Calendar Date: June 7, 2018Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch, Devine and Mulvey, JJ.__________Kouray & Kouray, Schenectady (Steven X. Kouray of counsel),for appellant.Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Tracey A.Brunecz of counsel), for respondent.__________Devine, J.Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Michalski,J.), rendered January 3, 2017 in Schenectady County, convictingdefendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree.Police responded to dispatch calls alleging that defendantand Jaharia Lind produced a handgun during an altercation withtwo other individuals, and they quickly spotted and stopped avehicle matching the description of the one used by defendant andLind and containing what appeared to be both of them.Thereafter, an officer arrived and his K-9 partner indicated thatthere was a firearm present in the vehicle. Defendant and Lindwere then detained and the vehicle was towed to secure it whilethe police applied for a search warrant. A search warrant wassubsequently approved and police found a handgun in the vehicle’scenter console.After defendant was charged by indictment, heunsuccessfully moved to, among other things, suppress theevidence obtained from the vehicle. Defendant then pleadedguilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree insatisfaction of the indictment. Supreme Court sentenceddefendant to the agreed-upon prison term of five years to befollowed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendantappeals, and we now affirm.Defendant’s challenges on appeal all relate to the denialof his suppression motion. It is well-settled that “[o]nce thepolice possess[] a reasonable belief that [a] vehicle [is], insome way, associated with the crime and that a search of thevehicle would produce the fruits, instrumentalities, contrabandor evidence of a crime, they [can] conduct[] a warrantless searchand seizure of the vehicle” (People v Martin, 141 AD2d 854, 855[1988] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvsdenied 73 NY2d 853, 857 [1988]; accord People v Hoffman, 130 AD3d1152, 1157-1158 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1009 [2015]). Thetestimony provided at the suppression hearing established thatthe police officers who stopped the vehicle were aware of reportsthat defendant and Lind had been involved in a domestic disputeand had a gun, and a canine sniff produced a “hit” that indicatedthe presence of explosives or firearms in the vehicle (see Peoplev Hoffman, 130 AD3d at 1158; People v Sweezey, 215 AD2d 910, 914[1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 980 [1995]). Hence, it was clear thatreasonable grounds existed to believe that a search of thevehicle would be fruitful, and it was properly seized and towedto a secure location so that any weapons in the vehicle would besecure pending the issuance of a search warrant.The police searched the vehicle pursuant to a searchwarrant obtained a few hours later and, contrary to defendant’scontention, the warrant properly was supported by a swornapplication that relied upon written reports, the writtenstatements from police officers involved in the investigation anda statement from Lind that the firearm was in the center consoleof the vehicle. According deference to the suppression court’scredibility determination, we agree that the foregoingestablished probable cause justifying the search of the vehicle(see People v Alberts, 161 AD3d 1298, 1302-1303 [2018], lv denied___ NY3d ___ [June 29, 2018]; People v Church, 31 AD3d 892, 894[2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 866 [2006]). Thus, the warrant and theensuing search were valid and suppression was properly denied.Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch and Mulvey, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
