FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Plaintiff James M. Maloney, a pro se attorney and amateur martial artist, brings this action against Defendant Madeline Singas, in her capacity as the Nassau County District Attorney, seeking a declaration that New York State’s 1974 ban on the possession of chuka sticks,1 also known as nunchaku, is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Based on its review and consideration of the evidence introduced at trial and the parties’ post-trial submissions, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. PROCEDURAL HISTORYI. Initial ProceedingsPlaintiff filed his initial complaint in this action on February 18, 2003 (Dkt. 1) and First Amended Complaint on September 3, 2005 (Dkt. 42). The Honorable Arthur D. Spatt dismissed the First Amended Complaint in 2007, Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 2d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), and the dismissal was affirmed by the Second Circuit in 2009, Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009). However, in light of its decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the Second Amendment as against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment), the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration. Maloney v. Rice, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). The Second Circuit subsequently vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case to the district court. Maloney v. Cuomo, 390 F. App’x 29 (2d Cir. 2010).II. Second Amended ComplaintPlaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in this action, on October 22, 2010. (Dkt. 116.) On April 23, 2013, this action was transferred from Judge Spatt to this Court. (04/23/13 docket entry.) Following the completion of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. (Dkts. 139, 140.) On May 22, 2015, the Court dismissed two of Plaintiff’s three constitutional claims, leaving only the instant Second Amendment challenge to proceed to trial. Maloney v. Singas, 106 F. Supp. 3d 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).III. Bench Trial in 2017 and 2018The Court held a bench trial from January 9 to 12, 2017. (Dkts. 180, 181, 182.) At trial, Plaintiff presented the following evidence: (1) Plaintiff’s own testimony about his history of nunchaku use; (2) testimony of retired Sergeant Kevin Orcutt of the Denver Police Department about his patented nunchaku, the Orcutt Police Nunchaku (“OPN”), which is used exclusively by law enforcement agencies; (3) purported expert testimony of a martial arts school (“dojo”) operator, Christopher Pellitteri; (4) testimony of Susan Saraceni, Chief Financial Officer of Asian World of Martial Arts (“AWMA”), a martial arts weapons distributor, discussing AWMA’s sales data; and (5) exhibits documenting various forms of martial arts practice that incorporate the use of nunchaku and AWMA’s sales data for nunchaku. At trial, Defendant presented: (1) the testimony of Catherine Rice, an employee of the Nassau County Internet Technology Department, who testified about Nassau County’s nunchaku crime statistics, and (2) exhibits documenting the legislative history of New York Penal Law §265.01(1) and Federal Bureau of Justice statistics on weapons used in crimes.Following the trial, the parties submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. (Dkts. 184 (Plaintiff), 185 (Defendant).) However, after reviewing the trial record and the parties’ post-trial submissions, the Court determined that both parties had neglected to consider the Second Circuit’s leading case on Second Amendment challenges, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Cuomo (“NYSRPA”) 804 F. 3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), which was decided after the Court’s summary judgment ruling, but before trial. (Dkt. 188.) In NYSRPA, the Second Circuit, inter alia, clarified that the government bears the burden of proving that the activity that is the subject of the challenged legislation falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment. 804 F.3d at 257 n.73 (explaining that the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller (“Heller” or “Heller I”), 554 U.S. 570 (2008) “identifies a presumption in favor of Second Amendment protection, which the State bears the initial burden of rebutting”).On July 23, 2017, the Court issued an order notifying the parties that because of their oversight regarding NYSRPA, they had litigated the case at the bench trial using the wrong burden of persuasion. (Dkt. 188.) The Court also admonished the parties for not addressing the level of constitutional scrutiny to be applied to Plaintiff’s claim in their post-trial briefing. (Id. at 4, 6-7.) The Court re-opened the trial to allow the parties to conduct additional discovery and to supplement the evidentiary record at trial to address these errors. (Dkts. 188, 191, 192, 193.) In the end, the parties chose to stipulate to the