeals; and it is further,ORDERED that if none of the actions described in (1), (2), (3), or (4) above has been taken within 30 days of the date of this , the Clerk of the Court shall issue an order to all parties to the appeals to show cause why the appeals should or should not be dismissed.The Case Manager assigned to this case is Ms. Vazquez. Please contact her at 718-722-6488 with any questions.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Suzanne Greenwald, appellant-res, v. Brian Greenwald, res-res — Appeal by Suzanne Greenwald, and cross appeal by Brian Greenwald, from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated August 24, 2017. Pursuant to Family Court Act §§1118 and 1120, and upon the certification of William C. Hoffman, Esq., dated December 3, 2017, it isORDERED that Brian Greenwald is granted leave to proceed as a poor person on the appeal and cross appeal, and the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the cross appeal:Heath J. Goldstein, Esq.90-50 Parsons Blvd., Suite 216Jamaica, NY 11432646-436-1052and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel shall promptly attempt to contact Brian Greenwald at the address provided by this Court, and on or before January 26, 2018, shall notify the Case Manager assigned to the appeal, in writing, that he has done so and that either(1) Brian Greenwald is interested in prosecuting the cross appeal, or(2) Brian Greenwald is not interested in prosecuting the cross appeal, or that he has been unable to contact Brian Greenwald, and wishes to be relieved of the assignment;and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal and cross appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the briefs of the parties. The parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other (22 NYCRR 670.9[d][1][ii]; Family Ct Act §1116); and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer(s) and/or the transcription service(s) is/are required promptly to make and certify two transcripts of the proceedings, if any, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (22 NYCRR 671.9); in the case of stenographers, both transcripts shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court, and the clerk of the Family Court shall furnish one of such certified transcripts to the assigned counsel, without charge; in the case of transcription services, one transcript shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court and one transcript shall be delivered to the assigned counsel. Assigned counsel is directed to provide copies of said transcripts to all of the other parties, when counsel serves a brief upon those parties; and it is further,ORDERED that the assigned counsel shall prosecute the cross appeal expeditiously in accordance with any or orders issued pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]); and it is further,ORDERED that upon a determination that Brian Greenwald is interested in proceeding with the cross appeal, the assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this order upon the clerk of the Family Court, Kings County.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.MATTER of Dana Capobianco, ap, v. Ann Marie Esposito, res — Appeal by Dana Capobianco from an order of the Family Court, Putnam County, dated November 28, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]), it isORDERED that the appeal in the above-entitled proceeding shall be perfected within 60 days after the receipt by the appellant of the transcripts of the minutes of the proceedings in the Family Court, and the appellant shall notify this Court by letter of the date the transcripts are received, or, if there are no minutes of proceedings to be transcribed, within 60 days of the date of this ; and it is further,ORDERED that within 30 days after the date of this , the appellant shall file in the office of the Clerk of this Court one of the following:(1) an affidavit or affirmation stating that there are no minutes of the Family Court proceedings to be transcribed for the appeal; or(2) if there are such minutes, an affidavit or affirmation that the transcript has been received, and indicating the date that it was received; or(3) if the transcript has not been received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it has been ordered and paid for, the date thereof and the date by which the transcript is expected; or(4) if the appellant is indigent and cannot afford to obtain the minutes or perfect the appeal, a motion in this Court for leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person and for the assignment of counsel, pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 1101. Such a motion must be supported by an affidavit from the appellant, stating either that he or she qualified for assigned counsel upon application to the Family Court and that his or her financial status has not changed since that time, or that he or she had retained counsel or appeared pro se in the Family Court, and listing his or her assets and income; or(5) an affidavit or an affirmation withdrawing the appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that if none of the actions described in (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) above has been taken within 30 days of the date of this , the Clerk of this Court shall issue an order to all parties to the appeal to show cause why the appeal should or should not be dismissed. MATTER of John Henry Eckstein, Jr., ap, v. Carolyn Alice Young, res — V-3951-12, V-3951-12/14A) — Appeal by John Henry Eckstein, Jr., from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County, dated October 22, 2015. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papersconstituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 16, 2018.