17-437. 551 WEST 172ND STREET LLC, pet-lan-app, v. GILDA TAVERAS AND EDWIN TAVERAS, res-ten-res — Final judgment (Jean T. Schneider, J.), entered on or about July 19, 2016, affirmed, with $25 costs.Civil Court properly determined that the evidence adduced at trial in this holdover summary proceeding commenced pursuant to RPAPL §711(5) and Real Property Law §231(1), was insufficient to sustain the landlord’s burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the subject premises were used to facilitate trade in drugs and that the tenant Gilda Taveras knew or should have known of the activities and acquiesced in the illegal drug activity in the apartment (see 855-79 LLC v. Salas, 40 AD3d 553, 554 [2007]; 88-09 Realty, LLC v. Hill, 305 AD2d 409, 410 [2003]). In this regard, no claim or showing was made that the tenant herself sold or attempted to sell drugs from the apartment or from the building premises, or that the apartment was utilized as a focal point for drug activity. Nor was any persuasive evidence presented to show that tenant, a full-time home attendant who slept away from the apartment one night a week during the relevant time period, knew or acquiesced in the illegal drug related activities of her adult son who (then) resided with her. As the trial court expressly found, “there [was] little if any evidence that [tenant's son] used the subject apartment or the building in an illegal trade or business and there [was] no evidence at all that [tenant] knew or should have known of [her son's] activities. In fact, the evidence suggests that [tenant's son] did everything he could to keep marijuana away from the apartment and his activities hidden from his mother.”Landlord also failed to establish that tenant violated paragraph 17 of the governing lease agreement, which authorized landlord to terminate the lease in the event that tenant created a nuisance, engaged in conduct detrimental to the safety of other tenants, or was disturbing to other tenants.On a bench trial, the decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is obvious that the court’s conclusions could not be reached under any “fair interpretation of the evidence,” especially where the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses (Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 544-545 [1990]). Under these circumstances, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s fact-based determination that the evidence presented did not warrant a forfeiture by tenant of this long-term tenancy (see Second Farms Neighborhood HDFC v. Lessington, 31 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50929[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2011]; 554 W. 148th St. Assoc. LLC v. Thomas, 8 Misc 3d 132[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51139[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]).We have examined landlord’s remaining arguments, including its contention that tenant’s son was himself a tenant of the subject apartment during the relevant time period, and find them to be without merit.THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.January 29, 201817-404/405. MEIRAV GAVRIELOV AND VARAN GAVRIELOV, pet-lan-app, v. UNGER CONSULTING GROUP LTD., res-ten-res, -and- HAROLD UNGER, res-ten-res, -and- “JOHN DOE” AND/OR “JANE DOE,” res-ten-res — Orders (Jack Stoller, J.), dated, respectively, November 14, 2016 and March 6, 2017, affirmed, with one bill of $10 costs.We reject, as did Civil Court, petitioners-landlords’ contention that the subject apartment “bec[a]me[] vacant” after expiration of the RPTL 421-a tax abatement and was therefore deregulated (RPTL 421-a[2][f][i]), when one corporate tenant, Unger Consulting Group Ltd. [UCG], was substituted for another corporate tenant, International Pension Systems Ltd. [IPS], on the renewal lease commencing March 1, 2014. The summary judgment record conclusively establishes that there was no hiatus in possession since the apartment was continuously occupied (for some thirty years) by respondent-undertenant Harold Unger [Unger]. Unger was identified as a rent stabilized tenant of the apartment (along with IPS) on renewal leases and DHCR rent registration statements at least from March 1, 2008 through February 28, 2014. After execution of the March 1, 2014 renewal lease naming UCG as tenant, Unger continued to occupy the apartment as an officer of UCG, and the record shows that petitioner-landlords accepted rent checks from Unger’s personal account during this period. Given that Unger continuously occupied the apartment at all relevant times, the apartment did not “become vacant” and was therefore not deregulated when UCG was substituted for IPS on the March 2014 renewal lease (see generally Matter of Ghignone v. Joy, 83 AD2d 839 [1981], affd 55 NY2d 853 [1982]; Matter of Hoy v. State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 233 AD2d 120 [1996]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.January 29, 2018