admission of additional documentary evidence offered by each side and to supplement the trial record solely with paper exhibits and argument, and no additional live testimony. (Dkts. 195, 196, 199, 202, 203, 204, 206.) Plaintiff’s lone additional exhibit was a video of a Subaru commercial in which a child is shown with nunchaku in his backpack. (Dkt. 203.)2 Defendant’s additional evidence included: (1) legislative history materials of New York Penal Law §265.01; (2) sales data for nunchaku from five additional manufacturers; and (3) a response to Plaintiff’s Subaru commercial. (Dkts. 199, 199-1, 199-9, 199-10.)On October 1, 2018, after receiving the parties’ supplemental trial submissions, the Court sua sponte amended its July 23, 2017 order to further clarify the applicable burden of persuasion. Maloney v. Singas, No. 03-CV-786 (PKC)(AYS), 2018 WL 4771900, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2018). The Court explained that, with respect to the threshold issue of whether the possession of nunchaku falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment, Defendant cannot meet her burden simply by demonstrating that nunchakus are not “in common use,” but that Defendant must show, at a minimum, that nunchakus are “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Id. at *1-3.3 The Court permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing in response to the Court’s amended order; that briefing was completed on November 12, 2018. (Dkt. 212 (Plaintiff), 213 (Defendant).) On December 5, 2018, the Court held oral argument (“Oral Argument”). (12/05/18 minute entry.)FINDINGS OF FACTI. The PartiesJames M. Maloney, appearing pro se, is a solo legal practitioner, an adjunct professor at the State University of Maritime College, and an amateur martial artist. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.”), at 11:13-16, 35:14-36:14.)4 He has developed his own martial arts style called “Shafan Ha Lavan,”5 of which Plaintiff is the only practitioner. (Tr. 36:10-37:11.) Integral to Shafan Ha Lavan is the nunchaku, which is wielded for self-defense, particularly in the home. (Tr. 20:4-22:3, 36:10-37:11, 72:8-73:7.) Maloney wishes to teach Shafan Ha Lavan to his twin sons, but is unable to do so due to New York’s nunchaku ban. (Tr. 37:14-38:18.)Madeline Singas, who is being sued in her official capacity, is the current Nassau County District Attorney. See Nassau County District Attorney, Meet the District Attorney, http://www.nassauda.org/9/Meet-the-District-Attorney (last visited December 14, 2018).II. The Nunchaku Ban: New York Penal Law §265.01(1)Since 1974, New York has had a complete ban on the possession of nunchaku by private citizens. (Dkt. 184, at 2; see generally Dkt. 199-1.) New York Penal Law §265.01(1) (“Section 265.01(1)”) criminalizes possession of nunchaku, along with a host of other banned weapons, as a Class A misdemeanor. “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when: (1) [h]e or she possesses any firearm, electronic dart gun, electronic stun gun, gravity knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle knife, cane sword, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, plastic knuckles, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sand bag, sandclub, wrist-brace type slingshot or slungshot, shirken or ‘Kung Fu star.’” N.Y. Penal Law §265.01(1) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. Penal Law §265.00(14) (defining “chuka stick” as “any device designed primarily as a weapon, consisting of two or more lengths of a rigid material joined together by a thong, rope or chain in such a manner as to allow free movement of a portion of the device while held in the hand and capable of being rotated in such a manner as to inflict serious injury upon a person by striking or choking”). The ban on nunchaku arose out of a concern that, as a result of the rising popularity “of ‘Kung Fu’ movies and shows,” “various circles of the state’s youth” — including “muggers and street gangs” — were “widely” using nunchaku to cause “many serious injuries.” (Dkt. 199-1, at ECF6 4-5 (letter from New York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz, dated April 8, 1974); id. at ECF 17 (letter from New York State District Attorneys Association, dated April 1, 1974).)7 New York Penal Law §265.10 criminalizes the manufacture, transport, and disposal of nunchaku as a Class A misdemeanor. Section §§265.10(1), (2), & (4).III. Nunchaku UsageA. The Purpose of NunchakuIt is undisputed that the nunchaku is a “martial arts instrument” used recreationally in martial arts training, practice, and performance.8 (Tr. 43:22-44:1 (Testimony of James Maloney), 255:12-258:25 (Testimony of Christopher Pellitteri).) It is primarily used for self-defense and as a weapon. (Tr. 212:25-213:6 (Testimony of Christopher Pellitteri).) There are no licensing or permit requirements for nunchaku possession in the United States. (Tr. 88:25-89:3 (Testimony of James Maloney).) There are