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Noelle Ann McGregor, ap, v. Brent Jeremiah Ferguson, res — Appeal by Noelle Ann McGregor from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated October 26, 2017. Pursuant to Family Court Act §§1118 and 1120, upon the certification of Alan Fried, Esq., dated January 4, 2018, it isORDERED that the appellant is granted leave to proceed as a poor person on the appeal, and the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Elliot Green, Esq.32 Court Street, Suite 404Brooklyn, NY 11201718-260-8668and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel shall promptly attempt to contact the appellant at the address provided by this Court, and on or before January 26, 2018, shall notify the Case Manager assigned to the appeal, in writing, that he has done so and that either(1) the appellant is interested in prosecuting the appeal, or(2) the appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal, or that he has been unable to contact the appellant, and wishes to be relieved of the assignment;and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the briefs of the appellant, the respondent, and the attorney for the child, if any. The parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other (22 NYCRR 670.9[d][1][ii]; Family Ct Act §1116); and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer(s) and/or the transcription service(s) is/are required promptly to make and certify two transcripts of the proceedings, if any, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (22 NYCRR 671.9); in the case of stenographers, both transcripts shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court, and the clerk of the Family Court shall furnish one of such certified transcripts to the appellant’s assigned counsel, without charge; in the case of transcription services, one transcript shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court and one transcript shall be delivered to the assigned counsel. Assigned counsel is directed to provide copies of said transcripts to all of the other parties to the appeal, including the attorney for the child, if any, when counsel serves the appellant’s brief upon those parties; and it is further,ORDERED that the assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with any or orders issued pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]); and it is further,ORDERED that upon a determination that the appellant is interested in proceeding with the appeal, the assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this order upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur. MATTER of Alexandria F. (Anonymous). Nassau County Department of Social Services, petitioner-res, George R. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Adalila R. (Anonymous). Nassau County Department of Social Services, petitioner-res, George R. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 2)MATTER of George R. (Anonymous). Nassau County Department of Social Services, petitioner-res, George R. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 3)MATTER of Adalila R.-S. (Anonymous), res-ap, v. George R. (Anonymous), appellant-res, Chastity M. (Anonymous), et al., res-res — (Proceeding No. 4) N-11060-12, N-10352-11, N-11061-12, N-10352, V-9379-13, V9380-13) — Appeal by George R., and cross appeal by Adalila R.-S., from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated August 30, 2016. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the respondent-appellant to serve and file a brief on theappeal is enlarged until February 5, 2018.Damian Gibbs, ap, v. New York City Transit Authority res — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for a 60-day enlargement of time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated April 12, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until February 1, 2018, the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellant’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.Jacob Mordekai, ap, v. City of New York, res — Application by the respondent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for a 60-day enlargement of time to serve and file a brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated July 7, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the respondent’s time to serve and file a brief is enlarged until February 21, 2018, the respondent’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.MATTER of Jennifer R. Grogan, res, v. Walter Claude Phillips, ap — Appeal by Walter Claude Phillips from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated October 25, 2017.On the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, on the ground that no appeal lies from an order entered upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511).Nationstar, res, v. Angelise Jackson def, 595 E 3 Management Corp., ap — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated April 19, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until February 27, 2018, and the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellant’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.Green Tree Servicing, LLC, res, v. Michael Peters appellants def — Application by the respondent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for a 60-day enlargement of time to serve and file a brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 22, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the respondent’s time to serve and file a brief is enlarged until February 13, 2018, the respondent’s brief must be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.MATTER of Kazel Wagner, pet-res, v. John Villegas, respondent-appellant; Karissa v. (Anonymous), et al., nonparty-ap — V-4556-04/17M, V-4557-04/17M) — Appeal by Karissa V. and Emily V., and separate appeal by John Villegas, from an order of the Family Court, Orange County, dated April 12, 2017. The appellant’s briefs were filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on January 3, 2018. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the petitioner-respondent’s brief shall be served and filed within30 days of the date of this .The Case Manager assigned to this case is Mr. Rose. Please contact him at 718-722-6487 with any questions.Anthony Dolce ap, v. City of New York res — Application by the appellants pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) for an enlargement of time until April 15, 2018, to perfect an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated June 27, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted to the extent that the appellants’ time to perfect the appeal is enlarged until March 6, 2018, the record or appendix on the appeal and the appellants’ brief shall be served and filed on or before that date, and the application is otherwise denied.