MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER The plaintiff, Jennifer Crowhurst, brings this action against Dr. Denise Szczucki, Hampton Inns LLC, Hampton Inn Management LLC, Sheryl Dicker Stein as the administrator of the Estate of Norman Stein (“the Estate”), and The Fannie Rebecca Dicker Stein Special Needs Trust. The action arises from injuries the plaintiff sustained from an assault in a hotel room in Easton, Pennsylvania, on November 22, 2015. The plaintiff was assaulted by Fannie Rebecca Stein (“Fannie”), an autistic young adult for whom the plaintiff was serving as a caretaker and companion. The plaintiff asserts causes of action sounding in negligence, medical malpractice, violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., and violation of the Wage Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. Labor Law §195.The Estate moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. Dr. Szczucki moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice.I.The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). The trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation “is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue — finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if any evidence in the record from any source would enable a reasonable inference to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993).II.The following facts are undisputed for purposes of this motion, unless otherwise indicated.In November 2013, Norman and Sheryl Stein hired the plaintiff to be a caretaker and companion for their daughter, Fannie Rebecca Stein. (Crowhurst Dep. at 18, 84.) Fannie was, at the time, a 22-year-old woman with a long-standing history of chronic psychiatric conditions, including autism. (Szczucki Ex. 4 (“Szczucki Medical Records”) at 1-2.)The plaintiff and Fannie would often travel together without Fannie’s parents. (Crowhurst Dep. at 25-28.) Starting in 2014, the two would go on trips once or twice per month to destinations including Walt Disney World and the Crayola Experience in Easton, Pennsylvania. Id.In November 2015, Fannie and the plaintiff went on a trip to the Crayola Experience. (Id. at 136-37.) Fannie and the plaintiff arrived in Easton on November 18, 2015. (Id.) On the morning of November 22, 2015, Fannie attacked the plaintiff in their hotel room. (Stein Ex. O.) The police were called, and Fannie was charged with terroristic threats, simple assault, harassment, and criminal mischief. (Id.) The plaintiff was severely injured and alleges that she suffered traumatic brain injury, a pinched nerve, post-concussion syndrome, post — traumatic amnesia, depression, swelling of the brain, damage to her reproductive organs, anxiety, and mental anguish. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) 48.)The plaintiff testified that, during the preceding two years that she worked with Fannie, Fannie had never exhibited violent or aggressive behavior. (Crowhurst Dep. at 36-37.) The plaintiff stated that she never felt physically threatened by Fannie before the attack. (Id.)The plaintiff now claims that the attack was caused by withdrawal from drugs given to Fannie by Norman Stein — namely, marijuana and OxyContin — and by medication prescribed for Fannie by Fannie’s psychiatrist, Dr. Szczucki. (Id.