two basic styles of nunchaku use: the traditional, “practical” style, which is “striking and blocking,” and freestyle, which is “more flashy, spinning, less effective, [and] more coordination based.” (Tr. 239:1-8 (Testimony of Christopher Pellitteri).) Additionally, the OPN is used by a number of law enforcement agencies across the country. (Tr. 119:12-16, 127:25-128:4, 130:9-12, 201:1-7, 209:5-7 (Testimony of Kevin Orcutt).)B. Data Regarding the Prevalence of NunchakuAt trial, the parties collectively submitted nunchaku sales data from six American nunchaku distributors: (1) American Nunchaku Company; (2) KarateDepot.com, a.k.a. Zengu; (3) Macho Products; (4) Swords Knives and Daggers; (5) Martial Arts Mart, a.k.a. Tigerclaw.com; and (6) AWMA. (Dkt. 199-9; Pl.’s Exhs. I & J.9) Based on the data provided, at least 64,890 metal and wood nunchakus were sold to individuals10 in the United States between 1995 and 2018.11 No evidence has been presented to explain what percentage of the United States nunchaku market share this data represents. (See Tr. 354:25-358:18 (Testimony of Susan Saraceni).) No reliable data was submitted about how many martial arts schools or dojos use nunchaku. (See Tr. 238:9-10, 278:25-279:4 (Pellitteri testifying “[t]here’s no specific data or statistics that I know of regarding the use of nunchaku as far as the number of people [using them],” but “nunchaku seem to be the most popular martial arts weapon”).)12In addition to data about nunchaku sales, Defendant also presented statistics regarding nunchaku-related crime in Nassau County. Between December 14, 2014 and January 11, 2017, there were five prosecutions in Nassau County involving nunchaku: two cases of assault and three cases of possession. (Tr. 373:1-12, 375:11-376:7 (Testimony of Catherine Rice).)13CONCLUSIONS OF LAWPlaintiff alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that New York Penal Law §265.01(1) “infringe[s] upon [his] rights as conferred by the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States” to the extent it “criminalize[s] the simple possession of nunchaku within one’s home for martial-arts practice and/or home defense,” and should be “declare[d]…unconstitutional and of no force and effect.” (Dkt. 116, at51 (First Cause of Action) & Wherefore Clause, at2.)I. Plaintiff’s Claim for Declaratory Relief and the Court’s Limited AuthorityAs an initial matter, the Court clarifies the scope of Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief in terms of the remedy he is seeking and can obtain in this action. Despite the above-quoted language from the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has, at times, suggested that he does not seek to have New York’s nunchaku ban struck down in its entirety, but rather, seeks to have Section 265.01(1) declared unconstitutional only as applied to home possession and use of nunchaku. (See, e.g., Dkt. 212, at 4 (stating “the challenge is solely to the ban as applied to simple in-home possession”); Tr. 66:21-67:22 (Plaintiff explaining that he is seeking a declaration that, under the Second Amendment, he should be allowed to use nunchaku in his home for “[his] personal use, for home defense purposes,…[a]nd for any other lawful use that they may have”).) However, while Plaintiff is clear about the relief he wants, i.e., to be able to legally use nunchaku in his home, he fails to appreciate that the Court lacks the authority to rewrite Section 265.01(1).While courts, under some circumstances, might be able to reform a statute to make it constitutional by “sever[ing] its problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact,” that is not possible here given how Section 265.01(1) is constructed. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). To achieve the remedy Plaintiff argues that he is seeking would require the court to write in an exception to the complete ban on nunchaku in Section 265.01(1). This the Court cannot do here. Id. at 229-330 (holding that courts must “restrain [themselves] from rewrit[ing] state law to conform it to constitutional requirements even as [courts] strive to salvage it” because, to do more, would go beyond “devis[ing] a judicial remedy” and, instead, “entail quintessentially legislative work” that is a “far more serious invasion of the legislative domain than [a court] ought to undertake”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as discussed infra, Section 265.01(1) as applied to nunchaku constitutes a “‘complete prohibition[]‘ of [a] Second Amendment right,” which, “under Heller[,]…[is] always invalid.” Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). The “total ban on exercises of [a Second Amendment] constitutional right…[is] enough to sink [a] law under Heller.” Id. at 667; see also Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Both Heller and McDonald suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment right…are categorically unconstitutional.”)Plaintiff’s reliance on “the seven principles of constitutional construction and adjudication” set forth in Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) does not dictate a different result. (Dkt. 202, at 8-10.) In fact, the Court’s decision is consistent with the principles set forth in Ashwander and, more recently, in Ayotte. Plaintiff argues that the Court should issue “no broader relief than a declaration that the statute as applied to simple in-home possession is unconstitutional” and urges the Court to abide by two of the Ashwander principles:(3) The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.…(7) When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn into question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.(Id. (quoting Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).) As discussed supra, the Court can only grant the relief Plaintiff seeks by striking down, as violative of the Second Amendment, the portion of Section 265.01(1) that applies to nunchaku. That is the rule of constitutional law “required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied” and cannot “be avoided.” Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48. Additionally, as discussed, the Court “may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is readily susceptible to such a construction,” but may “not rewrite a…law to conform it to constitutional requirements.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To read Section 265.01(1) as Plaintiff wishes “requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation.” Id. “[T]he touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (“After finding an application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).Thus, the Court declines to adopt Plaintiff’s suggestion of constitutional overreach,14 and construes Plaintiff’s claim to seek a declaration that Section 265.01(1), as applied to nunchaku, violates the Second Amendment.15 See Michelsen v. Brush, 224 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (“Every judgment must grant the relief to which the party is entitled, even if that party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. The character and the nature of the action is thus determined not by the prayer for relief but by the facts alleged and proved. Stated another way, the legal theories upon which the action may be bottomed do not determine the validity of a claim.”) (citations omitted).II. Legal Standards for Second Amendment ChallengesThere is a rebuttable presumption that “‘the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,’ not just to a small subset.” NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255-56 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582) (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit has “adopt[ed] a two-step analytical framework” to determine whether a challenged statute violates the Second Amendment. Id. at 253. “First, [the Court] consider[s] whether the restriction burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If the challenged restriction does not implicate conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, [the Court's] analysis ends and the legislation stands. Otherwise, [the Court] move[s] to the second step of [the] inquiry, in which [the Court] must determine and apply the appropriate level of [constitutional] scrutiny.” Id. at 254.The determination of whether the challenged restriction implicates the Second Amendment, in turn, involves a two-part standard. “The Second Amendment protects only the ‘sorts of weapons’ that are (1) ‘in common use’ and (2) ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” Id. at 254-55 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 627); see also id. at 253 (“Heller…endorsed the ‘historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.’”) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627). Furthermore, it is the government that bears the burden of rebutting the “prima facie presumption of Second Amendment protection” that extends to all bearable arms. Id. at 257 n.73. While the logical implication of the two criteria identified in Heller — “common use” and “typical possession by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” — is that the government need only disprove the existence of one or the other criterion to exempt the challenged law from Second Amendment coverage, the Court has concluded that the “common use” factor is ultimately irrelevant and that the government must show that, at a minimum, nunchakus are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Maloney, 2018 WL 4771900, at *1, 3; see Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1031 (stating that the test for whether a weapon falls within the scope of the Second Amendment is “a conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”) (Alito, J., concurring).16 The Court applies a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.17III. Nunchaku Fall Within the Ambit of the Second AmendmentHere, “the parties do