Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219 (a), of the papers considered in review of Respondent’s Motion.PAPERS NUMBEREDRespondent’s Order to Show Cause; Affirmation in Support; Affidavit; & Exhibits (“A” — “J”) 1, 2, 3, 4Affirmation in Opposition; Affidavit in Opposition; & Exhibits (“A” — “E”) 5, 6, 7DECISION/ORDER Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order on Respondent’s Motion is as follows:BACKGROUNDPetitioner Woody Heights, LLC (“Petitioner”) commenced the instant holdover proceeding against Respondent-Tenant Josephine Bello (“Respondent Bello”) and Respondent-Occupants Clarence Williamson; Klarice Williamson; John Doe; and Jane Doe based upon the allegation that Respondent Bello had violated a substantial and material obligation of her lease by refusing to provide access to the subject premises located at 74 West 165th Street, Apartment 19, Bronx, New York 10452. On December 15, 2016, Respondent Bello, a long-standing tenant of fifteen (15) years, entered into a pro-se stipulation of settlement wherein she consented to a final judgment of possession in favor of the Petitioner and agreed to vacate and surrender the subject premises by a date certain. Now, with the benefit of counsel, Respondent Bello moves to vacate that agreement. For the reasons stated below, Respondent’s motion is GRANTED.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDRespondent Bello is the rent stabilized tenant of the subject premises located at 74 West 165th Street, Apartment 19, Bronx, New York 10452 and has resided therein for approximately fifteen (15) years. Respondent suffers from bipolar depression, schizophrenia, COPD, and other chronic ailments that affect her cognitive functioning and her ability to move about. The prescribed use of an oxygen tank and the location of the subject premises on the fourth floor of a walk-up apartment building further place limitations on Respondent’s mobility.Petitioner, the fee simple of the owner the building in which the subject premises is located, issued a “Ten (10) Day Notice to Cure” dated September 26, 2016 advising the Respondent that she had violated a substantial obligation of her lease in refusing to provide the owner access to the subject premises for the purpose of making necessary repairs. The facts supporting Petitioner’s claim consisted of five dates on which the superintendent and field manager attempted but failed to gain access: August 12, 2016; August 18, 2016; August 29, 2016; September 1, 2016; and September 9, 2016. The curative notice further alleges that each failed attempt at access was followed up with a letter requesting an ensuing access date. The Court notes, however, that the requested access dates in Petitioner’s letters do not coincide with but are instead different from the dates on which access was actually attempted.Petitioner subsequently effected service of a Seven (7) Day Notice of Termination which asserted that Respondent’s tenancy was being terminated. The termination notice baldly stated that Respondent had not complied with the curative notice dated September 26, 2016.Petitioner thereafter commenced the instant holdover proceeding by Notice of Petition and Petition. The Petition was first noticed to be heard on December 15, 2016. On the very first court appearance, Respondent Bello, appearing pro-se, entered into a stipulation of settlement wherein she granted the Petitioner a final judgment of possession. The warrant was to issue forthwith but execution stayed till February 28, 2017 for Respondent Bello to vacate the subject premises. The stay was conditioned upon the payment of use and occupancy in the amount of $300 payable each month by December 30, 2016; January 20, 2017; and February 20, 2017, respectively.The matter was then adjourned to January 12, 2017 for an inquest against the remaining Respondents. It was on this latter date that Respondent Klarice Williamson appeared pro-se and entered into a stipulation of settlement which granted the Petitioner a final judgment of possession. Execution was stayed in a fashion similar to the terms and conditions found in the December 15, 2016 agreement with Respondent Bello. The proceeding was discontinued as against John Doe; Jane Doe; and Clarence Williamson.Respondent Bello thereafter defaulted under the terms of the December 15, 2016 stipulation of settlement and filed two successive orders to show cause seeking to further stay execution of the warrant of eviction. On the return date of each order to show cause, execution of the warrant of eviction was stayed by stipulation of settlement or court order.Respondent later retained Bronx Legal Services who filed the instant order to show cause seeking to vacate the December 15, 2016 stipulation of settlement.THE MOTIONIn her moving papers, Respondent Bello avers that there is sufficient cause to vacate the December 15, 2016 stipulation of settlement on what can be categorized as two grounds. First, the moving papers contend that the stipulation of settlement should be vacated because Respondent Bello improvidently or inadvisably entered into the agreement. As another summary eviction proceedings (nonpayment) was concurrently pending under L&T Index No.: 66137/2016, it is asserted that Respondent, impaired by her medical conditions, was unable to properly distinguish between the two. And, given the circumstances surrounding her condition, Respondent was not