SUMMARY ORDERPlaintiff pro se Andres P. Gallegos brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)1 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)2 against Tompkins Consolidated Area Transit, Inc. (TCAT) for a failure to promote him. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 5.) Pending is TCAT’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 47.) For the reasons stated in that motion and in TCAT’s reply, (Dkt. No. 51), summary judgment for TCAT is granted. To begin with, the court is mindful of the “need for caution about granting summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where, as here, the merits turn on a dispute as to the employer’s intent.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008).3 And, as a pro se litigant, the court must read Gallegos’s pleadings “liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A pro se plaintiff, however, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by simply relying on the allegations of his complaint; he must present admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor.” Belpasso v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 400 F. App’x 600, 601 (2d Cir. 2010).The court agrees with TCAT’s arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 12.) In particular, summary judgment is warranted because Gallegos voluntarily withdrew his application for the promotion at issue. (Id. at 3-4, 7-9.) Because Gallegos did not see his application through, he was not rejected by TCAT, and thus cannot set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. (Id. at 7 (citing Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Univ. of Conn. Health Care, 292 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394 (D. Conn. 2003)).)Gallegos’s response, (Dkt. No. 50), even when read liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments it suggests, cannot overcome TCAT’s motion. His subjective assessment of his own qualifications in comparison to other candidates, (id. at 4-12), is insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to a material fact. See Concepcion v. City of New York, 15 Civ. 2156, 2016 WL 386099, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2016), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). Gallegos also alleges that a former employee harassed him for his Mexican heritage, (Dkt. No. 50 at 4), TCAT’s budget was manipulated to promote other candidates, (id. at 15), certain events contributed to his post-traumatic stress disorder, (id. at 20, 21), and that someone named Mr. Dillard was repeatedly offered a “better” interview time for a second interview, (id. at 24). These allegations are non sequiturs because Gallegos offers no connection between them and his claims, see Clark v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 63, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), and “[s]tatements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment,” Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g (Dec. 22, 1999).In trying to overcome the fact that he withdrew from the application process before the second interview, (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 12 at 3-4), Gallegos alleges that notes from his first interview “clearly show that no one on the interview committee had any intention of promoting [him],” (Dkt. No. 50 at 14). If true, this allegation would arguably justify Gallegos’s withdrawal on the theory that completing his application (instead of withdrawing before the second interview) would have been a futile endeavor. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1213 (2d Cir. 1993); Matthews v. Corning Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 275, 288-89 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). But Gallegos’s allegation is speculation that need not be accepted as true. See Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996). At best, the notes from the first round of interviews show that one interviewer did not favor Gallegos and another did not recommend Gallegos as a top candidate at the time, which does not justify Gallegos withdrawing from his second interview. (Dkt. No. 50, Attach. 1 at 20-30.)4Gallegos also alleges that he had legitimate reasons for trying to reschedule his second interview. (Dkt. No. 50 at 1.) But he testified at deposition that he wanted a longer interview than the thirty minutes allotted, and no other candidate received more time. (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 10 at 36-37; Attach. 1
