Calendar Date: May 2, 2018Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.__________Linda B. Johnson, East Greenbush, for appellant.Joel E. Abelove, District Attorney, Troy (Jacob B. Sher ofcounsel), for respondent.__________Mulvey, J.Appeal from a decision of the County Court of RensselaerCounty (McGrath, J.), dated June 25, 2003, which classifieddefendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the SexOffender Registration Act.In August 2001, defendant pleaded guilty to a superiorcourt information charging him with sodomy in the third degree,and he was sentenced to a prison term of 1 to 3 years. Inanticipation of his release, the Board of Examiners of SexOffenders prepared a risk assessment instrument that, althoughpresumptively classifying defendant as a risk level one sexoffender, sought an upward departure to a risk level threeclassification. Following a hearing, which defendant did notattend, County Court — utilizing a standard risk levelclassification form dated June 25, 2003 — classified defendant asa risk level three sex offender with a sexually violent offenderdesignation. Defendant, pro se, prepared two notices of appealfrom County Court’s June 2003 decision — the most recent of whichwas dated in 2004.In October 2006, defendant asked County Court to revisitits 2003 ruling — contending that he “was given the wrongdesignation for [his] offense.” In so doing, defendant madeclear that he was not challenging his risk level classificationat that time but, rather, sought only to remove his designationas a sexually violent offender. On October 25, 2006, CountyCourt granted defendant’s request — again classifying him as arisk level three sex offender but omitting any furtherdesignation. Defendant was assigned counsel in this matter inOctober 2016 and filed his brief with this Court in December2017.The appeal must be dismissed. “County Court is statutorilyrequired to render an order setting forth its determinations andthe findings of fact and conclusions of law on which thedeterminations are based. The resulting order must be in writingand, further, must be entered and filed in the office of theclerk of the court where the action is triable” (People v Scott,157 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2018] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; see People v Cleveland, 139 AD3d 1270, 1271[2016]). Here, the standard form signed by County Court in 2003classifying defendant as a risk level three sex offender does notcontain “the ‘so ordered’ language required ‘so as to constitutean appealable paper’” (People v Scott, 157 AD3d at 1071, quotingPeople v Cann, 152 AD3d 828, 829 [2017]), and the record does nototherwise reflect that County Court issued a written order that,in turn, was properly entered and filed. Upon that basis alone,this appeal must be dismissed (see People v Scott, 157 AD3d at1071; People v Cann, 152 AD3d at 829; People v Horton, 142 AD3d1256, 1257 [2016]). Further, County Court’s 2003 risk levelclassification was superseded by its 2006 risk levelclassification and corresponding removal of defendant’sdesignation as a sexually violent offender (see generally Peoplev Ceja, 143 AD3d 685 [2016]; People v Willette, 115 AD3d 920[2014]). In this regard, even assuming, without deciding, thatthe standard form utilized by County Court in 2006, which wasdenominated as an order and did contain “so ordered” language,constituted an appealable paper, the record does not reflect thatthis document was “entered and filed in the office of the clerkof the court where the action is triable” (CPLR 2220 [a]) or,more to the point, that a notice of appeal subsequently was filedtherefrom. For all of these reasons, this appeal is not properlybefore this Court and must be dismissed.Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark and Rumsey, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
