IN THE MATTER OF BABY BOY O.———————————————BRITTNEY L.P. AND NICHOLAS J.P., MEMORANDUM AND ORDERPETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS;MELODY O., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT;ADOPTION S.T.A.R., AND SEAN D. LAIR, GUARDIANAD LITEM, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.NIXON PEABODY LLP, ALBANY (CAITLIN A. DONOVAN OF COUNSEL), FORRESPONDENT-APPELLANT.ASHCRAFT FRANKLIN & YOUNG, LLP, ROCHESTER (GREGORY A. FRANKLIN OFCOUNSEL), FOR PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS.GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O’SHEA, ALBANY (BRENDAN C. O’SHEA OF COUNSEL),FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT ADOPTION S.T.A.R.DEVALK, POWER, LAIR & WARNER, P.C., SODUS (SEAN D. LAIR OF COUNSEL),RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT PRO SE.Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Wayne County(Richard M. Healy, S.), entered March 16, 2017. The order granted thepetition for approval of the adoption of Baby Boy O.It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from isunanimously affirmed without costs.Memorandum: Shortly after the birth of the subject child, MelodyO. (respondent), the child’s biological mother, executed a surrenderof guardianship and custody of the child to respondent AdoptionS.T.A.R. Respondent subsequently executed a revocation of hersurrender, and the parties, pursuant to a stipulated order, lateragreed that her surrender of the child was voluntary and effective andthat her revocation was proper and timely. The stipulated ordertriggered a hearing to determine the issue of custody of the childbased on his best interests (seeSocial Services Law § 384 [5], [6]).Social Services Law § 384 (6) provides that, “[i]n an action orproceeding to determine the custody of a child not in foster caresurrendered for adoption and placed in an adoptive home or to revokeor annul a surrender instrument in the case of such child placed in anadoptive home, the parent or parents who surrendered such child shallhave no right to the custody of such child superior to that of theadoptive parents, notwithstanding that the parent or parents whosurrendered the child are fit, competent and able to duly maintain,support and educate the child. The custody of such child shall beawarded solely on the basis of the best interests of the child, andthere shall be no presumption that such interests will be promoted byany particular custodial disposition.” “The primary factors to beconsidered in determining what custodial disposition will be in achild’s best interests include the ability to provide for the child’semotional and intellectual development, the quality of the homeenvironment, and the parental guidance provided . . . In addition,other relevant considerations include the original placement of thechild, the length of that placement, the financial status and abilityof the parents to provide for the child, and the relative fitness ofthe prospective adoptive parents and the biological parents” (Matter of Anya W. [Darryl W.---Chalika W.-R.], 156 AD3d 709, 710 [2d Dept2017]).Contrary to respondent’s contention, we conclude that thedetermination of Surrogate’s Court to permit petitioners, the adoptiveparents, to complete the adoption is supported by the record inasmuchas “the adoptive parents demonstrated the ability to establish andmaintain continuous stable relationships and employment, and therecord demonstrates that they are better suited to meet the day-to-dayand life-long physical, emotional, and material needs of the child”(id. at 709; see Matter of Baby Boy M ., 269 AD2d 450, 450-451 [2d Dept2000]).We similarly reject respondent’s contention that the Surrogateerred in crediting the expert testimony regarding bonding andattachment disorder. In our view, that testimony was not undulyspeculative, and the fact that the studies cited by the expert werebased on children removed from their biological parents, as opposed totheir adoptive parents, was an issue relevant to the weight to begiven to the testimony, not its admissibility (see generally Likos vNiagara Frontier Tr. Metro Sys., Inc., 149 AD3d 1474, 1476 [4th Dept2017]).We reject respondent’s further contentions concerning thevalidity of her surrender. The record establishes that herunambiguous, open-court stipulation that the surrender was voluntarywas reduced to an order that provided, inter alia, that respondent“recognizes that her surrender was properly, voluntarily, andknowingly given, without undue pressure and not under duress; and shewithdraws any objections which she has made to the manner in which hersurrender was given” (seeCPLR 2104).Finally, contrary to respondent’s contention, we conclude thatshe was not denied effective assistance of counsel inasmuch as she didnot “demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimateexplanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings” (Matter of Reinhardtv Hardison,122 AD3d 1448, 1449 [4th Dept 2014] [internal quotationmarks omitted];see Matter of Brenden O., 20 AD3d 722, 723 [3d Dept2005]).Entered: June 8, 2018 Mark W. BennettClerk of the Court
