DECISION and ORDERBarry Lawrence (petitioner), a co-fiduciary of the estate of Winston Lawrence (decedent), petitions pursuant to SCPA 2110 to set the legal fees of Jeffrey St. Clair, Esq. (respondent), counsel for his co-fiduciary, Jean Lawrence (Lawrence), in the sum of $1,500 and to compel him to disgorge the amount of $35,500 from the $37,000 that respondent has been paid. As the history and underlying facts of the petition significantly undermine the petitioner’s allegations, and since the administration of the decedent’s estate has been concluded, the instant petition is dismissed.BackgroundThe decedent died on July 18, 2007 survived by his spouse, Lawrence, and two children, petitioner and Heather Lawrence (Heather). His last will and testament dated January 23, 2001 (the will) was admitted to probate and letters testamentary issued to Lawrence on October 24, 2007.The decedent’s estate consisted primarily of a six unit building located at 450 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York (the building), in which the decedent and Lawrence resided in for over twenty-five years. Lawrence and the decedent resided in one unit, and the other five units were rented. After the decedent’s death, Lawrence continued to reside in the building and struggled with its management. Moreover, Lawrence’s relationship with some of the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will, namely her step-children, was not only strained, but also became litigious.Less than a year after the decedent’s death, Heather petitioned to compel Lawrence to account as the estate’s fiduciary. An order to account was issued on February 2, 2009. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a separate petition to revoke Lawrence’s letters testamentary and to appoint himself as the estate’s fiduciary, citing Lawrence’s delay in filing the account as a basis for removal. Lawrence thereafter filed a petition to judicially settle her account and consented to the petitioner serving as her co-fiduciary, hoping that he would assist her in “managing the building and accelerate closing of the estate.”Lawrence asserted that management of the building posed troublesome issues, including poorly negotiated leases and low rents. Several non-payment proceedings were commenced against tenants and in December 2013, Lawrence retained the respondent to represent her with these matters. On March 30, 2016, Lawrence petitioned the court for permission to sell the building because, “[s]ince my husband’s death my life has been focused and consumed with managing and resolving his estate; once again with little or no help from anyone including the [petitioner].” Lawrence alleged that[Petitioner] has hindered my ability to effectively do my duties as Executor of the Estate, and to take action in the Estate’s best interests. Requiring his approval to take action as Executor has created a stalemate to the detriment of the Estate, and my own well-being as the person doing all of the ‘heavy lifting’ as it relates to the Estate and the building. He has hampered my ability to find closure, both in a physical and emotional sense. I believe he is clouded by his own personal bias and interest, as opposed to that of the Estate.Petitioner retained David Kravitz, Esq. (Kravitz), a zealous and competent counsel, to represent him and he interposed objections to Lawrence’s petition, disputing her allegations and opposing the proposed sale price of the building. The proceedings were contentious, and counsel for the parties conferred with the court on three separate and lengthy occasions over several months, until the parties reached a resolution as to the manner of sale for the building on November 1, 2016.Thereafter, petitioner commenced another proceeding demanding that Lawrence pay over $100,000 in rent at the closing of sale for the building. Once again, petitioner was represented by Kravitz, while Lawrence appeared and was represented by the respondent. After vigorous negotiations with the court, the parties settled the dispute and executed a stipulation of settlement on August 29, 2017. The stipulation provides that “[Petitioner] waives all claims against [Lawrence] and the Estate herein including but not limited to rent allegedly due and owing by [Lawrence], except as stated below;” and with respect to the issue of rent, Lawrence agreed to pay an additional $15,000 to the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will from her 34 percent share of the proceeds.Sale of the BuildingOn September 25, 2017, the petitioner and Lawrence attended a closing of sale for the building (the closing). At the closing, the sum of $37,000.00 was paid to the respondent for legal services rendered. As the building comprised the sole asset of the estate, upon its sale, all the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will, including the petitioner and Lawrence executed receipts and releases evidencing receipt of their distributions. Moreover, the receipts and releases signed by the petitioner and Lawrence provide, inter alia, that each fiduciary fully and satisfactorily accounted for all assets of the estate; that all money of the estate had been paid out; and that each fiduciary was released from liability with respect to all matters relating to or derived