Calendar Date: May 1, 2018Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Devine, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ.__________Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Ithaca (Dirk A. Galbraith ofcounsel), for appellant.Keith D. Miller, Liverpool, for respondent.__________Aarons, J.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Faughnan, J.),entered October 12, 2017 in Tompkins County, which granteddefendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.One evening in November 2015, defendant was drivingnorthbound in the left lane of State Route 13 in Tompkins County.A vehicle operated by Lindsey J. Pou (hereinafter decedent) wasbacking out from the median and collided with defendant’svehicle. Decedent sustained personal injuries as a consequenceof this accident and thereafter died. Plaintiff commenced thisaction and, following joinder of issue, defendant moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granteddefendant’s motion and this appeal by plaintiff ensued. Wereverse.A driver confronted with an emergency situation will notbear liability if the actions taken by the driver are reasonableand prudent in the context of such emergency (see Hubbard vCounty of Madison, 93 AD3d 939, 940 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 805[2012]; Burnell v Huneau, 1 AD3d 758, 760 [2003]). “Thereasonableness of a driver’s actions . . . is generally aquestion of fact and, thus, summary judgment is possible in suchcases only when the driver has established that his or heractions were reasonable as a matter of law and no outstandingfactual issues remain for jury resolution” (Dumas v Shafer, 4AD3d 720, 722 [2004] [citations omitted]; see Schlanger v Doe, 53AD3d 827, 828 [2008]).Defendant testified at his deposition that decedent wasmoving slowly and that he noticed her move her vehicle from themedian into his lane. Defendant tried to slow down, but beforehe could apply his brakes, decedent’s vehicle struck his vehicle.Defendant stated that he was driving no faster than 60 miles perhour prior to the accident. An eyewitness, who was a passengerin a vehicle driving next to defendant, testified, however, thatdefendant was traveling approximately 70 miles per hour. Inresponse to a question regarding the amount of time thatdefendant had to react to decedent, the passenger testified that“[a] few seconds” had passed from when decedent’s vehicle movedfrom the median and the ensuing collision. In contrast,defendant stated, “anywhere from 30 seconds to like 15 seconds”elapsed from when he first saw decedent’s vehicle and the momentof impact. Furthermore, although defendant could notspecifically quantify how far he was when he first saw decedent’svehicle, he stated that “it wasn’t far away.” Meanwhile, anothereyewitness to the accident, who was driving right next todefendant in the right lane, stated that when decedent’s vehiclebacked into defendant’s lane, “maybe 50 yards” separateddefendant’s vehicle and decedent’s vehicle.Given the conflicting accounts about the distance and theelapsed time between when decedent’s vehicle moved intodefendant’s lane and the collision and defendant’s speed prior tothe accident, we conclude that triable issues of fact exist as towhether defendant’s actions, when confronted with an emergencysituation, were reasonable and whether he could have takenevasive action to avoid decedent’s vehicle (see Cahoon vFrechette, 86 AD3d 774, 776-777 [2011]; Quiles v Greene, 291 AD2d345, 345-346 [2002]; Khaitov v Minevich, 277 AD2d 805, 806-807[2000]; Gaeta v Morgan, 178 AD2d 732, 734 [1991]; cf. Francis vNew York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD2d 107, 107 [1997]). We furtherconclude that there are issues of fact as to whether decedent’sactions, under the circumstances of this case, were not the soleproximate cause of the accident. Accordingly, viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Supreme Courtshould have denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment (seeCopeland v Bolton, 101 AD3d 1283, 1285-1286 [2012]; Schlanger vDoe, 53 AD3d at 829; Dumas v Shafer, 4 AD3d at 722). In light ofour determination, plaintiff’s remaining contentions areacademic.Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Devine and Pritzker, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs,and motion denied.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court