In the Matter of HARRYPOINTER,Petitioner,vKIM HARDENBERGH,Appellant.(And Another Related Proceeding.)_________________________________Calendar Date: May 2, 2018Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.__________Ivy M. Schildkraut, Monticello, for appellant.Marcia Heller, Rock Hill, attorney for the children.__________Lynch, J.Appeal from an amended order of the Family Court ofSullivan County (Meddaugh, J.), entered May 2, 2017, whichgranted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant toFamily Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody andvisitation, and issued an order of protection.Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent(hereinafter the mother) are the parents of two children (born in2003 and 2008). In February 2014, an order was entered grantingthe mother sole legal custody of the younger child. In October2016, the father filed two petitions, one seeking custody of theyounger child and the other seeking custody or visitation withthe older child. In October 2016, during an appearance, FamilyCourt sua sponte issued a temporary order of protection directingthe mother to prevent her husband — a level three sex offender –from having any contact with the children. On March 31, 2017,the parties consented to a custodial award granting the fatherparenting time without objecting to a permanent order ofprotection prohibiting contact between the mother’s husband andthe children until the younger child turns 18. Both parties wererepresented by counsel. The mother appeals.The only issue presented on this appeal is whether FamilyCourt had the authority to issue the order of protection in theabsence of a specific request by the father. Though the recordconfirms that the mother and her husband initially questioned theneed for the order of the protection, it also confirms — and sheconcedes in her brief — that she consented to both the custodialorder and the order of protection, albeit “reluctantly.” Becausea party may not appeal an order entered upon consent, the appealmust be dismissed (see Matter of Stopper v Stopper, 145 AD3d1329, 1330 [2016]). Were the challenged order properly beforeus, it is well-settled that Family Court has the authority to suasponte issue orders of protection to require a party “to refrainfrom acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonablerisk to the health, safety or welfare of a child” or “to observesuch other conditions as are necessary to further the purposes ofprotection” (Family Ct Act § 656 [e], [k]; see Matter of MelodyM. v Robert M., 103 AD3d 932, 934 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 859[2013]; Matter of Mongiardo v Mongiardo, 232 AD2d 741, 744[1996]). The undisputed record evidence that the mother’shusband is a level three sex offender provided amplejustification for the court’s determination to issue an order ofprotection here.Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
