DECISION AND ORDEROPINION OF THE COURT On September 11, 2018, defendant was arraigned on charges of PL §170.20 (Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree) and PL §165.40 (Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree). The defendant now moves by omnibus motion for an order: (1) dismissing the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL §§100.40 and 170.30; suppressing tangible evidence recovered from defendant or, alternatively, granting a Mapp/Dunaway hearing; (3) suppressing statements made by defendant or, in the alternative, granting a Huntley/Dunaway hearing; (4) precluding the admission of unnoticed statements or identification testimony pursuant to CPL §710.30; (5) precluding at trial the use of the defendant’s prior criminal history or prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct.FACIAL SUFFICIENCY“The procedural requirements for the factual portion of a local criminal court information are, simply: that it state facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges, that the allegations of the factual part together with those of any supporting depositions provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged and that the non-hearsay allegations of the information and supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof” (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000] [internal quotations omitted; CPL §100.40[1]; see, CPL 100.15[3]).“A court reviewing for facial sufficiency must assume that the factual allegations contained in the information are true and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them” (People v. Oldham, 54 Misc 3d 303, 305 — 06 [Crim Ct, New York County 2016] [internal quotations omitted]; see CPL §100.40 [1][c]). Furthermore, “[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360 [2000]).In the accusatory instrument, Detective Martin Pastor avers thatI am informed by an individual known to the District Attorney’s Office (“Informant #1″), that he had numerous items of film camera equipment stolen from his business. I am further informed by Informant #1that he observed his stolen film equipment advertised for sale on a Facebook account registered to an individual named “Andrew Hill”I am informed by a second individual known to the District Attorney’s Office (“Informant #2″), that he contacted “Andrew Hill” and agreed to buy Informant #1′s camera equipment for $530. I am further informed by Informant #2 that he and Andrew Hill agreed to meet in front of 6 Delancey Street on September 11, 2018 to secure the transaction.I observed the defendant, Andre Johnson, standing in front of 6 Delancey Street, on September 11, 2018 at the designated time agreed by “Andrew Hill” and Informant #2. I further observed the defendant carrying a bag containing four pieces of camera equipment.I recovered four pieces of film camera equipment from a bag the defendant was carrying. I further recovered a New Jersey State Driver’s License from the defendant in the name “Andrew Hill.” The defendant stated in substance to me that his real name is Andre Johnson and he uses the name “Andrew Hill” as an alias.I am informed by Informant #1 that the camera equipment the defendant attempted to sell on September 11th belonged to Informant #1 and the defendant did not have permission or authority to possess or sell his camera equipment.The defendant stated in substance to me that he had the New Jersey State Driver’s License made for him and it was not issued by the state of New Jersey.These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to establish defendant’s commission of every element of the offenses charged. The defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.PL §165.40 provides that “[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof.” Defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege that defendant knowingly possessed the stolen property in question because it does not allege facts “regarding the circumstances of the theft of the property” or “how defendant came into possession of the property.” No such allegations are needed, however. “Knowledge that property is stolen may be shown circumstantially, such as by evidence of recent exclusive possession, defendant’s conduct or contradictory statements from which guilt may be inferred” (People v. Zorcik, 67 NY2d 670, 671 [1986]). Here, defendant’s possession of the camera equipment and attempt to sell these items supports a reasonable inference that he knew these items were stolen.PL §170.20 provides, in turn, that “a person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument.” Defendant argues that the complaint does not allege that defendant possessed the forged New Jersey driver’s license with intent to defraud, deceive or injure. This argument is unavailing. The only conceivable reason for defendant to possess a forged driver’s license with a false name is to pass same off as the genuine article in order to deceive or defraud the person to whom they are presented (People v. Dallas, 46 AD3d 489, 491 [1st Dept 2007]; see also People v. Barona, 19 Misc 3d 1122(A) [Crim Ct, New York County 2008] ["there is simply no reason to obtain or possess a New York State Identification Card unless one intends to use it in order to demonstrate one's identity. And there is, therefore, no reason to knowingly possess a forged state identification card unless one intends to present it as real --- in other words, to defraud or deceive another"]). In this case, the allegation that the false name on defendant’s forged driver’s license is identical to the name of the Facebook account used to sell the camera equipment supports the reasonable inference that defendant intended to present this forged driver’s license to the prospective buyer of the stolen camera equipment, in order to buttress his claim to ownership of that equipment while concealing his identity.The cases defendant relies on in support of his argument are readily distinguishable, as they involve defendants arrested for acts which did not suggest an intent to use the forged instruments in their possession. In People v. Days, the court held that defendant’s possession of five forged twenty-dollar bills was insufficient to support a PL §170.20 charge where defendant did not offer these bills to anyone (People v. Days, 25 Misc 3d 1220(A) [Crim Ct 2009]). Similarly, the defendant in People v. Brunson, 66 AD3d 594, 595 [1st Dept 2009] was arrested for shoplifting and had engaged in no conduct evincing an intent to use an altered ID card (on which a letter in his name and digit in his identification number had been changed) found in his possession. By contrast, the facts here support the inference that defendant intended to use his forged driver’s license as part of his effort to sell stolen camera equipment.SUPPRESSION OF TANGIBLE EVIDENCEThe branch of defendant’s motion that is to suppress physical evidence is granted to the extent that a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is granted.MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENETSThe branch of defendant’s motion that is to suppress certain statements by the defendant is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is granted.MOTION TO PRECLUDE UNNOTICED STATEMENT EVIDENCEThe branch of defendant’s motion that is to preclude evidence of unnoticed statements (CPL §710.30[3]) is denied, with leave granted for the defendant to renew this branch of the motion upon learning that the People intend to introduce any such evidence at the defendant’s trial.SANDOVAL/VENTIMIGLIAThe branch of defendant’s motion that is to preclude the People from introducing evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral acts for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s credibility at trial is granted to the extent that the People are directed to provide written notice to the defendant of all such acts, if any, that they intend to introduce at the defendant’s trial (CPL §240.43) no later than three days prior to jury selection (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and court holidays).RESERVATION OF RIGHTSThe branch of the defendant’s motion seeking the right to make further motions is granted to the extent indicated in CPL §255.20.Accordingly, it isORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient is DENIED; and it is furtherORDERED that the branch of the defendant’s motion that is to suppress physical evidence is GRANTED to the extent set forth above; and it is furtherORDERED that the branch of the defendant’s motion that is to suppress evidence of statements allegedly made by the defendant is GRANTED to the extent set forth above; and it is furtherORDERED that the branch of the defendant’s motion that is to preclude evidence of unnoticed statements or identification procedures is DENIED without prejudice; and it is furtherORDERED that the branch of the defendant’s motion that is to preclude the People from introducing evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral acts is GRANTED to the extent set forth above.This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.Dated: New York, New YorkOctober 15, 2018
