MICHAEL EDWARDS AND KAREN ROTHENBERGH,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,V FRANCINE M. GORMAN, RURAL/METRO OFROCHESTER, INC., RURAL/METRO MEDICALSERVICES, RURAL/METRO OF NEW YORK, INC.,R/M MANAGEMENT CO., INC. (ALSO KNOWN ASRURAL/METRO MANAGEMENT), AND RURAL/METROCORPORATION, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.FARACI LANGE, LLP, ROCHESTER (CAROL A. MCKENNA OF COUNSEL), FORPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, ROCHESTER (PATRICK B. NAYLON OF COUNSEL), FORDEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (ReneeForgensi Minarik, A.J.), entered November 16, 2016. The order,insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summaryjudgment on the issue of liability.It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from isunanimously reversed on the law without costs and plaintiffs’ motionis granted in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiffscommenced this action seeking damages for injuries sustained byMichael Edwards (plaintiff) when he was struck by an ambulance drivenby defendant Francine M. Gorman. At the time of the collision,plaintiff, a parking attendant, was tasked with instructing vehiclestraveling in a two-lane, one-way “pass-through” road of the entranceloop of Strong Memorial Hospital on how to reach an alternate entrancefor a nearby parking garage. Plaintiff was standing in the center ofthe pass-through road between the two lanes of travel, and Gormanstruck him as she was slowing down for a stop sign at the end of thepass-through road. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment onthe issue of liability, and defendants cross-moved for partial summaryjudgment on the issue of plaintiff’s comparative fault. Supreme Courtdenied the motion and cross motion, and plaintiffs appeal. We agreewith plaintiffs that the court erred in denying their motion.We note at the outset that the issue of serious injury waspreviously decided in plaintiffs’ favor, and no appeal was taken fromthat order. Thus, in seeking partial summary judgment on liability,cplaintiffs were required to establish only that Gorman was negligentand that her negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Weconclude that plaintiffs met that burden by providing photographs,video footage and Gorman’s deposition testimony in which she admittedthat she executed a wide turn through multiple lanes of the pass-through road, which constitutes a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1128 (a) (see Gabriel v Great Lakes Concrete Prods. LLC, 151 AD3d1855, 1855-1856 [4th Dept 2017]). In opposition, defendants failed toraise a triable issue of fact (seegenerally Zuckerman v City of NewYork, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Although defendants successfullyraised triable issues of fact with respect to plaintiff’s negligence,that is of no moment in the context of plaintiffs’ appeal. “To beentitled to partial summary judgment a plaintiff does not bear thedouble burden of establishing a prima facie case of defendant’sliability and the absence of his or her own comparative fault”(Rodriguez v City of New York, — NY3d —, —, 2018 NY Slip Op 02287, *6[2018]).To the extent that plaintiffs contend that Gorman’s negligencewas the sole proximate cause of the accident, we conclude that theircontention is not properly before us inasmuch as it was raised for thefirst time in their reply papers in Supreme Court (seeMikulski vBattaglia, 112 AD3d 1355, 1356 [4th Dept 2013]). In any event, asnoted herein, defendants raised triable issues of fact concerningplaintiff’s comparative fault.Entered: June 8, 2018 Mark W. BennettClerk of the Court
