Calendar Date: June 8, 2018Before: McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Pritzker, JJ.__________Darryl Briggs, Troy, appellant pro se.Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Bradyof counsel), for respondents.__________McCarthy, J.P.Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (DeBow, J.),entered January 3, 2017, which granted defendants’ motion todismiss the claim.Claimant commenced this claim alleging false arrest,malicious prosecution and unlawful imprisonment based upon hisarrest and confinement in connection with a charged paroleviolation. Defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the groundsof untimeliness and failure to state a cause of action. TheCourt of Claims granted defendants’ motion and this appealensued.The Court of Claims properly dismissed, as untimely, thecauses of action sounding in false arrest and unlawfulimprisonment. Such actions accrue upon a claimant’s release fromconfinement, not, as urged by claimant here, upon the exhaustionof his administrative remedies in connection with the parolerevocation proceedings (see Burks v State of New York, 119 AD3d1302, 1303 [2014]; Davis v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1287, 1287[2011]; see also Campos v State of New York, 139 AD3d 1276, 1277[2016]). Based upon claimant’s assertion of illegal confinementfor 120 days following his arrest on July 24, 2013, his causes ofaction accrued on November 21, 2013. Claimant asserts that onJuly 7, 2014 he served a “Notice of Claim,” which defendantstreated as a notice of intention to file a claim. That documentis not included in the record, so we cannot independentlydetermine its character. In any event, claimant does not contendthat the July 7 document was, itself, a claim. Inasmuch as theclaim was not filed or served until June 2, 2016, well beyond theone-year statute of limitations period, the causes of action forfalse arrest and unlawful imprisonment were untimely (see CPLR215 [3]; Fleming v Sangster, 148 AD3d 1798, 1798-1799 [2017];Coleman v Worster, 140 AD3d 1002, 1004 [2016]; see also Court ofClaims Act § 10 [3-b]).1Further, we find no error in the dismissal of the claimsounding in malicious prosecution. Because claimant did notallege a necessary element of malicious prosecution –specifically, that the parole revocation proceeding terminated inhis favor — the claim was properly dismissed for failure to statea cause of action (see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d78, 84 [2001]; Bayat v Azaz, 12 AD3d 547, 547 [2004]). We havereviewed claimant’s remaining contentions and find them to beunpersuasive.Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Pritzker, JJ., concur.ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.ENTER:Robert D. MaybergerClerk of the Court
