MEMORANDUM:The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.The Appellate Division stated the correct standard of review when it concluded that,”viewing the evidence presented at trial in a neutral light… , and weighing the relative probative force of the conflicting testimony and evidence, as well as the relative strength of the conflicting inferences to be drawn therefrom, and according deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor, … the jury was justified in finding that the People sustained their burden of disproving defendant’s justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt” (157 AD3d 107, 116, 118 [1st Dept 2017]; see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-644 [2006]; People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). To the extent the Appellate Division cited to certain prior decisions (see 157 AD3d at 109, citing People v. Castillo, 223 AD2d 481, 481 [1st Dept 1996]; People v. Bartley, 219 AD2d 566, 567 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 898 [1st Dept 1995]; People v. Corporan, 169 AD2d 643, 643 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 77 NY2d 959 [1st Dept 1991]) containing language that is inconsistent with our more recent guidance regarding weight of the evidence (see People v. Delamota, 18 NY3d 107, 116-117 [2011]), those decisions should not be followed.Nevertheless, a review of the Court’s analysis demonstrates that the Appellate Division applied the correct standard from Romero and Bleakley, which involves a “two-step approach” wherein the court must (1) “determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, an acquittal would not have been unreasonable[;]” and (2) “ weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony” (157 AD3d 107, citing People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; Romero, 7 NY3d at 643; Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Thus, the incorrect language, in the context of the court’s written decision as a whole, did not “manifest a lack of application of that review power [to] which appellants are entitled” (Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 496; see Romero, 7 NY3d at 646).Defendant’s claim that his motion to suppress certain statements to the police was improperly denied is without merit. There is sufficient record support for the lower courts’ findings that the confidential informant had a basis for his knowledge of the information he transmitted (see People v. Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 403 [1985]) and that such information was reliable (see People v. DiFalco, 80 NY2d 693, 696-699 [1993]; People v. Rodriguez, 52 NY2d 483, 489-490 [1981]).