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.MATTER of Norma Parra, res, v. Victor Ponce, ap — Appeal by Victor Ponce from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated November 29, 2017. Pursuant to Family Court Act §§1118 and 1120, and upon the certification of Lesley J. Lanoix, Esq., dated December 20, 2017, it isORDERED that the appellant is granted leave to proceed as a poor person on the appeal, and the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Warren S. Hecht, Esq.118-21 Queens Blvd., Suite 518Forest Hills, NY 11375718-575-8721and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel shall promptly attempt to contact the appellant at the address provided by the Court, and on or before January 26, 2017, shall notify the Case Manager assigned to the appeal, in writing, that he has done so and that either(1) the appellant is interested in prosecuting the appeal, or(2) the appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal, or that he has been unable to contact the appellant, and wishes to be relieved of the assignment; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the briefs of the appellant, the respondent, and the attorney for the child, if any. The parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other (22 NYCRR 670.9[d][1][ii]; Family Ct Act §1116); and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer(s) and/or the transcription service(s) is/are required promptly to make and certify two transcripts of the proceedings, if any, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (22 NYCRR 671.9); in the case of stenographers, both transcripts shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court, and the clerk of the Family Court shall furnish one of such certified transcripts to the appellant’s counsel, without charge; in the case of transcription services, one transcript shall be filed with the clerk of the Family Court and one transcript shall be delivered to the assigned counsel. Assigned counsel is directed to provide copies of said transcripts to all of the other parties to the appeal, including the attorney for the child, if any, when counsel serves the appellant’s brief upon those parties; and it is further,ORDERED that the assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with any or orders issued pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]); and it is further,ORDERED that upon a determination that the appellant is interested in proceeding with the appeal, the assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this order upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Elijah Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Jimmy Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 2)MATTER of Rosa Evelyn Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 3)MATTER of Yvette Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 4)MATTER of Alisa E. Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 5)MATTER of Evelyn J. Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 6)MATTER of Maribel Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 7) N-5115-17, N-5113-17, N-5117-17, N-5112-17) — Motion by the petitioner-appellant to stay enforcement of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated December 19, 2017, pending hearing and determination of an appeal therefrom.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is denied.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.MATTER of Elijah Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Jimmy Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 2)MATTER of Rosa Evelyn Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 3)MATTER of Yvette Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 4)MATTER of Alisa E. Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 5)MATTER of Evelyn J. Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 6)MATTER of Maribel Q. (Anonymous). Administration for Children’s Services, petitioner-appellant; Malisa Q. (Anonymous), res-res — (Proceeding No. 7) N-5115-17, N-5113-17, N-5117-17, N-5112-17) — Appeal by Administration for Children’s Services from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, dated December 19, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a) of the rules of this Court (22 NYCRR 670.4[a]), it isORDERED that the appeal in the above-entitled proceedings shall be perfected within 60 days after the receipt by the petitioner-appellant of the transcripts of the minutes of the proceedings in the Family Court, and the petitioner-appellant shall notify this Court by letter of the date the transcripts are received, or, if there are no minutes of proceedings to be transcribed, within 60 days of the date of this ; and it is further,ORDERED that within 30 days after the date of this , the petitioner-appellant shall file in the office of the Clerk of this Court one of the following:(1) an affidavit or affirmation stating that there are no minutes of the Family Court proceedings to be transcribed for the appeal; or(2) if there are such minutes, an affidavit or affirmation stating that the transcript has been received, and indicating the date that it was received; or(3) if the transcript has not been received, an affidavit or affirmation stating that it has been ordered and paid for, the date thereof and the date by which the transcript is expected; or(4) an affidavit or an affirmation withdrawing the appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that if none of the actions described in (1), (2), (3), or (4) above has been taken within 30 days of the date of this , the Clerk of the Court shall issue an order to all parties to the appeal to show cause why the appeal should or should not be dismissed.By Leventhal, J.P.; Chambers, Miller and Duffy, JJ.MATTER of Baby Boy R. (Anonymous), a/k/a Miguel R. (Anonymous). SCO Family Services, petitioner-res, Diana R. (Anonymous), a/k/a Diana L. (Anonymous), res-res — Motion by the respondent-appellant on an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated December 19, 2016, to enlarge the record to include a decision of the same court dated August 31, 2017, and for leave to serve and file a replacement brief.ORDERED that the motion is granted, the