not dispute that nunchakus constitute a ‘bearable arm’” (Dkt. 188, at 4),18 and so the rebuttable presumption that nunchakus are protected by the Second Amendment applies.19A. Typical Use of NunchakuThe next step, under NYSRPA, is that the Court must determine whether the nunchaku ban impinges upon conduct protected by the Second Amendment, i.e., whether Defendant has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that nunchakus are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Admittedly, there is no defined analytical standard for what constitutes “typical possession by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 257 (describing “reliable empirical evidence of lawful possession for lawful purposes” as “elusive, beyond ownership statistics”) (footnotes omitted); see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (stating that the “typical possession” requirement is met where “[t]he overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use [the] rifles [at issue] do so for lawful purposes”) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). However, in NYSRPA, the Second Circuit indicated that to determine a weapon’s “typical possession,” the Court is “require[d]…to look into both broad patterns of use and the subjective motives of [the weapon's] owners.” 804 F.3d at 256.Considering the scant evidence presented, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden to exclude nunchaku from the ambit of Second Amendment protection. Simply put, Defendant does not contradict the contention that the nunchaku’s primary use, which Defendant concedes is as “a tool from the sphere of martial arts” (Dkt. 199, at 10), is a lawful one. To the extent any evidence was offered at trial regarding the “subjective motives of [nunchaku] owners,” the Court has considered the testimony of Plaintiff himself, Pelletteri, and Orcutt as further support for the conclusion that the typical possession of nunchaku in this country is for recreational and other lawful purposes.Furthermore, although the criminality associated with a weapon is not the only relevant inquiry, NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256, here, there is virtually no evidence that nunchakus are associated with, or have been used to engage in, criminal conduct since Section 265.01(1) was amended to include nunchaku over forty years ago.20 The only evidence presented by Defendant as to the unlawful use of nunchaku are five nunchaku prosecutions, two cases of assault and three cases of possession, between December 14, 2014 and January 11, 2017 in Nassau County. (Dkt. 199-3.) Moreover, Defendant presents no national data on the unlawful use of nunchaku.21 Given Defendant’s concession that the nunchaku is primarily a tool of martial arts, pointing to these isolated incidents falls far short of Defendant’s burden of establishing that the nunchaku’s typical use is an unlawful one. (Dkt. 213, at 2 (Defendant stating that, “[t]here is no question that nunchaku are martial arts weapons”).)22 Moreover, unlike a sawed-off shotgun, gun without a serial number, or pipe bomb — weapons that courts have found to be outside the ambit of Second Amendment protection — nunchaku have no special propensity for unlawful use. Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015). In fact, its intended use as a weapon for recreational martial arts practice and training appears to greatly outstrip its use in crime.The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the Court’s “typical use” analysis should be limited to whether the nunchaku is typically used for home self-defense — and should not consider the nunchaku’s use in martial arts — because Plaintiff’s request for relief is limited to this use. (Dkt. 199, at 7-8; Dkt. 213, at 2.) Defendant cites no caselaw to support such a limited understanding of “typical use.” See Friedman, 136 S. Ct. at 449 (discussing “self-defense and target shooting” in determining a weapon’s “typical use”) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256 (considering “lawful pursuits like self-defense and hunting”); Fyock, 779 F.3d at 998 (examining “marketing materials and sales statistics” to determine the “lawful purposes” for which large-capacity magazines are possessed); (Dkt. 202, at 16-17.) Defendant’s reliance on Heller for this argument (Dkt. 206, at 2-3) is also unavailing, since nowhere in Heller does the Supreme Court state that Second Amendment protection only extends to “bearable arms” that are typically used for home defense, Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260 (“[T]he Court [in Heller I] also said the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for other ‘lawful purposes,’ such as hunting, but self-defense is the ‘core lawful purpose’ protected.”) