OPINION & ORDER This case centers around alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) by Defendants Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (“Flate Rate”), Sam Gholam, and Israel Carmel. On June 8, 2018, Plaintiff, Mirko Djurdjevich, moved to conditionally certify this action under the FLSA and send notice to potential plaintiffs. Dkt No. 40. Defendants oppose the conditional certification motion, and also object to several components of Plaintiff’s proposed notice. See Dkt No. 47 (“Def. Br.”). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion for conditional certification and orders the parties to confer and submit a joint proposed notice as described below.I. BackgroundThe Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case, which were the subject of an earlier Memorandum Opinion & Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 29. In short, Plaintiff, the operator of a moving service crew, alleges that he was improperly classified as an independent contractor, but was actually Defendants’ employee. See id. at 1, 7 (citing to Dkt. No. 16, First Amended Complaint). Plaintiff alleges that as Defendants’ employee, he was the subject of several FLSA and NYLL violations. See id. at 6-12 (citing to Dkt. No. 16, First Amended Complaint).After the Court ruled on the motion to dismiss, on June 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to conditionally certify this action and send notice to potential plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 40. Plaintiff requests that the Court conditionally certify a collective action comprising “all persons who were or are engaged by Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. from January 1, 2010 to entry of judgment in this case, who performed moving services for Flat Rate and were either misclassified as independent contractors or were engaged as truck crews for said misclassified persons.” Dkt. No. 52 (“Pl. Rep. Br.”) at 2. On July 6, 2018, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 47. On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum of law in further support of his motion. Dkt. No. 52.II. Legal StandardThe FLSA authorizes workers to sue on behalf of both themselves and “other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. §216(b). “District courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement §216(b) by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs of the pendency of the action and of their opportunity to opt-in as represented plaintiffs.” Vargas v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 1 l-cv-7887 (DAB), 2012 WL 10235792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2012) (quoting Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 554 (2d Cir. 2010)). Courts in this circuit apply a two-step method to determine whether a collective action should be certified. Myers, 624 F.3d at 554-55. “The first step involves the court making an initial determination to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs with respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Id. at 555. At the second step, “the district court will, on a fuller record, determine whether a so-called ‘collective action’ may go forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs.” Id. If they are not, the action may be “de-certified,” and the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Id.At the first step, plaintiffs need only “make a ‘modest factual showing’ that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs ‘together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.’” Id. (quoting Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Sotomayor, J.)). While this showing “cannot be satisfied simply by ‘unsupported assertions,’” it “should remain a low standard of proof because the purpose of the first stage is merely to determine whether ‘similarly situated’ plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Lynch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 491 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing plaintiffs’ burden as “very low” and “minimal”). This standard is “‘considerably less stringent’ than the requirements for class certification under Rule 23.” Poplawski v. Metroplex on the Atl, LLC, No. 11-cv-3765 (JBW), 2012 WL 1107711, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) (citation omitted). As a result, in a FLSA exemption case, plaintiffs need only make “some showing that ‘there are other employees… who are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions,’ on which the criteria for many FLSA exemptions are based, who are classified as exempt pursuant to a common policy or scheme.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In other words, “the Court must merely find some identifiable factual nexus which binds [Plaintiff] and potential class members together as victims of a particular practice.” Alvarado Balderramo v. Taxi Tours Inc., No. 15-cv-2181 (ER), 2017 WL 2533508, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).To meet this low burden, “[t]he plaintiff may adduce evidence through its own pleadings, affidavits, and declarations, including any hearsay statements contained therein.” Morris v. Lettire Constr. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted). “[C]ourts in this circuit have routinely granted conditional collective certification based solely on the personal observations of one plaintiffs affidavit.” Hernandez v. Bare Burger Dio Inc., No. 12-cv-7794 (RWS), 2013 WL 3199292, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013) (collecting cases). At this initial stage, “the court does not resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make credibility determinations.” Cunningham v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 638, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 368). “Indeed, a court should not weigh the merits of the underlying claims in determining whether potential opt-in plaintiffs may be similarly situated.” Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 368; see also Hoffman, 982 F. Supp. at 262 (“[T]he Court need not evaluate the merits of plaintiffs’ claims in order to determine that a definable group of ‘similarly situated’ plaintiffs can exist here.”). As a result, “any factual variances that may exist between the plaintiff and the putative class do not defeat conditional class certification.” Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 369; see also Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Thus “courts in this Circuit routinely decline to consider…opposing declarations, because the issue for the Court is not whose evidence is more persuasive, but ‘whether Plaintiffs have made the modest factual showing that they are required to make at this stage of the litigation.’” Vasto v. Credico (USA) LLC, No. 15-cv-9298 (PAE), 2016 WL 2658172, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2016) (citation omitted); see also Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11-1279 (ALC), 2012 WL 2574742, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012) (“While a large amount of discovery has been conducted, discovery remains incomplete. Defendants’ arguments are more appropriate after discovery is finished.”).III. DiscussionHaving reviewed the filings under the relevant legal standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs motion for collective certification is sufficiently supported by the allegations in his Second Amended Complaint, and the declaration and exhibits attached to his motion.Plaintiff has made a “modest factual showing” that he and prospective collective action members “were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 554-55. These common practices include the allegation that Defendants classified Plaintiff and potential plaintiffs as independent contractors, when they were actually employees of Defendants. Dkt. No. 33, Second Amended Complaint31, 70-74; Dkt. No. 41, Ex. 4, May 18, 2018 Declaration of Mirko Djurdjevich (“Djurdjevich Dec.”)
4, 16-18; Dkt. No. 41, Ex. 5, June 2, 2018 Declaration of Djordjie Bacovic (“Bacovic Dec.”)
