In the Matter of CHRISTINE A.CARTER,Appellant,v MEMORANDUM AND ORDERDOUGLAS B. VAN ZILE,Respondent.(And Another Related Proceeding.)_________________________________Calendar Date: April 26, 2018Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.__________Michelle I. Rosien, Philmont, for appellant.Pamela Bleiwas, Ithaca, attorney for the child.__________Clark, J.Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schuyler County(Morris, J.), entered June 15, 2015, which, among other things,dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant toFamily Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.In June 2015, petitioner (hereinafter the mother) andrespondent (hereinafter the father) entered into a stipulationand order in which they agreed to joint legal custody and sharedphysical custody of their daughter (born in 2010). The followingmonth, the mother filed a modification petition, which shesubsequently amended, seeking primary physical custody of thechild. The father, in turn, cross-petitioned for the samerelief. After a fact-finding hearing and a Lincoln hearing,Family Court dismissed the petitions on the ground that neitherparty had demonstrated the requisite change in circumstancessince entry of the stipulation and order. The mother nowappeals, and we affirm.Initially, contrary to the mother’s contention, FamilyCourt did not err in denying her request for a change in venue tothe Chemung County Family Court. Pursuant to Family Ct Act§ 171, “a lawful order of the family court in any county may beenforced or modified in that county or in the family court in anyother county in which the party affected by the order resides oris found.” Additionally, Family Ct Act § 174 provides thatFamily Court “may for good cause transfer a proceeding to afamily court in any other county where the proceeding might havebeen originated and shall transfer a proceeding laying venue inthe wrong county to a family court in any county where theproceeding might have been originated.” Here, the parties soughtto modify a lawful order of the Schuyler County Family Court and,thus, the mother’s original choice of venue was proper (seeFamily Ct Act § 171). Accordingly, the determination of whetherto grant or deny the mother’s application for a change in venuefell squarely within Family Court’s discretion (see Family Ct Act§ 174; Matter of Young v Morse, 92 AD2d 706, 706 [1983]), and wediscern no abuse of that discretion here, particularly since themother failed to establish good cause for the transfer and, asthe court noted, a change in venue would have likely resulted inthe assignment of a new attorney for the child (see Matter ofShaffer v Winslow, 17 AD3d 766, 767 [2005]; compare Matter ofWinter v Karins, 96 AD3d 865, 866 [2012]).We further agree with Family Court that the mother did notsatisfy her burden of demonstrating that there had been a changein circumstances since entry of the June 2015 stipulation andorder to warrant the undertaking of a best interests analysis(see Matter of Crystal F. v Ian G., 145 AD3d 1379, 1380 [2016];Matter of Menhennett v Bixby, 132 AD3d 1177, 1179 [2015]). Themother failed to establish that, in the short time that hadpassed since entry of the stipulation and order, there had beenany significant developments in the parties’ relationship ortheir respective situations. Although the mother alleged thather living situation had changed, the proof adduced at the fact-finding hearing demonstrated that the mother had moved prior tothe entry of the June 2015 stipulation and order. The mother’sremaining allegations were either not borne out by the record orinsufficient to establish the requisite change in circumstances.As such, Family Court properly dismissed the mother’s amendedpetition (see Matter of Elizabeth NN. v Hannah MM., 148 AD3d1235, 1236-1237 [2017]; Matter of Gilbert v Gilbert, 128 AD3d1286, 1287 [2015]; Matter of Scott LL. v Rachel MM., 98 AD3d1197, 1198 [2012]).Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
