By: Shulman, P.J., Ling-Cohan, Edmead, JJ.18-315/316. 844 WESTEND LLC, pet-lan-app, v. MAGDI BOULOS, res-ten-res — Final judgment (Jean T. Schneider, J.) entered on or about November 8, 2017, affirmed, with $25 costs. Appeal from order (Jack Stoller, J.), dated June 5, 2015, dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment.We agree with Civil Court that the governing 2005 lease rider was ambiguous, i.e., “reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation” (Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 66 NY2d 570, 573 [1986]), as to whether tenant had the option of successive lease renewals at guideline increases for the period he remained in the West End Avenue apartment as the sole leaseholder. Thus, the trial court properly looked to evidence of the “events leading up to the execution of the lease” to resolve the ambiguity (see Coliseum Towers Assoc. v. County of Nassau, 2 AD3d 562, 564 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 707 [2004]), as well as the “course of conduct” of tenant and landlord-appellant’s predecessor under the lease (Citibank, N.A. v. 666 Fifth Ave. Ltd. Partnership, 2 AD3d 331, 332 [2003]) as to whether the lease was renewable at tenant’s option.The trial evidence, fairly interpreted, supports the court’s interpretation of the rider in tenant’s favor. The only practical and reasonable construction of the rider requires a finding that the parties intended that the lease be renewable for successive one or two year terms at tenant’s option as long as he remained the sole leaseholder (see Farone v. Mintzer, 133 AD2d 1009, 1010 [1987]). Indeed, this apartment was offered to tenant after the prior landlord of tenant’s rent stabilized West 98th Street apartment commenced an owner use proceeding against him, in accordance with said prior landlord’s obligation under Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) §2524.4(a)(2) to offer tenant, a disabled individual, “equivalent or superior housing” at the “same or lower regulated rent.” The unrebutted testimony of tenant, the attorney who represented him during the relevant period, and the broker who procured the lease, clearly established that the contracting parties intended to enter a lease providing tenant with continuing renewals at guideline increases. Indeed, no reasonable individual in tenant’s position would exchange his stabilized apartment for one which did not guarantee him lease renewals. Furthermore, the right of renewal leases was exercised twice over several years by tenant prior to landlord-appellant’s ownership. We therefore agree with the finding of the trial court, that the language of the rider and the conduct of the parties requires that tenant has the option to renew the lease, warranting the dismissal of the holdover petition.Inasmuch as landlord’s claims have been disposed of at trial, its appeal from the prior order denying its motion for summary judgment is moot (see General Elec. Co. v. Rabin, 177 AD2d 354, 356 [1991]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.January 30, 2019
18-247. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, app, v. ROBERT BROOKS, def-res — Order (Tamiko A. Amaker, J.), dated August 4, 2017, reversed, on the law, the accusatory instrument reinstated, and the matter remanded to Criminal Court for further proceedings.On July 5, 2017, defendant sent a text message to his ex-girlfriend that read “I am going to hurt you, I want you to die, I have a mixture of bleach and hair dye that I am going to use on you.” Later that day, after the victim saw defendant outside of a Manhattan subway station, defendant was arrested and police recovered from him a bottle containing bleach and water. At arraignment, Criminal Court, in New York County, issued a temporary order of protection directing, inter alia, that defendant “stay away” from the victim. Defendant signed the order of protection, which was personally served on him in court.Approximately one week later, on July 14, 2017, defendant approached and spoke to the victim inside a Kings County subway station, in violation of the order of protection. As a result, defendant was arrested in New York County and charged herein with second-degree criminal contempt. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the New York County Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged criminal conduct occurred in Kings County. Criminal Court granted the motion and dismissed the accusatory instrument. The People appeal and we now reverse.CPL 20.40(2)(c) confers jurisdiction in a county where the offending conduct “had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon such county.” In this case, when defendant violated the order of protection in Kings County, his conduct had a “particular effect” on the New York County Court that issued the edict because Courts rely upon the full force and effect of their orders of protection to protect not only the named complainant but the well being of the community as a whole. Therefore, defendant’s conduct in King’s County had a “particular effect” in New York County by producing “a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare” (CPL 20.10[4]; see Matter of Taub v. Altman, 3 NY3d 30, 36-37 [2004]; People v. Fludd, 44 AD3d 408, 409 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 765 [2008]; People v. Latour, 11 AD3d 819 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 800 [2005]; People v. Sandy, 236 AD2d 104, 114-115 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 977 [1998]; People v. Ortega, 152 Misc 2d 84 [Crim Ct, NY County 1991]). Manifestly, “it would not be in keeping with the purpose of a temporary order of protection, to protect the victims of family offenses pending trial, if the court did not have jurisdiction over violations of the order of protection that allegedly occurred in other counties” (People v. Nakouzi, 31 Misc 3d 1213[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50665[U], *3, [Crim Ct, Kings County 2011]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.January 30, 2019