from the administration of the estate. The remaining beneficiaries under the decedent’s will, to wit, Arthurlane Applewhite, Heather, and Monica Lawrence, each executed general releases relieving from all liability the “Estate of Winston Lawrence, Barry Lawrence and Jean Lawrence.”The Instant PetitionDespite the finalization of the estate’s administration, on March 5, 2018, almost six months later, the petitioner commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2110, with the assistance of new counsel, alleging that the petitioner was coerced into paying respondent the sum of $37,000.00 from the proceeds of the building’s sale, because the petitioner “felt compelled to close the deal under duress,” and because the respondent threatened litigation. Petitioner alleges that unless he had agreed to the respondent’s fee demand, the closing would not have taken place. Further, the petitioner alleges that “[t]his tactic holding the closing in abeyance for six (6) hours, required my attorney David Kravitz, and the Lawyer for the Buyer to negotiate an agreement whereby the matter would be able to close by agreeing to pay thirty-seven thousand ($37,000.00) to St. Clair.” Specifically, the petitioner requests that the respondent’s legal fees be fixed at $1,500.00 and that the respondent be ordered to return the sum of $35,500.00 to the estate. The petitioner alleges, despite two previous petitions litigated in this court where the respondent represented Lawrence, that the respondent charged $37,000.00 “for the closing alone.”The respondent’s answer disputes that he represented Lawrence only at the closing of the building’s sale, and rather alleges that legal fees paid were for representing Lawrence as the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate since his retention in 2013.1 Further, the respondent disputes that he coerced the petitioner, who was represented by counsel throughout the pendency of this matter culminating with the closing of sale of the building.In addition to the petition and the answer, the submissions before the court include the respondent’s affirmation of legal services, and copies of the executed receipts and releases of all the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will, and the mutual receipt and release executed by Lawrence and the petitioner. The petitioner has submitted an affirmation in opposition to the affirmation of legal services.DiscussionGenerally, EPTL 11-1(b)(22) authorizes a fiduciary to pay reasonable attorney’s fees as an administration expense of the estate. Nonetheless, SCPA 2110 provides in relevant part that at any time during the administration of an estate, the court is authorized to fix and determine the compensation of an attorney for services rendered to a fiduciary. The time period within which to file such a proceeding is “broad, but not unlimited, covering any time during the administration of an estate irrespective of which particular proceeding is pending.” In re Ullmann, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 9, 2011, at 24, col. 5 (Sur. Ct. New York County). However, when the administration of an estate is complete, the Surrogate’s Court may no longer fix and determine an attorney’s compensation. Completion is triggered when a decree in an accounting proceeding is issued. In re Ullmann, supra. Alternatively, an estate’s administration is complete when the persons interested in the estate have executed general releases. See, Matter of Stemmler’s Estate, 171 Misc. 318, 320 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939) (“Whereas no judicial decree was entered settling his accounts, this was replaced by a general release which, unless vacated or impeached, possessed an equivalent effect.”)2The petitioner admits in his submissions that, despite disagreeing with the amount charged by the respondent, he expressly agreed to the respondent’s fee with the benefit and assistance of counsel albeit for the purpose of avoiding further litigation and to complete the closing. The fact that the petitioner was displeased with the bargain he struck does not nullify his explicit agreement to the transaction. Robust negotiation conducted with the assistance of able counsel culminating in a settlement to avoid the uncertainty, time and expense of further litigation, is not evidence of coercion. This agreement to the payment of the respondent’s legal fees resulted in the petitioner’s execution of a mutual release with Lawrence.Accordingly, the facts of this case demonstrate that the administration of the estate has been concluded. Not only was the building, the only substantive asset of the estate, sold and the proceeds distributed, all the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will and both the fiduciaries have executed general releases. Since the parties have executed general releases and have received their distributions, the estate’s administration is concluded, and therefore a proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2110 to fix the compensation of counsel may no longer be commenced in the Surrogate’s Court.3Accordingly, on the facts presented, and all arguments having been considered, the petition is dismissed.This constitutes the decision and order of the court.Dated: January 17, 2019Brooklyn, New York
