DECISION/ORDER Upon the foregoing papers, all defendants herein move for summary dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3212. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted only as to defendants Advance Transit Bus Company Inc. and Advance Transit Services Inc. The motion is otherwise denied as against the remaining defendants.Plaintiff was caused to fall on snow that accumulated on the public sidewalk adjacent to his place of employment. On the date of the incident, plaintiff located parking nearby for his personal vehicle and began his walk to work when he slipped and fell on snow outside of the building, several yards from the entrance. He called inside for help and eventually an ambulance was required to transport him to the hospital. Plaintiff was informed by his employer, defendant Advance Transit Co. Inc. (“Advance”) that the accident occurred outside the scope of his employment and plaintiff could not recover Workers’ Compensation benefits.Defendants Advance and 745 Whittier Street LLC (“745 Whittier”) seek summary judgment. Advance contends that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law. 745 Whittier contends that although it owns the subject building, it had no maintenance obligations pertaining to the condition of the sidewalk. The motions are denied.1The court’s function on this motion for summary judgment is issue finding rather than issue determination (Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]). Since summary judgment is a drastic remedy, it should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1978]). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence submitted and the papers will be scrutinized carefully in a light most favorable to non-moving party (Rodriguez v. Parkchester South Condominium, Inc., 178 AD2d 231 [1st Dept. 1991]). The movant must come forward with evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to direct judgment in its favor as a matter of law (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). A party seeking summary judgment may not merely point to gaps in the opponent’s proof to obtain relief. Rather, the movant must adduce affirmative evidence of it entitlement to summary judgment (Torres v. Industrial Container, 305 AD2d 136 [1st Dept. 2003]). Thus, when the existence of an issue of fact is even arguable or debatable, summary judgment should be denied (Stone v. Goodson, 8 NY2d 8 [1960]); Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra.). Failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Avenue Corp., 81 NY2d 982 [1993]).For an injury to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law, it must have arisen both out of and in the course of employment (Workers’ Compensation Law §§10, 2[7]). Defendant Advance contends that although plaintiff had not yet arrived at work, he was injured off-premises by a “special hazard” entitling him to recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Law and thus, in turn, such entitlement serves as a bar to the instant suit. This argument is without merit. “The general rule that employees do not enter into the course of employment until they reach the premises or the entrance to the premises of their employer has been, of necessity, subject to certain well-recognized exceptions” (Husted v. Seneca Steel Serv., Inc., 41 NY2d 140, 142 [1976] [citations omitted]). Here, Advance argues the instant case is one of those “situations where the off-premises point at which the injury occurs lies on the only route, or at least the normal route, which employees must traverse to reach [their place of employment] and that, therefore, the special hazards of that route become the hazards of the employment (id.). The court finds the accumulation of snow on a public sidewalk adjacent to plaintiff’s place of employment is not a “special hazard” as contemplated by Husted. For an off site injury to be compensable, there must exist “some reasonable nexus between the risk to which a claimant was exposed and the employment” (Lemon v. New York City Tr. Auth., 72 NY2d 324, 327 [1988]). The court observes that any individual traversing the instant sidewalk could have fallen on the snow accumulation and there is no reasonable nexus between the snow hazard and plaintiff’s position as a para transit driver. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits and, thus, the Workers’ Compensation Law does not bar plaintiff’s potential recovery against Advance. The motion is denied.Defendant 745 Whittier contends that it had no duty, contractual or otherwise, to maintain the sidewalk. This argument fails as it is well settled that the owner of a premises is under a statutory nondelegable duty to maintain the sidewalk adjacent to its property (Cook v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 51 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2008]; Administrative Code of City of N.Y. §7-210). As there exists at least a question of fact as to whether their failure to maintain the sidewalk was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, the motion is properly denied.Accordingly, it isORDERED, that the motions by defendants Advance Transit Co. Inc. and 745 Whittier Street LLC are denied; and it is furtherORDERED, that the motions by defendants Advance Transit Bus Company Inc. and Advance Transit Services Inc and granted; and it is furtherORDERED, that the Clerk is directed to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as to defendant Advance Transit Bus Company Inc. and Advance Transit Services Inc only.Dated: 5/02/2018ENTER,