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 630).The Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that the nunchaku ban should be upheld because “the dangerous potential of nunchucks is almost universally recognized.” (Dkt. 185, at 25-26; see also id. at 21-22 (collecting cases); Dkt. 199, at 8-10.) “If Heller tells us anything, it is that [weapons] cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous,” since the “relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes.” Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1031 (Alito, J., concurring); see also NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256.23Therefore, because Defendant has failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance, that nunchakus are not typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, she has failed to rebut the presumption that the possession and use of nunchaku is within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.B. Nunchaku Being “In Common Use”Although the Court has concluded that, under the standard established in Heller, a bearable arm is entitled to Second Amendment protection where the government fails to show that the weapon’s typical use is not a lawful one, out of an abundance of caution, the Court also finds that Defendant has failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence,24 that nunchakus are not in common use. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, at least 64,890 metal and wood nunchaku were sold on the retail market in the United States between 1995 and 2018. Courts have not set a numerical floor for determining what constitutes “common use.” See, e.g., Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 449 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Every post-Heller case to grapple with whether a weapon is ‘popular’ enough to be considered ‘in common use’ has relied on statistical data of some form, creating a consensus that common use is an objective and largely statistical inquiry.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hat line separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership is something the [Supreme] Court did not say.”).25 In his concurrence in Caetano, Justice Alito found that stun guns were in “common use” because “hundreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens, who it appears may lawfully possess them in 45 States.” 136 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, at least 64,890 nunchakus have been sold over the past 23 years to private citizens, who may lawfully possess them in 48 states. (Dkt. 184, at19.) The Court finds that based on this magnitude of sales — especially given the outright bans on nunchaku (in New York and Massachusetts), the other restrictions placed on nunchaku ownership and use in the states where they may be lawfully possessed,26 and the apparent incompleteness of Defendant’s nunchaku sales data27 — and the relevant, albeit limited, case comparators,28 Defendant has failed to establish that nunchaku are not in common use.Thus, even assuming that Defendant need only prove that nunchakus are not in common use to exempt them from Second Amendment coverage, she has failed to do so.***Accordingly, the Court concludes that the possession and use of nunchaku is protected by the Second Amendment.IV. Constitutional ScrutinyHaving concluded that Section 265.01(1), as applied to nunchaku, impinges upon Plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights, the Court must next determine and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny. 804 F.3d at 257. Although “Heller did not specify the precise level of scrutiny applicable to [weapons] regulations,” id. at 258, it is clear that, at a minimum, intermediate scrutiny applies, id. at 259-61; see also Maloney, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (collecting cases). Because the blanket ban imposed by Section 265.01(1) as applied to nunchaku easily fails constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the Court need not decide whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should apply.The test for determining the proper level of constitutional scrutiny with respect to a Second Amendment challenge has two factors: “(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 258 (citation omitted). Given that Section 265.01(1) completely bans the possession and use of nunchaku in New York State, the determinative issue is whether possession and use of nunchaku is an activity that is at the core of the Second Amendment. The centuries-old history of nunchaku being used as defensive weapons, Maloney, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 314 n.22, strongly suggests their possession, like the possession of firearms, is at the core of the Second Amendment. Nonetheless, even as recreational items, nunchaku may still be at the core of the Second Amendment’s protections. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (stating that founding-era Americans thought that the right to own firearms was “even more important for self-defense and hunting” than for militia service). The Court, therefore, finds that at least intermediate scrutiny applies to Section 265.01(1)’s ban on nunchaku.29“Though ‘intermediate scrutiny’ may have different connotations in different contexts, here the key question is whether the statute[] at issue [is] ‘substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.’” NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 261 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012)). “The legitimate and compelling state interest in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court “need only inquire…whether the challenged laws are ‘substantially related’ to the achievement of that governmental interest.” NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 261. Given the dearth of nunchaku-related crime, discussed supra, and the all-encompassing nature of the New York nunchaku ban, it cannot be said that the “fit between the challenged regulation” and the state interest is “substantial.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97; NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 264 (“[O]n intermediate scrutiny review, the state cannot get away with shoddy data or reasoning.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive intermediate scrutiny, the defendant[] must show ‘reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence’ that the statute[] [is] substantially related to the governmental interest.” NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 264 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)) (emphasis in original). With respect to the nunchaku ban, Defendant has plainly failed to do so. As previously discussed, Defendant has offered virtually no evidence supporting a public safety rationale for a total ban (as opposed to lesser restrictions)30 on the possession and use of nunchaku in New York State. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 709 (“[T]he [defendant] produced no empirical evidence whatsoever and rested its entire defense of the…ban on speculation.”).Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 265.01(1), as applied to nunchaku, does not survive intermediate scrutiny and must be invalidated as unconstitutional. However, this ruling merely reflects Defendant’s failure to present sufficient evidence and argument to support Section 265.01(1)’s constitutionality as applied to nunchaku and “do[es] not foreclose the possibility that [the government] could in the future present evidence to support such a prohibition[],” or some lesser restriction, on the possession and/or use of nunchaku in New York. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 257 n.73.V. Additional ReliefIn light of the Court’s finding that Section 265.01(1) as applied to nunchaku is unconstitutional, the Court also invalidates the portions of N.Y. Penal Law §265.10 (“Section 265.10″) that apply to nunchaku. The relevant portions of Section 265.10 are, as follows:1. Any person who manufactures or causes to be manufactured any machine-gun, assault weapon, large capacity ammunition feeding device or disguised gun is guilty of a class D felony. Any person who manufactures or causes to be manufactured any switchblade knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, plastic knuckles, metal knuckles, Kung Fu star, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.2. Any person who transports or ships any machine-gun, firearm silencer, assault weapon or large capacity ammunition feeding device or disguised gun, or who transports or ships as merchandise five or more firearms, is guilty of a class D felony. Any person who transports or ships as merchandise any firearm, other than an assault weapon, switchblade knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, plastic knuckles, metal knuckles, Kung Fu star, chuka stick, sandbag or slungshot is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.…4. Any person who disposes of any of the weapons, instruments or appliances specified in subdivision one of section 265.01, except a firearm, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and he is guilty of a class D felony if he has previously been convicted of any crime. N.Y. Penal Law §§265.10(1), (2), &(4) (emphasis added). It is clear that these provisions exist to create a comprehensive ban on the prohibited weapons listed in Section 265.01 by criminalizing all means to possess them. (See Dkt. 199-1, at ECF 9 (letter from the Commissioner of the State of New York’s Division of Criminal Justice, dated April 4, 1974, stating that the purpose of the nunchaku ban was “to outlaw the possession, manufacture or shipment of ‘chuka sticks’”); id. at ECF 11 (letter from New York State Assemblyman Richard C. Ross, dated April 2, 1974, stating that “[t]he proposed legislation to control the possession and use, as well as the manufacture and transport of chuka sticks would insure uniformity of prosecution which currently varies from county to county within the state of New York”)); see also New York Bill Jacket, 2008 S.B. 7528, Ch. 257, at §§3-6 (simultaneously banning