Calendar Date: May 2, 2018Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.__________Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for appellant.Steven G. Natoli, Norwich, attorney for the children.__________Clark, J.Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Chenango County(Revoir Jr., J.), entered May 11, 2017, which, among otherthings, granted petitioner’s application, in proceeding No. 2pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, for custody of the parties’children.Maggie A. Davis (hereinafter the mother) and Daniel E.Church II (hereinafter the father) are the unmarried parents oftwo boys (born in 2011 and 2012). In January 2015, the fatherbegan a one-year security contract in Afghanistan and, withinweeks of his assignment, the parties ended their relationship.The mother then moved with the children to New Jersey. However,in May 2015, the mother moved to Massachusetts to manage a horsebarn and the children returned to Chenango County to live withthe father, who had returned from Afghanistan early. Thechildren thereafter lived primarily with the father, and themother had parenting time with the children pursuant to informalarrangements between the parties, which varied to accommodate themother’s changing living situations and employment.In September 2016, the mother filed a petition seekingcustody of the children, and the father cross-petitioned forsimilar relief. During the pendency of these proceedings, theparties shared physical custody of the children pursuant totemporary custody orders. Following a fact-finding hearing,Family Court granted the mother and the father joint legalcustody, with primary physical custody to the father andparenting time to the mother. Specifically, the court directedthat the mother have parenting time with the children during theschool year on alternate weekends from Thursday after schooluntil Tuesday morning and on alternating weeks during thechildren’s summer break. The court further directed that themother and the father share the Thanksgiving, Christmas andEaster holidays, with the specific times and arrangements to beworked out by the parties. The mother now appeals, primarilyarguing that Family Court should have granted her request forshared physical custody of the children, instead of awarding thefather primary physical custody.When presented with an initial custody determination,Family Court’s primary consideration is the best interests of thechildren, which requires an examination of “such factors as eachparent’s relative fitness and past performance, ability toprovide for the children’s well-being and furnish a stable homeenvironment, and willingness to foster relationships with theother parent” (Matter of McLaughlin v Phillips, 110 AD3d 1184,1185 [2013]; see Matter of Smithey v McAbier, 144 AD3d 1425,1425-1426 [2016]; Matter of Kayla Y. v Peter Z., 125 AD3d 1126,1127 [2015]). Given that Family Court is in a superior positionto evaluate testimony and assess witness credibility, we accordgreat deference to Family Court’s custody determinations, and wewill not disturb such a determination if it is supported by asound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Teri vElliott, 122 AD3d 1092, 1093 [2014]; Matter of Torkildsen vTorkildsen, 72 AD3d 1405, 1406 [2010]).Although it is clear that both the mother and the fatherlove the children deeply and have each developed close bonds withthem, a sound and substantial basis exists in the record tosupport Family Court’s determination that the father is the morestable parent. As established by the evidence, the father hadbeen the children’s primary caretaker since May 2015 and hadconsistently provided for the children’s educational, medical andday-to-day needs. In contrast, the record revealed that, sincethe parties ended their relationship, the mother had changed jobsand residences frequently and that some of these changes,including her decision to move to Massachusetts, had negativelyaffected her ability to exercise parenting time with thechildren. The evidence further demonstrated that the mother hadnot taken an active and consistent role in the children’s routinemedical care or the older child’s education since before May2015. Accordingly, Family Court’s determination to award thefather primary physical custody is supported by a sound andsubstantial basis in the record (see Matter of Driscoll vOursler, 146 AD3d 1179, 1182 [2017]; Matter of Smithey v McAbier,144 AD3d at 1426; Matter of Holland v Klingbeil, 118 AD3d 1077,1078-1079 [2014]). Furthermore, on this record, we discern nobasis upon which to disturb the parenting time schedule fashionedby Family Court in the best interests of the children (see Matterof LaBaff v Dennis, 160 AD3d 1096, 1097-1098 [2018]; Matter ofWilliams v Williams, 151 AD3d 1307, 1309 [2017]).Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