fully cognizant of the terms of the agreement which required her to relinquish possession of the subject premises. Secondly, it is asserted that Respondent waived meritorious defenses to the instant holdover proceeding. Respondent contends that the predicate notices are defective in that they failed to properly provide the Respondent with an opportunity to cure the alleged default.In opposition, Petitioner contends that the terms of the stipulation are unambiguous and in “plain English”. Thus, Respondent could not have been confused by the requirements or implications of the agreement. In a similar vein, Petitioner also asserts that Respondent’s contentions are not only conclusory in nature but belied by the court process itself; a process which requires a conference with a court attorney and allocution of a stipulation before a judge. It is through these steps, Petitioner contends, that Respondent was advised of the nature of this proceeding; her rights; and the terms of the agreement.DECISION AND ORDER ON THE MOTIONIt is well settled that stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly cast aside (see Hallock v. State of New York, 64 NY2d 224 [1984]). Adherence to this axiomatic rule not only allows efficient dispute resolution but maintains integrity of the litigation process. (id.) Notwithstanding the aforementioned, courts retain control over the enforcement of stipulations and may relieve a party from the terms thereof where it appears that the stipulation was entered into inadvisably or where it would be inequitable to hold the parties to the agreement (Matter of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143 [1971]). The Court may exercise its discretion in setting aside a stipulation as having been inadvisably entered into where an unrepresented litigant unknowingly waives a potentially meritorious defense that could have otherwise defeated the action (Northtown Roosevelt LLC v. Daniels, 35 Misc. 3d 137 [A] (App Term, 1st Dept 2012]; 126 Bapaz, LLC v. Alamo, 14 Misc. 3d 145[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2007]).Applying the foregoing principles to the matter at bar, the Court grants Respondent’s Order to Show Cause to the extent of vacating the underlying stipulation of settlement; the judgment and warrant based thereon; and all attendant stipulations and Decision/Orders stemming from the December 15, 2016 agreement. The hurried nature by which the Respondent had reached her uncounseled decision to relinquish her valuable tenancy rights on the very first court appearance is but one expression of the stipulation having been entered into inadvisably. While making a decision concerning Respondent’s frame of mind may be speculative, the Court need not enter that realm in order to find other supporting reasons. Respondent may have unknowingly waived a valid defense to this proceeding at the time she entered into the stipulation that could potentially defeat “no access” breach of lease holdover proceeding. The documentary evidence presented tends to show that Petitioner did not provide the Respondent with a reasonably opportunity to cure. Petitioner sent a total of five letters to the Respondent. Each letter noted the date on which access was attempted and requested a single specified access date. The certificate of mailing and accompanying postmark for each letter reveals that a majority of the letters were likely never received by the Respondent in time to provide access on the specified date within those letters. One of the letters in question requested access on August 16, 2016 but was mailed on the preceding day. A second letter requested access on September 1, 2016 but was mailed on August 30, 2016. A third letter was mailed on Friday, August 19, 2016 with a requested access date of Monday, August 22, 2016.The United States Postal Service notes on its website that delivery of first class mail with certificate of mailing usually takes one (1) to three (3) business days. It is entirely likely that Respondent did not receive three of the five letters requesting access. The remaining two letters similarly contain brief turnaround dates between the mailing and the requested access date but could have conceivably been received by the Respondent. Whether such short notice was purposefully designed or inadvertent is not of import for the Court’s decision. Even if the letters were all received in a timely manner, which it is clear that they were not, Petitioner itself disregard the requested access dates set forth in those letters. Petitioner appears to have attempted access on altogether different dates than those set forth in the letters and had done so without notice. The short-time frame between mailing and the requested access date, however, calls into question whether access was even attempted. In any event, it is clear Respondent had a real defense to this proceeding relating to meaningfulness of the cure period.CONCLUSIONAccordingly, it is hereby:ORDERED, that Respondent’s Order to Show Cause seeking to vacate her pro-se stipulation of settlement dated December 15, 2016 is GRANTED and the judgment and warrant and all subsequent stipulations and Decision/Orders based thereon are hereby VACATED; and it is furtherORDERED, that this matter is restored to the Court’s calendar in Part I, Room 520 on May 31 at 9:30a.m. for trial.This constitutes the Decision/Order of this Court.Dated: Bronx, New YorkApril 20, 2018
