THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,V DAVID M. CAREY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SHERRY A. CHASE OFCOUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.DAVID M. CAREY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (ASHLEY R. LOWRY OFCOUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Kenneth F. Case,J.), rendered March 2, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon ajury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in thesecond degree.It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from isunanimously affirmed.Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting himupon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a controlled substancein the second degree (Penal Law § 220.18 [1]). A parole warrant wasissued for defendant after defendant failed to report to parole andmoved out of his parole-approved residence. Defendant was arrested inthe early morning hours outside an apartment leased to his girlfriendafter defendant fled the residence upon hearing parole officersknocking at the door. In conducting a protective sweep of theresidence, the parole officers found a box that contained whatappeared to be baggies of cocaine. The parole officers found nofurnishings upstairs at the residence, and they found some furniture,including a bed, downstairs. They found only men’s clothing in theapartment, and they also found defendant’s identification card andwhat appeared to be a key to the residence. Defendant’s girlfriendwas inside the residence when the parole officers entered, but theyhad observed her outside 20 to 30 minutes earlier, knocking on thedoor several times before being let inside, thus suggesting that shedid not have a key to the apartment.We agree with defendant in his main and pro se supplementalbriefs that County Court erred in finding that he lacked standing tocontest the search of the residence. “One seeking standing to asserta violation of his Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate alegitimate expectation of privacy. One may have an expectation ofprivacy in premises not one’s own, e.g., an overnight guest” (People vOrtiz, 83 NY2d 840, 842 [1994]). Here, we conclude that defendantestablished his standing at least as an overnight guest, if not assomething more (see People v Telfer, 175 AD2d 638, 639 [4th Dept1991],lv denied78 NY2d 1130 [1991];People v Moss, 168 AD2d 960, 960[4th Dept 1990];see generally People v Rodriguez, 69 NY2d 159, 162-163 [1987]). We agree with the court’s further determination,however, that the search of the apartment was lawful (see People vJohnson, 94 AD3d 1529, 1531-1532 [4th Dept 2012],lv denied19 NY3d974 [2012]). The search by the parole officers was rationally andreasonably related to the parole officers’ duties “to detect and toprevent parole violations for the protection of the public from thecommission of further crimes” (People v Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181[1977];see Johnson, 94 AD3d at 1531-1532).We reject defendant’s further contention in his main and pro sesupplemental briefs that the court erred in granting the People’srequest for a missing witness charge with respect to defendant’sgirlfriend. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the Peopleestablished that the girlfriend would have provided testimony on amaterial issue in the case and would have testified favorably fordefendant (see People v Soto, 297 AD2d 567, 567 [1st Dept 2002],lvdenied99 NY2d 564 [2002]). Defendant’s further contention that themissing witness instruction constituted improper burden-shifting iswithout merit. “Although a court may not ordinarily comment on adefendant’s failure to testify or otherwise come forward with evidenceat trial, . . . once a defendant does so, the customary standards forgiving a missing witness charge apply” (People v Macana, 84 NY2d 173,177 [1994]).Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime ascharged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]),we reject defendant’s further contention in his main brief that theverdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People vBleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987];People v Russaw, 114 AD3d 1261,1261-1262 [4th Dept 2014],lv denied22 NY3d 1202 [2014]). Alsocontrary to defendant’s contention in his main brief, the sentence isnot unduly harsh or severe.We reject defendant’s contention in his pro se supplemental briefthat he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counselfailed to make a CPL 30.30 speedy trial motion. The record before usdoes not support defendant’s contention that there was a speedy trialviolation (see People v Cooper, 134 AD3d 1583, 1585-1586 [4th Dept2015]), and it is well settled that “[t]here can be no denial ofeffective assistance of trial counsel from counsel’s failure to ‘makea motion or argument that has little or no chance of success’ “(People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005];see People v Jackson, 132AD3d 1304, 1305 [4th Dept 2015],lv denied27 NY3d 999 [2016]). Tothe extent that defendant’s contention involves matters outside therecord on appeal, it must be raised by way of a motion pursuant to CPL