the possession, manufacture, shipment, and disposal of plastic knuckles); Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Penal Law §265.10 (stating that Section 265.10 “generally makes it unlawful to manufacture…, transport.. ., or ‘dispose of’…the listed weapons, the possession of which is unlawful“) (alterations omitted; emphasis added). In light of the fact that, by this Order, possession of nunchaku is no longer unlawful, the Court finds that the subsections of Section 265.10 barring manufacture, transport, and disposal of nunchaku are no longer valid or enforceable. Walden v. Bodley, 39 U.S. 156, 164 (1840) (“Under the general prayer for relief, the Court will often extend relief beyond the specific prayer.”); see also Watts v. Waddle, 31 U.S. 389 (1832) (“[A]ny relief may be given for which the basis is laid in the [complaint].”); Michelsen, 224 F. Supp. at 953.To leave these subsections intact, would render the Court’s Order meaningless and without effect, because the combination of these prohibitions would prevent anyone from lawfully possessing nunchaku in New York State unless they already (illegally) possess them now. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 710-11 (holding that, in order for the Seventh Circuit’s preliminary injunction “[t]o be effective,” the court “must also prevent [the government] from enforcing other provisions of the [gun range] [o]rdinance that operate indirectly to prohibit range training,” not just the ordinance that “plaintiffs asked the [court] to enjoin the enforcement of”). While Section 265.10, on its face, does not preclude Plaintiff from purchasing nunchaku in a brick-and-mortar store in New York State, if Section 265.10 remains on the books, no store could legally have them because they would have to, at a minimum, aid and abet the transportation, shipment, or manufacturing31 of nunchaku. N.Y. Penal §20.00. In sum, the effect of leaving Section 265.10 intact would be “another complete ban on [nunchaku] ownership” within the state. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 712 (Rovner, J., concurring).Therefore, the Court declares that the portions of Section 265.10(1), (2), & (4) that apply to nunchaku are void as violative of the Second Amendment.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated herein, the Court grants judgment in favor of Plaintiff, declaring that New York Penal Laws §265.01(1) and §265.10(1), (2), & (4), as applied to nunchaku, are an unconstitutional restriction on the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment and are, therefore, void. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to enter judgment and close this case accordingly.SO ORDERED.Dated: December 14, 2018Brooklyn, New YorkAPPENDIX1. Courthouse Records: Worcester Central District Court, Telegram.com (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.telegram.com/news/20180926/courthouse-records.2. Mark D. Wilson, Man Used Nunchucks in Street Attack in Downtown Austin, Police Say, Statesman (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.statesman.com/news/20180906/man-usednunchucks-in-street-attack-in-downtown-austin-police-say.3. Maura Grunlund, Man Recounts Scary Battle with Nunchucks-Slinging Ninja Burglar, SILive.com (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.silive.com/expo/news/erry-2018/09/d44987c24d9566/from-straw-hats-to-dresses-dis.html.4. Jeff Bonty, Man Charged with Attempted Kidnapping of Child, Daily Journal (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.daily-journal.com/news/crime/man-charged-with-attempted-kidnapping-ofchild/ article_f287aef0-ad53-11e8-a088-436c975df517.html.5. Three Charged with Aggravated Assault, MRT (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.mrt.com/news/crime/article/Three-charged-with-aggravated-assault-13139270.php.6. 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Craig Shoup, 5th Grader Reportedly Threatened to Kill Teacher, Students, Fremont News Messenger (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.thenewsmessenger. com/story/news/crime/2018/03/19/bellevue-5th-grader-kill-list-threatenedteacher/ 437405002/.15. Lisa Kaczke, Two Duluth Residents Charged with Kidnapping, Attempted Murder, Duluth News Tribune (Mar. 12, 2018), http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/a/crime-andcourts/ 4416425-two-duluth-residents-charged-kidnapping-attempted-murder.16. Amanda Cochran, Knife v. Nunchucks: Baytown Man Stabbed in Fight Over Woman, Police Say, Click2Houston (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.click2houston.com/news/knife-vsnunchucks-baytown-man-stabbed-in-fight-over-woman-police-say.17. Douglas Fritz, Concord Student Armed with Nunchakus Accused of Threatening Neighbor, WVNS-TV (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.wvnstv.com/local-news/mercer-county/concordstudent-armed-with-nunchakus-accused-of-threatening-neighbor/963488635.18. 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