respondent-appellant’s brief is stricken, and on or before February 13, 2018, the respondent-appellant shall serve and file the replacement brief with a copy of the decision dated August 31, 2017, annexed as an addendum.LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHAMBERS, MILLER and DUFFY, JJ., concur.By Dillon, J.P.; Leventhal, Connolly and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ.MATTER of Erika G. A. (Anonymous), a/k/a Erika A. (Anonymous). SCO Family of Services, petitioner-res, Anthony J. F. (Anonymous), a/k/a Anthony F., respondent-appellant res — Motion by the appellant to enlarge the time to perfect an appeal from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated April 12, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted, and the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papers constituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 13, 2018; and it is further,ORDERED that no further enlargement of time shall be granted.DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur. MATTER of Robert v. Sofia, ap, v. Kellie M. Hendry, res — Appeal by Robert V. Sofia from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated August 19, 2016. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the attorney for the child to serve and file a brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 5, 2018.MATTER of Hung Ling Fu, res, v. Andre Wilson, ap — Appeal by Andre Wilson from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated April 11, 2017. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal by causing the original papers constituting the record on the appeal to be filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.9[d][2]) and by serving and filing the appellant’s brief on the appeal is enlarged until February 9, 2018.MATTER of Wayne R. Rose, res, v. Cristina Simon, ap — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Cristina Simon, ap, v. Wayne R. Rose, res — (Proceeding No. 2) — Appeal by Cristina Simon from an order of the Family Court, Queens County, dated May 19, 2017. The appellant’s brief was filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on January 5, 2018. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that within 30 days of the date of this order, the briefs for the respondent and the attorney for the child in the above-entitled appeal shall be served and filed.The Case Manager assigned to this case is Ms. Vazquez. Please contact her at 718-722-6488 with any questions.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Hector Diaz, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered December 20, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Mark Smith, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 12, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Terrell Washington, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered August 2, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Glenn Cherry, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered May 16, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Robert Hernandez, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 24, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Jose Torres, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute appeals from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County, both rendered November 14, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeals will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeals:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeals is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeals expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeals are taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Levi Johnson, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 19, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Wagner Soler, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 6, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Miguel Pedraza, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute appeals from three judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County, all rendered August 3, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeals will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeals:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeals is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeals expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeals are taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Yayun Weng, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 1, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.MATTER of Valerie Weiss, ap, v. Juanito Chavez res, Orange County Department of Social Services, res-res — (Proceeding No. 1)MATTER of Valerie Weiss, ap, v. Chad Collins res — (Proceeding No. 2) — Appeal by Valerie Weiss from an order of the Family Court, Orange County, dated December 16, 2016. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that the time for the appellant to serve and file a reply brief on the appeal is enlarged until January 18, 2018.MATTER of Dennis Nieves, Jr., ap, v. Nicole Marie Iacono, res — Appeal by Dennis Nieves, Jr., from an order of the Family Court, Kings County, dated March 1, 2017. The appellant’s brief was filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on January 4, 2018. Pursuant to §670.4(a)(2) of the rules of this Court (see 22 NYCRR 670.4[a][2]), it isORDERED that within 30 days of the date of this order, the brief for the respondent in the above-entitled appeal shall be served and filed.The Case Manager assigned to this case is Ms. Vazquez. Please contact her at 718-722-6488 with any questions.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Nicholas Cariello, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered January 30, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Laurette Mulry, Esq.Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County – Appeals Bureau300 Center DrivePO Box 1697Riverhead, New York 11904-3398and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. John K. Rogers, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered December 21, 2016, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Laurette Mulry, Esq.Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County – Appeals Bureau300 Center DrivePO Box 1697Riverhead, New York 11904-3398and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Henry Brown, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered July 12, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Laurette Mulry, Esq.Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County – Appeals Bureau300 Center DrivePO Box 1697Riverhead, New York 11904-3398and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Arthur Haluda, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered July 19, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Laurette Mulry, Esq.Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County – Appeals Bureau300 Center DrivePO Box 1697Riverhead, New York 11904-3398and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, res, v. Keith Schoelermann, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County, dated August 2, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that of the motion is denied as unnecessary, as the appellant was granted leave to proceed as a poor person in the County Court and, pursuant to Correction Law 168-n (3), his status as a poor person and the representation by counsel assigned by the County Court, Suffolk County, continues on appeal; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any hearing held in connection with the order dated August 2, 2017, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that the clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPLR 1102[b]); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with or considered by the trial court in connection with the appellant’s risk level determination, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that the filing fee is waived (see CPLR 1102[d]); and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.MATTER of Applications for Extensions of Time — Parties in the following causes have filed applications pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to extend the time to perfect or to serve and file a brief.Upon the papers filed in support of the applications, it isORDERED that the applications are granted and the following parties in the following causes are granted the specified extensions of time:Title Docket No. Applicant Name(s) Extended DeadlineArmour v. Saxon2017-07754Penny Saxon March 13, 2018Citimortgage, Inc. v. Chako2017-06980David Chako+1Dalia ChakoFebruary 7, 2018Deutsche Bank National 2017-04911Deutsche Bank National TrustTrust Co. v. Burnett Co. February 7, 2018De Zapata v. City of New2017-03033City of New YorkYorkFebruary 2, 2018Excel Capital Group Corp.2017-00596Excel Capital Group Corp.v 255 Ross Street Realty,Inc.February 15, 2018Golden Mountain Income, 2017-04819Mendel PomerantzLLC v. Spencer Gifts, LLCForshay Marketing Corp.February 2, 2018Goldgrab v. City of New 2017-00854City of New YorkJanuary 30, 2018YorkManko v. Gabay2017-07541Nella Manko March 5, 2018Millennium Resource, Inc. 2017-07490Giuliano Bruschi v. BBS Business SystemsFebruary 13, 2018Title Docket No. Applicant Name(s) Extended DeadlineNationstar Mortgage LLC2017-06974Peter Cavallaro v. Cavallaro+1February 1, 2018Nieves-Iglesias v. Iglesias2017-06829Juan Carlos IglesiasFebruary 5, 2018Palero Food Corp.2017-06289Palero Food Corp. v. ZuckerPreparate Corp.February 5, 2018Patouhas v. Patouhas2017-04302Christine PatouhasFebruary 20, 2018Pennymac Corp. v2017-05414Sebastian BongiovanniFebruary 2, 2018BongiovanniPeople v. Edwards, Kevin2016-07088Kevin EdwardsJanuary 16, 2018People v. Mavour, Kolomo2015-00216Kolomo MavourFebruary 8, 2018Polite v. 1st American2017-085181st American Homes, LLCHomes, LLCMarch 6, 2018Puglisi v. Embro2017-08560Eric EmbroFebruary 20, 2018Rocco G.C. Corp. v. Bridge2017-05262Bridge View Tower, LLCView Tower, LLCFebruary 5, 2018Rojas v. Linton2017-02614Sheryll P. LintonFebruary 2, 2018Santiago v. Boyer2017-07590Terry A. BoyerMarch 19, 2018Statler v. Dioguardi2017-08156Anthony DioguardiMarch 5, 2018Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v2017-06549Zikar DhananiDhananiFebruary 1, 2018Wilmington Savings Fund 2017-05845Margarita Carbal-DavisSociety, FSB, vCarbal-DavisFebruary 1, 2018Zuluaga v. Angelopoulos2017-08566Winthrop University HospitalMarch 19, 2018By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Manuel Ramirez, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered August 31, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Laurette Mulry, Esq.Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County – Appeals Bureau300 Center DrivePO Box 1697Riverhead, New York 11904-3398and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.Alissa Raineri, etc. ap, v. Barry Huppert respondents def — Application by the appellants to withdraw an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated January 11, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted and the appeal is marked withdrawn.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Thomas Volkes, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, rendered August 9, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Luz Decosta, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, rendered May 5, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Samir Pelinkovic, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, rendered February 6, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeal will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeal:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeal is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Kevin Harding, ap — Motion by the appellant pro se for leave to prosecute appeals from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, both rendered August 2, 2017, as a poor person, and for the assignment of counsel.Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the motion is granted; and it is further,ORDERED that the appeals will be heard on the original papers (including a certified transcript of the proceedings, if any) and on the appellant’s and the respondent’s briefs; the parties are directed to file nine copies of their respective briefs and to serve one copy on each other; and it is further,ORDERED that the stenographer of the trial court is directed promptly to make, certify, and file two transcripts of the proceedings of any pretrial hearings, of the plea of guilty or of the trial, and of the imposition of sentence in this action, except for those minutes previously transcribed and certified (see 22 NYCRR 671.9); and it is further,ORDERED that in the event that the case was tried to a conclusion before a jury, the stenographer shall also make, certify, and file two transcripts of the minutes of proceedings during jury selection; and it is further,ORDERED that the Clerk of the trial court shall furnish one certified transcript of each of the proceedings set forth above to the appellant’s counsel, without charge (see CPL 460.70); assigned counsel is directed to turn over those transcripts to the respondent when counsel serves the appellant’s brief on the respondent; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the stenographer has already prepared a copy of any of the minutes for a codefendant, then the Clerk of the trial court is directed to reproduce a copy thereof for assigned counsel; and it is further,ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this decision and order on motion upon it, the Department of Probation is hereby authorized and directed to provide assigned counsel with a copy of the presentence report prepared in connection with the appellant’s sentencing, including the recommendation sheet and any prior reports on the appellant which are incorporated in or referred to in the report, and to provide additional copies to this Court upon demand; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event an issue as to the legality, propriety, or excessiveness of the sentence is raised on appeal, or if assigned counsel cites or relies upon the probation report in a brief or motion in any other way, counsel shall provide a complete copy of such report and any attachments to the Court and the District Attorney’s office prior to the filing of such brief or motion; and it is further,ORDERED that pursuant to County Law §722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the appeals:Paul Skip Laisure, Esq.Appellate Advocates111 John Street – 9th FloorNew York, New York 10038and it is further,ORDERED that the appellant’s time to perfect the appeals is enlarged; assigned counsel shall prosecute the appeal expeditiously in accordance with this Court’s rules (see 22 NYCRR 670.1, et seq.) and written directions; and it is further,ORDERED that in the event the file has been sealed, it is hereby unsealed for the limited purpose of allowing assigned counsel or his or her representative access to the record for the purpose of preparing the appeal; such access shall include permission to copy the papers insofar as they pertain to the appellant; and it is further,ORDERED that assigned counsel is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order on motion upon the clerk of the court from which the appeals are taken.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Tyshawn Augustus, ap — Application by the appellant pro se for leave to vacate a decision and order on motion of this Court dated June 20, 2017, which granted his motion for leave to serve and file a supplemental pro se brief on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered February 25, 2014.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the decision and order on motion of this Court dated June 20, 2017, is recalled and vacated, and the appellant’s motion for leave to serve and file a supplemental pro se brief is denied.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin. JJ.Inna Karaseva, plf-res, v. EAN Holdings, LLC def, Michele J. Worden def-res, Brian J. Labuda ap — Appeal by Brian J. Labuda and Sharon F. Labuda from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated May 3, 2017.On the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that so much of an order on application of this Court, entitled “[i]n the Matter of Applications for Extensions of Time” dated January 9, 2018, as extended the appellants’ time to serve and file a reply brief is recalled and vacated.SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Elvis Taylor, ap — Application by the respondent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to serve and file a brief in response to the appellant’s pro se supplemental brief on an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County, rendered October 9, 2014.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the respondent’s time to serve and file a brief in response to the appellant’s pro se supplemental brief is enlarged until February 13, 2018, and the respondent’s brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.By Scheinkman, P.J.; Mastro, Rivera, Dillon and Balkin, JJ.PEOPLE, etc., res, v. Milton E. Wiggins, ap — On the Court’s own motion, it isORDERED that the order on application of this Court dated January 10, 2018, in the above-entitled matter, on an appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County, rendered October 3, 2017, is amended by deleting from the caption thereof Appellate Division Docket Number “2017-06858,” and substituting therefor Appellate Division Docket Number “2017-11096.”SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MASTRO, RIVERA, DILLON and BALKIN, JJ., concur.Larry Allen, res, v. City of New York, appellant def — Application by the appellant pursuant to 22 NYCRR 670.8(d)(2) to enlarge the time to serve and file a reply brief on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered January 5, 2017.Upon the papers filed in support of the application and no papers having been filed in opposition or in relation thereto, it isORDERED that the application is granted, the appellant’s time to serve and file a reply brief is enlarged until January 22, 2018, and the reply brief shall be served and filed on or before that date.By Hall, J. M244662 ORDER ON MOTION. The People, etc., respondent, v Michael Walker, appellant. (Ind. Nos. 7835/16, 272/17) Motion by the appellant pursuant to CPL 460.50 for a stay of execution of two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County, both rendered August 30, 2017, and to release the appellant on his own recognizance or to set bail. Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that the motion is denied.
