DECISION In this miscellaneous proceeding to recover the possession of real property, the court has before it a motion brought by respondent, Yan Ping Xu (“respondent”) seeking reargument of this court’s October 10, 2018 decision and order (the “October Decision”) and granting respondent a stay. Petitioner, Raymond E. Van Zwienen (“petitioner”) opposes. For the reasons that follow, objectant’s motion is denied.BackgroundThe court assumes familiarity with the procedural history of this case, which is more fully delineated in this court’s numerous prior orders. As is relevant here, decedent, William H. Van Zwienen (“decedent”) died on September 29, 2016, survived by his spouse, respondent herein, and his four children, including petitioner herein.Decedent’s last will and testament, dated October 17, 2014, bequeathed his tangible personal property to respondent and his four children equally, and the residue to the William H. Van Zwienen Revocable Trust (the “Trust”). As provided under the most recent trust amendment, respondent was given a six-month period to live in decedent’s resident, 12 Mallar Avenue, Bay Shore, New York (the “subject property”) following decedent’s death, after which the trustee is directed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally amongst respondent and decedent’s four children.Following a contested probate proceeding, this court granted probate of the propounded instrument and issued letters testamentary to petitioner. Pursuant to his authority thereto, and as successor trustee of the Trust, petitioner then commenced the instant proceeding on December 22, 2017, seeking to recover possession of the subject property and a judgment against respondent for her use and occupancy of the premises. By decision and order dated February 16, 2018, this court determined that respondent had defaulted in this matter, granted petitioner’s application, and directed respondent to vacate the subject property within ten (10) days of being served with a copy of the order.Respondent subsequently moved to vacate her default and filed an order to show cause seeking to restrain enforcement of the February 16, 2018 decision and order. The court signed the order to show cause and heard oral argument on March 14, 2018. On April 5, 2018, the court rendered a decision and order (the “April Order”) denying respondent’s motion to vacate and again directing respondent to vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days of being served with a copy of the order. Respondent filed her appeal of that decision on May 8, 2018.On July 2, 2018, during the pendency of her appeal, respondent moved this court for a statutory stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(a) (6). By decision and order dated August 16, 2018 (the “August Order”), the undersigned granted respondent’s motion for a stay conditioned upon the filing of an undertaking in the amount of $2,400 per month, payable to petitioner, during the pendency of her appeal from the April Order.To date, respondent has not filed said undertaking. She has, however, filed a motion to renew and reargue the August Order, which is returnable on January 15, 2019. Respondent also submitted an order to show cause seeking a restraining order and stay of the proceedings. By decision and order dated October 10, 2018 (the “October Order”), this court returned respondent’s order to show cause without signature. The court therein reiterated the holding of the August Order, noting that respondent’s motion to renew and reargue the August Order was also pending. As such, the court declined to entertain the order to show cause, as it was again requesting the same relief.Currently pending is respondent’s motion to reargue the October Order, in which she seeks an order “staying the undertaking” and restraining her eviction (see Notice of Motion). Petitioner opposes.Applicable Law and DiscussionCPLR 2221 (d) (2) requires that a motion to reargue be “based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion.” Its purpose is to convince the court that it was wrong, “not to serve as a vehicle to permit the unsuccessful party to argue once again the very questions previously decided” (Foley v. Roche, 68 AD2d 558 [1st Dep't 1979]; see also Richardson v. Lindenbaum & Young, 14 Misc3d 1223 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings County]).As best the court can discern, respondent asserts that the court erred in finding that the relief was duplicative and in rejecting her order to show cause because the relief requested within the order to show cause is different from that requested within her motion to renew and reargue the August Order (see Aff. in Support
