By Acosta, P.J., Tom, Mazzarelli, Moulton, JJ.6859. In re Jacob Alpert, pet-res, v. M.R. Beal & Company, respondents-Appellants. — Law Offices of John P. DeMaio, New York (John P. DeMaio of counsel), for appellants.Liddle & Robinson, L.L.P., New York (Matthew McCann of counsel), for respondent.Order and judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 12, 2016, which granted the petition to confirm an arbitration award, denied respondents’ cross petition to vacate the award, and awarded judgment in favor of petitioner in the total sum of $642,153.52, unanimously affirmed, with costs.The arbitration award was not in manifest disregard of the law, based on petitioner’s undisputed claim, amended claim, and testimony that he was promised bonuses in 2011 and 2012, which he did not receive (Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, 304 AD2d 103, 108 [1st Dept 2003]). ”[T]o the extent the FAA permits vacatur of an arbitration award on the ground that it is irrational” (Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Afridi, 13 AD3d 248, 250 [1st Dept 2004]), the motion court correctly found that respondents, at best, demonstrated disagreement with the award, which was not a basis to conclude the award was irrational., respondents’ contention that any promise to pay a bonus was an unenforceable agreement to agree is unpreserved and unavailing. In any event, “[a]n arbitrator’s paramount responsibility is to reach an equitable result” (Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 629 [1979]). The elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are that plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant, and the defendant obtained such benefit without adequately compensating plaintiff (see Nakamura v. Fujii, 253 AD2d 387, 390 [1st Dept 1998]). These elements were met, based on petitioner’s undisputed claim that he rebuilt a municipal bond department “decimated” by the 2008 financial crisis, and that he brought significant new clients to the firm, for which he received no incentive compensation in 2011 and 2012.The arbitration panel’s finding that respondents were jointly and severally liable for petitioner’s bonuses pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law §§273 and 276 was not in manifest disregard of the law or irrational based either on the individual respondent’s 100 percent ownership of M.R. Beal as a limited partner or his ownership of the general partner corporation (see Gonzalez v. Chalpin, 77 NY2d 74, 77 [1990]; D’Mel & Assoc. v. Athco, Inc., 105 AD3d 451, 452 [1st Dept 2013]). Nor was it irrational to find that the Debtor and Creditor Law was applicable, based on petitioner’s claim that there was ample money in the firm to pay his promised compensation, notwithstanding transfers of assets made by the individual respondent.This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
By Acosta, P.J., Manzanet-Daniels, Tom, Mazzarelli, Moulton, JJ.6860. In re Leonidez A., pet-res, v. Sira L.R., res-res — Steven N. Feinman, White Plains, for ap — Joseph R. Daniels, New York, for res — Karen P. Simmons, The Children’s Law Center, Brooklyn (Katherine J. Herrmann of counsel), attorney for the child.—Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Tracey A. Bing, J.), entered on or about August 7, 2017, which, after a hearing, awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ child to petitioner father, and parenting time to respondent mother, unanimously affirmed, without costs.The Family Court’s determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record (Matter of Xiomara M. v. Robert M., 102 AD3d 581, 582 [1st Dept 2013]). The court considered the relevant factors, and properly determined that the child’s welfare and happiness would be best served in the father’s care (Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 172-173 [1982]), particularly given that the father has provided the child with unwavering stability (see Matter of Michael B. [Lillian B.], 145 AD3d 425, 430 [1st Dept 2016]). Since the child was very young, he has spent the entirety of every weekend with the father and the paternal extended family, whereas, when with the mother during the week, in New York, the child spent much of his time with a babysitter, even when the mother was not working. By contrast, the father has been more of a hands-on parent, who spent as much time as he could with the child, and relied on family or caregivers as little as possible (see id. at 428; see also John A. v. Bridget M., 16 AD3d 324, 335 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 710 [2005]). The father has been active in the child’s education, as well as in enriching him with extracurricular activities and excursions (see Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 NY2d 946, 947 [1985]; see also Michael B., 145 AD3d at 428). Moreover, the father has greater financial stability, and the child has thrived in his care (see e.g. Williams v. Williams, 78 AD3d 1256, 1258 [3d Dept 2010]; see also Ricardo S. v. Carron C., 91 AD3d 556 [1st Dept 2012]). Further, the father recognized and supported the child’s need to maintain a relationship with the mother and his half-siblings and ensured that the child spent holidays with them while the child was in his care in New York and also visited them in Florida (see e.g. Matter of Winslow v. Lott, 272 AD2d 406 [2d Dept 2000]). The mother, on the other hand, has shown a disregard for the child’s relationship with the father (see Matter of Matthew W. v. Meagan R., 68 AD3d 468 [1st Dept 2009], having, among other things, absconded with the child to Florida without the father’s knowledge or consent (see Matter of Goodman v. Jones, 146 AD3d 884, 885 [2d Dept 2017]).This constitutes the decision and order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
